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Without doubt, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is one of the most important 
statements of Anglo-American political philosophy in the twentieth century. Through a 
revival of the social contract device, Rawls formulates a set of principles of correct 
political association ("the right") that he argues must be considered as prior to any 
conception of the good. These principles apply to all persons as free and equal beings in 
2 
society, but more importantly they assume some things about the nature of persons in that 
society. 
On the institutional aspect of his theory, Rawls conceives of the state as a neutral 
arbiter of the good. This, coupled with a conception of persons as individuals that affirm 
the values of autonomy and equality, has drawn extensive critical fire from philosophers 
within and without liberalism. One such group of critics, the communitarians, claim that 
Rawls's idea of the person is too abstract or "groundless" to account for shared values, 
and thus fails to appreciate the extent to which we understand ourselves as embedded 
within our culture. Michael Sandel has thus argued that Rawls's person so conceived is 
too abstract to be of any theoretical let alone practical use, while Alasdair Macintyre has 
argued that such a conception of persons is incoherent: liberal "persons" do not know 
themselves, and so they cannot know what is right or what is good. This thesis analyzes 
the liberal-communitarian debate by comparing and contrasting some terms used by both 
sides in the debate. By analyzing the terms, I will present a liberal conception of the 
person as properly understood in Rawls's theory. 
' Rawls has not been idle since the publication of A Theory of Justice. He has 
defended his theory in a series of articles and lectures that have developed his position in 
response to these and other criticisms. Specifically, by positing his theory within liberal-
democratic culture, by acknowledging individual formative conceptions of the good, and 
by emphasizing and relying upon a modus vivendi view as the basis for political 
liberalism and a liberal culture, Rawls has answered the communitarian objections by 
incorporating and responding to those pertinent criticisms. 
I will argue that Rawls's recent emphasis on a theory of political liberalism 
successfully accounts for his idea of persons because it accords with our considered 
moral principles, it treats persons as free and equal beings worthy of respect, and it 
incorporates the only coherent construction of the social embeddedness thesis to a greater 
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degree than communitarians acknowledge or appreciate. Rawls's political liberalism thus 
surpasses this aspect of the communitarian critique. 
THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
A POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF 
THE PERSON 
by 
KENNETH HOWARD BIGGS 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
in 
POLIDCAL SCIENCE 
Portland State University 
1993 
TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES: 
The members of the Committee approve the thesis of Kenneth Howard Biggs 
presented February 11, 1993. 
APPROVED: 
Craig L.( Carr, Chair 
David A. Smeltzer 
t 
Do~. Moor 
hair, Department of Political Science 
, Vice Provost for Graduate Studies and Research 
NOllV:>I0'30 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank the following people (an incomplete list and in no particular 
order) without whose help this project could not have been accomplished: 
Professor David Smeltzer, for the many conversations in which we have talked 
about teaching in general, but also many topics relating to fairness; 
Professor and Mrs. Dennis Anderson, from whom I have received much moral 
support and encouragement, amongst other things; 
Tory Mitchell, for the many conversations about liberalism that we have engaged in 
that have pushed me to ask some more questions about liberalism than I was willing to 
address; 
My advisor, Professor Craig Carr, from whom I have learned not only about 
political philosophy, but who has also instilled in me an appreciation of the importance of 
theory in our very lives; 
and of course, Elaine, without whose patience, support, and (especially) love this 
project would not have been possible. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................... iii 
CHAPfER 
I INTRODUCI"ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Limits of Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
JAF and Political Liberalism in the Debate ..................... 5 
Structure of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Notes .............................................. 13 
II RAWLS AND 1HE DEVELOPMENT OF "JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS" 15 
Exposition and Clarification of JAF: 1957-1979 ................. 16 
Basic Considerations 
The Justifications of and Arguments for JAF 
The Model-Conceptions 
Three Advantages of JAF 
Reflective Equilibrium 
The Right and the Good 
Shifts in Emphasis: 1980-1982 ............................ 27 
"Kantian Constructivism" 
The Aims of Political Philosophy 
The Model-Conceptions: Expanded Roles 
The Objects of and Some Objections To a Situated Moral Theory 
''The Basic Liberties and Their Priority" 
Difficulties and Unanswered Questions 
JAF Responds: The Advent of Political Liberalism, 1985-1989 . . . . . . 38 
"Political, Not Metaphysical" 
Additional Model-Conceptions 
Political Liberalism 
Particular-Political vs. Comprehensive-Moral Conceptions 
Five Facts of Political Sociology 
v 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 
Notes .............................................. 49 
ill THE ONTOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF MICHAEL SANDEL . . . . . . . 55 
Communitarianism and Liberalism: A Study in Contrasts? . . . . . . . . . 57 
The Communitarian Challenge 
A Response: Clarifying the Project of Liberalism 
Ontology and Persons in JAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
Sandel's Two-Pronged Critique 
The OP and the Derivation of the Self: Objections 
The Claims Regarding Persons, Justice, and the Community 
The Social Embeddedness Thesis ........................... 72 
Metaphysical or Political Beings? 
Wholly or Partially Determined Social Beings? 
Oscillation Between Conceptions 
Liberal Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 
Objection One: "Interesting Misreadings" 
Objection Two: Context and Constitution 
Objection Three: Of Distinctions and Difference 
Objection Four: Against a Political Conception 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
IV ALASDAIR MACINTYRE AND 1HE VIRTUE OF THEORY . . . . . 95 
The Call: A Return to Virtue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 
Three Theses 
"A Disquieting Suggestion" 
Practices, A Unified Life, and Traditions 
Some Preliminary Objections 
The Social Em beddedness Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
Two Distinctions 
Between Conceptions 
Vl 
Accounting for Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 
The Role of the Virtues In Modernity 
Aspects of Rationality in Liberalism 
Analogy and Dichotomy 
A Question of Justification 
The Christian Dilemma 
The Critique of Liberalism and Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 
Of Heterogeneity and Plurality: Strength or Weakness? 
Liberalism As A Tradition 
Disparate Views, Disparate Rationalities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 
Notes .............................................. 127 
V POLffiCAL LffiERALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 
Ethics or Epistemology? 
Structure of the Chapter 
A Review of the Argument, and Some Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
Rawls Reconsidered 
Sandel Reconsidered 
Macintyre Reconsidered 
Foundations and Limitations of Political Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 
Conceptions and Persons 
Dignity and Equality 
Liberty 
Aims and Justifications of Political Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 
Skepticism 
Neutrality 
Rationality 
Aims and Norms of Political Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 
The Norms of Political Liberalism 
Moral and Personal Ideals: Kantian Ideals? 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 
vii 
Notes .............................................. 166 
VI CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 
Rawls or Lannore? Liberty or Neutrality? ..................... 172 
Beyond the Debate Over Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5 
Notes .............................................. 180 
SELECTED BffiLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
At present we are combating a trend. But this trend will die out, super-
seded by others, and then the way we are arguing against it will no longer 
be understood; people will not see why all this needed saying. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 
Since the publication of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice in 1971,2 political theory 
and philosophy have changed significantly. Contemporary political theorists are, to a 
great extent, involved in defending or criticizing the liberal theory of justice advanced 
and defended by Rawls. This development has had important consequences for theories 
of justice and for liberalism in particular. Liberalism has responded to changes not only 
in the concepts of justice, neutrality, equality and liberty, but more importantly in the 
manner in which these concepts are viewed and justified, e.g., by hypothetical social 
contract, by utilitarian methods, or an altogether different basis such as convergence or 
commonality theories. 
As Rawls and similar-minded theorists have developed their respective theories 
since the publication of Theory, a question has arisen surrounding the current debate be-
tween liberals and a group - the communitarians - that appears to be opposed to many 
basic liberal tenets. In what ways has liberalism of the kind that Rawls wishes to promote 
and defend changed in response to those communitarian criticisms, and what conse-
quences have these changes had for a liberal theory of justice? I suggest that an answer 
lies in part in the exchange between these two groups of theorists, an exchange that has 
been labeled by some as "the liberal-communitarian debate."3 
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In this presentation of the liberal-communitarian debate (sometimes called an 
"argumentative dialogue" in order to distinguish it from that form of public speaking and 
parliamentary procedure), I want to point out some distinctions between different kinds of 
reasoning and argument There are four kinds of argumentative dialogue that we can dis-
tinguish here. First, there is a critical discussion where, while the goal is to convince 
other positions of the superiority of one's own view, the benefit derived is mutual under-
standing. Secondly, there is an inquiry which seeks to demonstrate the validity of claims 
or conjectures, and has the benefit of accumulating knowledge and gaining conceptual 
coherence. A third kind of argument is the negotiation, which seeks settlement and/or 
consensus on an issue, and seeks to maximize goals of a particular side in an argumenta-
tive dialogue. Finally there is a debate which, although usually presented as an adversar-
ial contest, nevertheless seeks to clarify an issue.4 Some of the contributors to this debate 
seem to not have paid close attention to these significant if fine distinctions; that is, some 
responses both by liberals and communitarians have taken on the less desirable character-
istics of a debate (primarily that of exacerbating conflict) while contributing only slightly 
towards understanding or reconciliation. While not excluding debates per se, the first 
three kinds of argument are preferable for academic inquiry; each of these kinds of argu-
mentation have occurred in the liberal-communitarian debate to various degrees. It is my 
purpose here to engage in both a critical discussion and an inquiry into how well the de-
bate has proceeded and why that might be so. 
LIMITS OF INQUIRY 
Following Rawls and Patrick Neal, 5 I will hereafter refer to the theory of justice 
proposed and developed by Rawls as "justice as fairness" or "JAF," and later as "political 
liberalism." (I will occasionally refer to "Rawls's theory"; the distinction will, I hope, be 
clear from context.) This distinction is necessary, as Neal points out, for at least two rea-
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sons. First, Rawls himself distinguishes between his own theoretical constructions and 
the underlying ideas of JAF. Secondly, this will allow me to concentrate not solely on 
Rawls's theory of justice insofar as it is concerned with the two principles of justice, but 
additionally the larger question of JAF and political liberalism in general, i.e., as a liberal 
theory of justice, not only as a particular philosopher's theory. 
Granted, the explications and developments of the many concepts - "model con-
ceptions"- that Rawls has added to JAF over the years seem to be more embellishments 
or shifts of emphasis than anything. But some developments can be seen as clarifications 
or embellishments; some are shifts in emphasis or role of particular model-conceptions; 
still other developments can be seen as additions or departures - radical change - from 
the initial theory. Thus, many subtle shifts can result in significant change. 6 We should 
also be careful to note that some perceived ambiguities in Rawls's thought might not be 
the result of changes in his theory, but rather with his disinclination to disagree sharply 
with his critics or defend his position via explanation and reply.7 
Many liberal thinkers have written either in defense of or to constructively criticize 
JAF; other liberal writers have responded by formulating their own theories of justice 
along slightly different (but often liberal) lines. However, supporters and defenders have 
taken a different tack since the advent of Rawls's "new" theory of political liberalism. 
Many have moved to support Rawls's latest development, and in so doing have trans-
formed "what liberalism is all about," so to speak. This thesis is then devoted to the idea 
that political liberalism is a satisfactory and successful response to the communitarian 
critique. 
Since the publication of Theory, a veritable closet industry has developed with sup-
porters and detractors of Rawls and liberalism adding fuel to the fire and rhetoric to the 
debate. As noted, one of the strongest group of detractors are the group loosely-labeled 
as communitarians, and just as there are numerous liberalisms or liberal theories (perhaps 
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corresponding to the number of theorists advancing particular conceptions of a political 
theory), there are also numerous communitarian positions. (While a truism, this is not an 
unimportant point.) I will discuss only two of these positions: Michael Sandel's episte-
mological-ontological critique of the Kantian justification of JAF,8 and Alasdair 
Macintyre's historical-traditional critique that argues against liberalism's perceived foun-
dational absence and lack of conceptual coherence.9 
I will not be able to address those criticisms or theories that are predominantly: (a) 
legal- and epistemologically oriented such as Roberto Unger's of the CLS movement; (b) 
liberal legal and rights-oriented such as Ronald Dworkin's (which relies rather heavily on 
Rawlsian liberalism); (c) libertarian-oriented such as Robert Nozick's; (d) theories that 
(in some ways) seek to "bridge the gap" between weaker forms of community and liberal-
ism such as Michael Walzer's; or (e) theories such as Charles Taylor's dialectic- and re-
publican oriented theory that serves to reconstruct Hegel and interpret people and institu-
tions in politics from a logical-historical approach. to Neither will my limited inquiry al-
low me to address some of the most thorough inquiries into the conception of the self in 
modern society in general: Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons, and Charles Taylor's 
Sources of the Self.ll These are (unfortunately) beyond my purview. Finally, I will not 
be able to discuss debates within liberalism, in particular different theories that produce 
different results as the theorist "tinkers" with the conditions of choice under the social 
contract.l2 
So while I will not discuss some things that liberals are wont to discuss - e.g., rights 
and liberties - this thesis could perhaps be viewed as a defense of a basis for liberal 
rights. My concern is both more narrow and more deep or fundamental: how does liber-
alism view the concept of the person? Why did Rawls's conception of persons in JAF 
come under such attack from the communitarian critics? Has deontologicalliberalism in 
its current form survived the communitarian critique? If so, what does it "look like" 
now? In addressing Sandel's and Macintyre's claims against Rawls's liberal theory, I 
will evaluate their respective aptness- and therefore their success- as well as Rawls's 
and his defenders' success in responding to those criticisms. 
JAF AND POLITICAL LffiERALISM IN THE DEBATE 
5 
Rawls draws upon many great historical philosophers in his theory, primarily Kant 
and Locke, but also Aristotle, Sidgwick, Hume, Montesquieu, Madison and even Hegel. 13 
While I cannot address this line of criticism, we should note that some critics base their 
objections in part upon their interpretation of Rawls's fidelity to the philosophy of a par-
ticular historical thinker, Kant in particular.14 This, I think, misunderstands the direction 
and purpose of Rawls's theory, as well as his unique position. Rawls's theory is not in-
tended as an historical reconstruction of a particular philosophy or theory. Rather, Rawls 
has looked for ways to return to ground-level considerations ("first-order theory") in po-
litical and moral theory, as opposed to focusing on "second-order analysis" of ethical 
ideas and principles. Rawls's project has been a desire to return to studies of proposing 
and describing the principles of association that are desirable and feasible for our society, 
not just a second-order analysis of those principles we think we see in our own society 
and culture. 
Political liberalism is a current trend in liberal political theory. It is primarily an 
outgrowth and defense of the developments in J AF that have been undertaken both by 
Rawls and his defenders since the publication of Theory. Rawls's project of providing a 
socio-political basis for a universal ethic of association has remained essentially intact. It 
has in some ways been constrained and altered by placing the theory within a specific 
context: a liberal society with free-market capitalism within the political regime of a rep-
resentative constitutional democracy, and the movement towards a situated theory belies 
a concern for social order and structure that has become increasingly important to fueling 
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JAF. But it also underlies much of Rawls's concern (and liberalism's concerns in gen-
eral) to justify liberal principles of association that are politically oriented yet have a basis 
and reason established in history, and that account for our moral notions and attitudes to-
wards communal association. 
JAF has always been concerned with the construction and operation of the basic 
structure of society. But, as I will demonstrate, Rawls's initial presentation of JAF was 
concerned more with people than is his current theory. This opens JAF and political lib-
eralism to a two-pronged criticism. If J AF is neither an adequate nor accurate represen-
tation of the place of the person in political society, then political liberalism's emphasis 
on theoretical and institutional matters to the (almost) exclusion of personal considera-
tions is even worse; political liberalism then fails to account for social and political theo-
ries of the person. The political liberal's quick rejoinder to this objection is: Is the per-
son an adequate basis for the conception of politics? That is, while any theory of justice 
must account for and justify a conception of the person, how "deep" or formative must 
that conception be? Moral considerations and moral theory certainly must be used and 
accounted for; but to what extent and what areas of moral inquiry are truly appropriate in 
a political theory? 
There are two important distinctions here. First, this way of putting the issue is not 
simply a confusion or conflation of the distinctions between ethics, or the treatment of 
individuals towards each other, usually formulated in the question: "How ought I to act?" 
or "What ought I to do?", and questions of justice which Rawls formulates as questions 
about the basic structure of society or "rules of the game," and their answers as formu-
lated in our institutions. It is, rather, a question of how ethics is put into practice in our 
political institutions. Second, and following from the first distinction, it is a way of con-
sidering if there is a just manner of conceptually constructing people (citizens) so as to 
account for "the moral assessment and justification of institutions," IS but additionally to 
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consider how individuals must act in accordance with those institutions. (Throughout this 
thesis I will be concerned primarily with the first distinction.) 
As it has developed, political liberalism does in some ways describe a more appro-
priate aim or target for political theory. It eschews fundamental or "comprehensive" 
moral questions and belief-systems, relying instead upon reasoned and considered moral 
notions, judgments, and justifications that can be used to lay a groundwork for political 
agreement. That is, political liberalism uses moral theory as a guide to chart a course 
through the thicket of comprehensive moral systems and modus vivendi-type theories, 
cutting a path towards a political overlapping consensus.16 
Of course, liberalism is, was, and remains a theory of political legitimacy, not one 
of moral legitimacy or philosophical psychology; liberalism is not a theory of the person 
or of humankind. When liberalism is characterized or presented as a moral, sociological, 
or psychological theory, it quickly runs up against charges of individualism and estrange-
ment. That is not to say that political liberalism does not in some aspects rely upon a the-
ory of man or of human nature. The project of political liberalism has been to move 
away from epistemological and psychological questions that have dominated much dis-
cussion in current social and political theory, and concentrate instead on moral and politi-
cal ones. This recasting of liberal political theory in less expansive tenns recalls the the-
ories of some of the earliest liberals such as Locke, whose concerns for order fueled his 
ideas of toleration, an issue that is currently under close scrutiny and re-examination.l7 
I will suggest, as has been argued in some recent periodic literature, that a primary 
objective of political philosophy - an objective that some have overlooked in the liberal-
communitarian debate - is to conceptually construct the person-politics relation to enable 
moral considerations to play a part in our political association, and thereby accommodate 
different and various communities and groups (disparate conceptions of the right and the 
good) without exacerbating intolerance between them. A great deal then hangs on what 
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precisely is meant by the political liberals' "political conception of persons" and its im-
plicit concepts. 
Unlike some liberal writers, I do not think that the communitarian critique is fun-
damentally a "misconceived debate."18 Despite some questionable theoretical assump-
tions and misrepresentations of liberal theory, I think that the current communitarian cri-
tique of liberalism is valuable even if its only contribution has been, through second-
order analysis of the terms of debate, a clarification of the terms, assumptions and 
justifications of the respective philosophical positions. 
One common liberal criticism of communitarianism is that the writings, as critiques 
of liberalism and modernity, are almost wholly destructive and thus serve little construc-
tive purpose; communitarians do a lot of diagnosis, but provide little in the way of a 
"cure." A second, related criticism is that in the few places where communitarians do ad-
vance genuinely distinct theories of social and political association, these theories are 
marked either by unsubstantiated claims or rest on dubious assumptions about the ways 
we associate and the ways we conceive of that association. My purpose here is not to 
analyze the liberal communitarian debate as a whole, but instead to examine and evaluate 
one significant aspect of that debate - the placement of the person in society or what has 
been called the social thesis or social embeddedness thesis - and some of the conse-
quences of that placement for the aims of political philosophy, and neutrality. 
I will argue that some communitarian criticisms properly address shortcomings of 
liberal theory, but on this particular .aspect of the debate the communitarian criticism has 
failed because liberals, and particularly Rawls in his theory of political liberalism, have 
incorporated the only coherent construction of the social embeddedness thesis into liberal 
theory. I will argue that political liberalism has a superior conception of the person for 
several reasons: it successfully answers major communitarian objections, and proceeds to 
articulate a theory of persons in politics that is at once capable of sustaining that is more 
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coherent, complete, and sufficient, if not defensible and workable.19 In short, I will not 
be concerned so much with the theories as I will with the way these theories are ad-
vanced, justified, and critiqued with respect to some shared concepts about persons. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
I will argue three main points. First, political liberalism as currently put forth by 
Rawls and his primary supporters is a viable liberal and political theory as well as a the-
ory of justice because (a) it has successfully responded to appropriate communitarian 
criticisms, even though (b) it has not altogether sufficiently distinguished and justified the 
components of the theory. I will also suggest, along with some liberal critics, that (c) 
while political liberalism as justified has not altogether successfully charted a course be-
tween comprehensive moral conceptions and modus vivendi or Hobbesian-style argu-
ments, this does not pose a significant obstacle to the theory. Most liberals who endorse 
this development in JAF explicitly or implicitly suggest (and sometimes demonstrate how 
this can be done) that political liberalism can develop into an overlapping consensus that 
can be more than a modus vivendi, and yet not be so constrictive- rely upon or contain 
such a full or thick conception of the good - that the theory becomes instead a compre-
hensive moral conception. 
Second, while the communitarian critique is an important contributor to the larger 
ontological debate about philosophical psychology, epistemology, and social composi-
tion, it does not appear to have adequately addressed the focus of liberal theories. 
However interesting communitarian writers and their theories may be, some of them 
seem to have "missed the point" of liberalism. This is not to say that all the communi tar-
ian criticisms of liberalism are inappropriate; indeed some of what they have to say about 
liberalism is indeed apt and brings up important questions that liberals have yet to 
answer. (Michael Walzer is especially important in this regard, an argument that 
unfortunately I cannot address.) I will try to demonstrate where some of these 
communitarian critics appropriately address JAF, and also where they fail to do so. 
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Third, as suggested by the above quotation from Wittgenstein, the liberal-communi-
tarian debate is still in progress; it has not yet developed to the point where any definitive 
statements about the future of liberalism or communitarianism or some sort of mutual re-
lation (perhaps even an Hegelian synthetic theory) can be made. Many contributors to 
the debate have rightly focused on relatively narrow issues: a defense of JAF, a de-
structive critique of liberalism, what is meant by neutrality in liberalism, etc. So, while 
very few writers have noted areas of consensus or agreement between the two camps, this 
is to be expected due to the currency of the debate. But this is not to suggest that such a 
synthesis or consensus is impossible; only that it may be undesirable for both sides as the 
time may not be ripe, or there might simply be too much at stake. As some contributors 
have noted, significant concessions would have to made by both sides, concessions that 
would eventually undermine the respective theories. 
I will analyze the debate by looking at how political liberalism and communitarian-
ism each view and justify four ideas central to the conception of persons: the social em-
beddedness thesis, rationality, and the companion concepts of liberty and equality. Much 
of my discussion will then be devoted to how these theories respectively view these con-
cepts, and how these concepts make sense within the theoretical structure. 
I will proceed by chapters as follows. In Chapter II, which is primarily expository, I 
will present and analyze the pertinent aspects of JAF as it has developed since the publi-
cation of Rawls's Theory of Justice, especially the later years where JAF has yielded to 
political liberalism. 
In Chapters m and IV, I will discuss two of the more prominent communitarian the-
orists, Alasdair Macintyre and Michael Sandel. I will do several things here: review 
Macintyre's and Sandel's theories-cum-critiques against liberalism, evaluate the commu-
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nitarian criticisms against J AF and political liberalism (particularly their criticisms 
against the conception of persons), and evaluate the aptness and success of those critiques 
in general by analyzing these theorists's respective uses of the social embeddedness the-
sis. 
Chapter Vis an examination and analysis of political liberalism not only as it has 
been defended and developed by Rawls, but also from some other articulate defenders of 
political liberalism such as Will Kymlicka and Charles Larmore, and other theorists who 
share some liberal concerns such as Susan Mendus and Steven Lukes. After a brief 
review of the argument up to that point, I will examine some of the conceptual bases and 
limits of political liberalism and see how it has been defended against the communitarian 
criticisms through self-critique and examination. I will argue there that political liberal-
ism's conception of persons is a coherent and sufficient response to the communitarian 
objections. 
I will conclude in Chapter VI by noting that because of the eternal nature of these 
questions, this debate can never be fully resolved. However, the last decade or so- "our 
current way of arguing" - must be seen as an important and significant development in 
the history of political philosophy. Perhaps Michael Walzer is correct: "The 
communitarian critique is like the pleating of trousers: transient but certain to return."20 
(I cannot hope at this point to be so complacent as to the status - or ascendancy - of 
liberalism.) So while I endorse political liberalism, I also think that some points of 
concession and consensus must be reached between the two parties if the debate is to 
move forward; hopefully my analysis will point to one area of this debate that can be 
settled. This then does not commit me to the idea that political liberalism is indeed the 
"best available" theory of justice, only the currently best available liberal theory that 
adequately responds to the communitarian critique. That is, when shorn of some of the 
"conceptual baggage" of Rawls's earlier formulations in Theory, political liberalism 
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seems to offer the most coherent theoretical conception of modem democratic political 
culture by offering the least restrictive account of principles of political association, yet 
maintaining an acceptable adherence to moral principles. 
13 
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CHAPTER IT 
RAWLS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
"JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS" 
Naturally, my aim must be to say what the statements one would like 
to make here, but cannot make significantly. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 
John Rawls's liberal theory of justice as fairness has changed in some substantial 
and significant ways since the publication, some twenty-two years ago, of A Theory of 
Justice.2 That Rawls's theory continues to fuel debate about basic principles of political 
association and the role of political theory in contemporary political philosophy is 
undeniable; certainly, this is a tribute to Rawls the man and philosopher. But how have 
these changes affected liberal political theory, and what affect have these changes had for 
the theory of JAF? My purpose in this chapter is to present and analyze the principal 
aspects of JAF as found in Theory that have gained prominence in JAF since its 
publication. 
Rawls's work can be roughly divided into four different periods. The first period 
consists of articles and writings up to the writing of his magnum opus, A Theory of 
Justice, including the drafts for that work.3 Although these works are important in 
gaining an understanding of Rawls's work and its development as a whole, I shall not 
consider the works from this period in my analysis as it is the developments following the 
publication of Theory with which I am concerned. The second period consists of (along 
with Theory) articles from 1972 through 1979.4 This period is the exposition and 
development of JAF. While I will be primarily concerned with Theory in this section, 
16 
some subsequent writings will be addressed to clarify points in Theory. The third period, 
from 1980 through 1982,5 is a transitional stage. Here Rawls adds some concepts to 
JAF, and further clarifies the roles these concepts play in their inter-relations; these are 
the shifts in emphasis in JAF. But as we shall see, this is also where Rawls departs from 
some of the basic ideas of JAF: the role of the person, and the aims of political 
philosophy. This has had important and not altogether desirable consequences for JAF. 
The fourth period, found in Rawls's four most recent articles 1985 through 1989,6 is 
where Rawls has, in some fundamental and radical ways, departed from the initial project 
in Theory, and developed instead a different although closely related theory of political 
association: political liberalism. I will address these periods in chronological order. 
These broad areas of change in JAF can be usefully viewed by following the devel-
opment of the model-conceptions that have become increasingly important to the theory: 
the well-ordered society, the moral person, and the original position (hereafter OP) 
amongst others. How these ideas are developed and related also has a great deal to do 
with Rawls's most controversial step, the formation of political liberalism. 
As it has developed, JAF has been primarily concerned with two subjects: the basic 
structure and how it is arrived at or derived, and the construction and placement of the 
individual in political society. The first contains Rawls's response to critiques and 
accusations that J AF was too abstract, too Kantian, to be of any practical application or to 
understand and explain contemporary political culture. The second contains Rawls's 
response to critics, primarily communitarians, who have questioned the conceptual basis 
of the individual, and how the individual "fits" into society in the scheme of JAF. A 
great deal of space, then, will necessarily be devoted to the development of those model-
conceptions. 
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EXPOSffiON AND CLARIFICATION OF JAF: 1957-1979 
Basic Considerations 
As initially developed in Theory, JAF is a complex and complicated theory of social 
and distributive justice. Due to the subject and style, it can be either deceptively attrac-
tive or mind-bogglingly expansive: "Some students [have become] so enamored of the 
elegant, central treatment of the social contract that they [are] unable to look objectively 
at the book .... Other students [have] the opposite reaction. They [are] unable to grasp the 
general outlines of Rawls's theory because they [become] so bogged down in the many 
details of Rawls's exposition."7 But for all it's length and breadth, JAF relies on some 
fundamental assumptions and basic concepts in political theory.8 
The Basic Structure. As a liberal, Rawls has always and will remain concerned 
with the basic structure of society; it is the primary subject of justice. "By the basic 
structure of society, Rawls means the entire set of major social, political, legal, and eco-
nomic institutions.''9 The Constitution, private ownership of the means of production, 
competitive markets, and the monogamous family are all examples of components of the 
basic structure. The primary problem of justice, given the inequalities inherent in any 
system of social organization, is "to formulate and justify a set of principles which a just 
basic structure must satisfy."lO 
The Two Principles of Justice. As a theory of distributive justice, JAF is concerned 
with the way primary social goods, e.g., rights, opportunities, power, authority, and even 
specific goods such as wealth and access to social services, are to be meted out to the 
members of society. The intuitive idea (as Rawls would note) is to structure a conception 
of justice that answers questions about political association and distribution of social 
goods by addressing how we get what we do in politics (as opposed to how we give). 
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The main ideas of JAF are found in a set of two inter-related principles (the second of 
which has two parts) that are formulated and designed to accord with both our intuitive 
notions of justice and our more considered judgments and decisions about justice. The 
principles are often referred to by their common names, as given. 
1. [The Equality Principle] Each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both: 
(a) [The Difference Principle] to the greatest benefit of the least ad-
vantaged; and 
(b) [The Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity] attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity .11 
The subtle contrast between the two principles with regard to primary social goods 
should be noted. Where the equality principle is concerned with the distribution of a sub-
set of the total set of primary goods (that is, the basic liberties), 12 the difference principle 
by contrast is concerned with social goods such as wealth, income, power, and the like; 
hence the phrase "social and economic inequalities." The equality principle is relatively 
straightforward: all persons are accorded the same rights and liberties that are present in 
a social structure so long as those rights and liberties are compatible with all persons 
sharing or claiming those rights as individuals. 
The difference principle, on the other hand, is more complex. The phrase "least 
advantaged" means either the representative worst-off person or the representative worst-
off class of peoples. (This definition has been variously interpreted.) There are two 
definitions here, "either of which, or some combination of them, will serve well 
enough."13 The representative worst-off person or class can be defined as either a 
particular social position, e.g., an unskilled worker, or by making no reference to social 
class, relying "solely [upon] terms of relative income and wealth with no reference to 
social position." The representative worst-off is not some "ideal individual" who might 
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happen to fit the characteristics of either definition; it is not a hard-and-fast rule for 
determining who such a person is or might be, but rather "it is the practical criterion itself 
that is to be evaluated from the perspective of the original position."14 So the worst-off 
are simply a way of describing the OP in a manner consistent with the desire to provide 
justice upon equal grounds. For the same reasons that we exclude race and sex from 
some decisions about justice, wealth and social status are excluded. 
The third principle, that of fair equality of opportunity, is intended to ensure that all 
people, regardless of social standing, are afforded equal access to social goods, and are 
placed on a level or fair playing field relative to other competitors. Presumably fairness 
in equality of opportunity (or fair equality of opportunity, or equal opportunity for short) 
might require that in some cases that the disadvantaged are to be awarded some form of 
financial aid in order to compete fairly with others who, all other aspects aside (including 
financial), have similar capabilities and desires. IS However, this last point is not entirely 
clear, as we will see in chapter 4 when I discuss neutrality. 
Priority Rules. Conflict amongst these principles is anticipated. Rawls forestalls 
this by noting a lexical priority rule that governs the reference and application of these 
principles. The principle of equal liberty (principle 1) is to be considered before the sec-
ond principle, and within the second principle, the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity (principle 2 (b)) is to come before the difference principle (principle 2 (a)).16 
The principles and their lexical priority are summarized in Rawls's general conception: 
All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, 
and the bases of self-respect- are to be distributed equally unless an un-
equal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the 
least favored.17 
The Justifications of and Ar~uments for JAF 
Iwo Intuitive Ar~uments. There are three related justifications for these principles; 
this comprises the bulk of Rawls's initial theory and its subsequent developments. The 
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first two justifications appeal to our considered moral judgments and notions; the third, a 
philosophically- and theoretically-oriented approach, has generated the most debate. The 
first justification "rests on the thesis that if a principle accounts for our considered moral 
judgments about what is just or unjust, then this is a good reason for accepting that prin-
ciple."18 This justification suggests - and stands or falls on the idea- that the principles 
adequately and accurately account for what is just and unjust. The second justification 
notes that "if a principle would be chosen under conditions which, according to our con-
sidered moral judgments, are appropriate conditions for choosing principles of justice, 
then this is a good reason for accepting the principle."19 If we are not willing to look any 
further, then we can accept these principles if we feel that they accord with our consid-
ered ideas about principles of justice, or if we feel that they were decided in an appropri-
ate venue and manner (if the principles were derived under conditions appropriate to 
render mutually agreeable principles of justice: the OP). 
The Kantian Interpretation. But if we are more concerned with questions about jus-
tice and what it entails, then we must look to Rawls's third justification. The OP and ra-
tionality play an important role in this third or "Kantian" interpretation and justification 
of a theory of justice. This Kantian interpretation uses the concepts of the OP and a spe-
cific conception of rationality in a particular way. 
Rawls suggests that persons in the OP be thought of as rational agents (Kantian 
"noumenal selves") that by virtue of their situation (a form of limited ignorance) are truly 
autonomous and independent. They have no ties to bias them, and they must then accept 
what rationality demands: the proposal and acceptance of principles that can serve for all 
peoples, not only people with contingent desires. Buchanan summarizes the central point 
of this argument: 
[W]hen persons such as you and I accept those principles which we 
recognize would be chosen from the original position, we are expressing 
our nature as noumenal selves, i.e., we are acting autonomously. There 
are two main grounds for this thesis, corresponding to two features of the 
original position. First, since the veil of ignorance .. . excludes information 
about particular desires, acceptance of the principles does not depend upon 
the particular desires which an agent may or may not have. Second, since 
the formal constraints on the choice of principles include the requirement 
that the principles must be universalizable, the principles will be rational 
principles in Kant's sense. 20 
21 
This may seem incredulous at first. Such a description of the social considerations 
from which we decide our lives and roles - or have them decided for us - goes against 
such basic assumptions of the way in which we decide from a particular social position. 
That is, we are products of our culture, and because that is so there are only so many 
conceivable roles or lives that we could pursue, given our social status, education, etc. 
(This is a crude formulation of the social embeddedness thesis, which will be crucial in 
my subsequent analysis.) This is a common objection to JAF, one that Rawls does not 
answer satisfactorily until his fourth period. It is there that Rawls reconsiders such 
objections in light of communitarian critiques - particularly Michael Sandel's now 
famous accusation that JAF is "deontology with a Humean face" - and responds 
persuasively to them. But it should suffice for the moment to note that such social 
considerations - relative scarcity of resources, and the derivation and importance of 
moral education in our action and political association - are answered more satisfactorily 
by Rawls in his later period. 
Rational Actors. The principles of justice and association chosen in the OP would 
be chosen according to the principle called maximin. In rational choice theory, it is a way 
of choosing the safest alternative: a person using the maximin criteria (or choice method) 
will maximize the chance that the chosen alternative will have the best worst outcome (in 
this case, principles of political association and social/distributive justice). That is, even 
if what is chosen ends up being a "bad" choice, the way we choose and the ensuing 
situation will end up being the best, given the circumstances available from which to 
decide, and in which to live once that decision has been made. 21 
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Although an account of rationality and the rational person is important in JAF, it 
has become clear as JAF has developed that the OP and other model-conceptions are 
focused on the moral and rational situation of agents from which they choose an 
agreeable set of principles. So while rational choice still plays a part in the theory, 
particularly in the OP, as JAF has progressed, Rawls's reliance upon rational choice 
theory has diminished. (We shall see a little later that in political society, persons are 
restrained by concepts of the reasonable and the rational.) 
The Model-Conceptions 
The OP. Much has been said of Rawls's OP. The OP allows the connection of the 
theory of justice with rational choice. 22 It considers the chosen principles as the result of 
a collective decision within a context that makes some basic assumptions regarding 
rationality and action. The OP emphasizes that there are some base-level commitments 
and responsibilities that go along with that decision and that the decision is reached by 
voluntary means: no one is coerced to join per se, but it is strongly suggested that it 
would be irrational (if not anti-social) not to join. There are, according to Rawls, four 
primary features of the OP that make it a rational and even advantageous choice for per-
sons in the OP: (a) the rational motivation of the parties, (b) the veil of ignorance, (c) the 
formal constraints of the concept of right, and (d) the list of competing principles of jus-
tice. This last point will not be addressed here as it is peripheral to my analysis. 23 
The rational motivation of the parties assumes that people are, to an extent, 
motivated by desires to form a "life plan" that is designed to accumulate an individual 
portion of primary social goods. Mutual disinterestedness is assumed here to ensure the 
independence of the agents in the OP. By relying on rational choice, members of a to-be-
arranged society hypothetically gather together under a mutual veil of ignorance - feature 
(b) - in order to discuss what kinds and which specific moral and political principles to 
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live by. This veil is relatively "thick." (Another way to say this is that the normative 
conception of the person in the OP is relatively "thin.") It excludes knowledge of one's 
socio-economic place in society; particular ideas of the good or how to lead and live a 
good life; particular social circumstances such as technological sophistication or socio-
economic situation; it excludes generational reference; and the parties must not know 
their own personal contingencies (physical attributes, and what might be desirable under 
a particular set of social circumstances).24 Persons, as potential members of such a 
society, thus gather together in mutual ignorance in order to decide the rules to live by. 
Rawls suggests that the original position (another name for the social contract that 
has characterized many different of theories of political association) is ideal because it re-
moves from consideration any and all information that might be useful in order to make 
decision that might be biased in any way, particularly in one's favor. It is important to 
note that because he wishes to exclude these concepts about ourselves that we often take 
as granted that Rawls assumes that persons have and act from the observed inherent traits 
of selfishness and egoism. Despite claims to the contrary, Rawls implicitly relies upon 
some fundamental assumptions about human nature. (Critics have referred to these as-
sumptions about human nature by various names, e.g., philosophical anthropology, a 
theory of the person, a conception of the self, or a theory of the moral subject)25 By 
removing these psychological states from consideration, Rawls hopes to derive principles 
of justice that would be fair to all under fair considerations: ''The aim is to use the notion 
of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory."26 That is, if the principles are derived 
under completely fair conditions, with all players being equal, then we cannot help but 
choose those principles fairly. 
The Yeil of I~norance. The veil of ignorance and the OP are the embodiment of 
Rawls's desire in JAF to envision and build the basic structure upon the idea of pure pro-
cedural justice. 27 The veil of ignorance in the OP is thus a central and fundamental 
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aspect of JAF: the importance of this, even in the later developments of JAF, cannot be 
overstated. 
Now, we must be clear about the role of the OP and the veil of ignorance. The OP 
should not be considered a starting point for rational or moral inquiry. Rather, it is a way 
of "arguing through" the moral thicket of differing and disparate conceptions of good that 
can influence the concept of right;28 it is more procedure than substance. The purpose of 
the OP is to remove doubt about the applicability of rational choice and moral notions in 
a theory of justice, and to be able to account for a feasible and desirable account of the 
person in the outcome of that procedure. 
Formal Constraints On the Concept of Ri~ht. Feature (c) reflects some of the con-
sidered moral notions and judgments about political association that can be found in a 
liberal-democratic culture, or what Rawls calls the formal constraints of the concept of 
rights. The principles of justice, in order to provide a just basic structure that at least 
qualifies for the first two types of justification, must have some specific characteristics. 
They must be: (i) general, (ii) universal in application, (iii) universalizable (as distinct 
from generalizable; i.e., they must be "for all persons as moral persons"), (iv) available 
and known to the public, (v) adjudicative and transitive (they must be able to provide an 
ordering of conflicting claims about distributive justice), and (vi) they must be final.29 
Three Adyaota~es of JAF 
Due to the circumstances found in the OP and the above-mentioned formal con-
straints upon the concept of right, Rawls feels that there are three advantageous conse-
quences of JAF as a political theory. (These are additionally reasons that could be used 
to persuade others disinclined to accept the OP, or for OP participants to accept justice as 
fairness over other conceptions.) First is the "strains of commitment" argument. The 
idea here is that "the principles of justice as fairness are principles that ... the parties in the 
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OP can rely on one another to adhere to once adopted. There will be no consequences 
they cannot accept."30 That is, the principles will be more than merely a contract: they 
become a basis for society that is mutually acceptable to all because it is fair to all. All 
persons are accorded an equal opportunity to take part in (or simply take) their share of 
social primary goods. 
Secondly, Rawls proposes an argument from stability. Because justice as fairness 
generates its own support and allegiance, and because everyone's good is affirmed within 
the limits of reason and rationality, J AF will be more stable than other conceptions that 
might require certain sacrifices of, say, individual rights and liberties.31 "[E]ach person's 
liberties are secured, and yet the difference principle ensures that everyone is benefited by 
social cooperation .... Since everyone's good is affirmed, all acquire inclinations to up-
hold the scheme."32 
Rawls's third reason is the most important, and it becomes more so as JAF devel-
ops. This is the argument for self-respect; both the concept and the argument are tied to 
Rawls's concept of primary social goods. In fact, self-respect is "perhaps the most 
important primary good" because 
Without it nothing may seem worth doing or if some things have value 
for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes 
empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism. Therefore the par-
ties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the so-
cial conditions that undermine self-respect.33 
Self-respect ensures that people will respect others as well. It is a way of saying, by 
a Kantian reckoning, "that the principles of justice manifest in the basic structure of soci-
ety men's desire to treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselves."34 
Reflective EQuilibrium 
Reflective equilibrium is a conceptual necessity for JAF. It is a way of balancing 
between our intuitive notions and our considered judgments about justice. In this respect, 
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reflective equilibrium is Socratic because it allows us the opportunity to "change our pre-
sent considered judgments once their regulative principles are brought to light." 
But the notion varies depending upon whether one is to be [1.] pre-
sented with only those descriptions which more or less match one's exist-
ing judgments except for minor discrepancies, or [2.] whether one is to be 
presented with all possible descriptions to which one might plausibly con-
form one's judgments together with all relevant philosophical arguments 
for them .... Clearly it is the second kind of reflective equilibrium that one 
is concerned with in moral philosophy.35 
Persons then, in the OP and as citizens, use reflective equilibrium as a tool or 
method to compare and contrast conceptions of what is good and right, and to arrive at a 
decision as to which principles to adopt depending upon how those conceptions are sup-
ported Gustified). Reflective equilibrium is Rawls's allowance in JAF for the person to 
"step outside one's self' so to speak and evaluate principles of justice as they develop. 
Rawls does not say that this is a neutral procedure any more than he says that JAF is a 
completely neutral conception of justice; it is instead Rawls's way of proceeding towards 
an objective method to derive a conception of justice in society. 
An Objection. An important objection to this use of reflective equilibrium as a 
balancing tool is that we then have no standard from which to judge such a balance: we 
can reason from our intuitions or we can reason from our considered judgment, but then 
when do we know we have "arrived at" a balance that is acceptable, i.e. that satisfies both 
of those approaches? Rawls does not answer this objection in this period of his work. 
But, as we shall see, an answer is provided that develops out of the concepts of equal 
respect and rational dialogue, the primary and controlling concepts of what Rawls later 
calls political liberalism. 
The Rii:ht and the Good 
Having developed and justified JAF, Rawls wishes further to convince us that JAF 
meets an additional considered notion about morality as found in the relationship of the 
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right and the good: that what is right is compatible with what is good, and further that 
justice and goodness are congruent.36 Briefly, Rawls maintains a distinction between 
deontological theories like JAF that assert that what is right does not depend upon or is 
independent of a conception of the good (variously good, social goods, the good life, 
etc.), and teleological theories that assert that what is right depends upon what is good.37 
For JAF, the right embodied in the two principles and the model-conceptions is prior to 
the good: the "rules" for a just culture must be considered before the content of the cul-
ture. "Something is good only if it fits into ways of life consistent with the principles of 
right already on hand."38 So the arguments from commitment, stability, and self-respect 
are additionally arguments for a concept of right, or our desire "to maintain and express 
our nature as free and equal rational beings." 
[This] can be fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right and j~s­
tice as having first priority. This is a consequence of the condition of fi-
nality: since these principles are regulative, the desire to act upon them is 
satisfied only to the extent that it is likewise regulative with respect to 
other desires. It is acting from this precedence that expresses our freedom 
from contingency and happenstance. 39 
With the basic ideas of J AF reviewed in this second period of the development of 
JAF, I will proceed to an examination and evaluation of Rawls's third stage. 
SHIFfS IN EMPHASIS: 1980-1982 
"Kantian Constructivism" 
The more important of the two articles in this second period is Rawls's Dewey 
Lectures, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," which he later notes should have 
been named "Kantian Constructivism in Political Philosophy."40 Rawls begins by limit-
ing the scope and breadth of JAF. "Kantian constructivism" does not propose a system of 
political ethics or moral obligations that descend from Kant's construction of the moral 
universe and serve to subsume a moral and political culture; rather, the purpose is "to 
establish a suitable connection between a particular conception of the person and first 
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principles of justice, by means of a procedure of construction."41 The approach is 
Kantian in that it provides a justification for moral actions that refer directly to 
deontological principles and duties that can or may be acknowledged as "good," or de-
rived from analyzable a priori knowledge; it does not rely upon the more emotive charac-
teristics of humanity, e.g., desires, passions, instincts and the like. The approach is con-
structivist in that it uses a procedural method to derive a fair outcome according to mutual 
agreement, that is, by a reliance upon pure procedural justice. 
The Aims of Political Philosophy 
The primary objective is to establish a theory of justice that will aid in achieving 
social cooperation through the principles of JAF. This suggests that Rawls has become 
more concerned with sociability and social stability. JAF (and therefore justice within a 
democracy) is then limited to an inquiry of the meaning of justice "in order to settle a 
fundamental disagreement over the just form of basic institutions within a democratic 
society under modem conditions." 
This attenuated aim of JAF additionally has consequences for the aims of political 
philosophy. 
The aim of political philosophy, when it presents itself in the public 
culture of a democratic society, is to articulate and to make explicit those 
shared notions and principles thought to be already latent in common 
sense; or, as is often the case, if common sense is hesitant and uncertain, 
and doesn't know what to think, to propose to it certain conceptions; and 
principles congenial to its most essential convictions and historical tradi-
tions .... 
The real task is to discover and formulate the deeper bases of agree-
ment which one hopes are embedded in common sense, or even to origi-
nate and fashion starting points for common understanding. 42 
This suggests several changes. First, that Rawls is reconsidering the aims of 
political philosophy in general and in JAF in particular. Second, and more importantly, 
JAF has shifted from being concerned with discovering the principles of justice and 
political association, to actively formulating and applying principles that meet with our 
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desired moral ends of political association. So the "search for reasonable grounds to 
achieve agreement on basic principles" uses reflective equilibrium in a slightly different 
way than initially proposed: "On the one hand imagining what we would agree to (in 
idealized conditions) will reveal to us the right principles of justice; on the other hand, we 
need to construct such principles as will secure agreement."43 
The Model-Conceptions: Expanded Roles 
The Well-Ordered Society. Rawls moves to an expanded view of the role of the 
model conceptions in JAF. A well-ordered society is first one where "such a society is 
effectively regulated by a public conception of justice" that the basic structure satisfies 
derived and agreed principles; secondly, it is one where those principles are the result of 
"generally accepted methods of inquiry."44 Thirdly, the members of a well-ordered soci-
ety, as moral persons, have three characteristics: they are free in that they are entitled to 
pursue some ideas of the good and "make claims upon the design of their common insti-
tutions"; they are equal in that they regard each other as equal in the determination of the 
first principles of justice; and they are moral beings in a rather special way, given the 
constraints of rational as opposed to full autonomy (discussed below).45 
The Ori~inal Position. In moving from the constraints of the veil of ignorance in 
the OP to the well-ordered society, Rawls envisions four successive stages where 
reasonability and rationality gain prominence. At the initial stages of decision, ignorance 
(hence the definition of persons) and the flexibility of the principles (hence the exercise 
of the reasonable and the rational) is relatively great. But as the tasks, decisions and 
therefore the normative moral content of the society become progressively more specific, 
ignorance lessens and the constraints of reasonability and rationality increase: the further 
one progresses in JAF towards a fully-defined society, the less flexibility there is in the 
constraints of reasonability and rationality, and therefore justice. That is, as we move 
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from theory to practice, our account of persons becomes progressively more "full." 
"While the constraints of the Reasonable are weakest and the veil of ignorance thickest in 
the original position, at the [final] stage these constraints are strongest and the veil of ig-
norance thinnest."46 The OP has now been recharacterized as that place in society that 
"incorporates pure procedural justice at the highest level."47 
The Moral Person. The role and constraints placed upon the parties in the OP 
(moral persons) are fairly clear in this passage: 
The essential thing is that when we formulate the model-conception of 
the original position, we must view the parties as selecting principles of 
justice which are to serve as effective public principles of justice in a well-
ordered society, and hence for social cooperation among persons who con-
ceive of themselves as free and equal moral persons .... 
The original position would represent the parties not solely as free and 
equal moral persons, but instead as persons also affected by social fortune 
and natural accident. Thus, these and other limitations on information are 
necessary to establish fairness between the parties as free and equal moral 
persons and, therefore, to guarantee that it is as such persons that they 
agree to society's basic principles of justice. 48 
The model-conception of moral persons constrained by rational autonomy thus be-
comes central to the understanding of the choices available to the parties in the OP. Their 
choices and actions are limited by particular conceptions of rationality and justice, which 
also considers their collective and individual interests and desires. So moral persons are 
... characterized by two moral powers and two highest-order interests in 
realizing and exercising these powers. The first power is the capacity for 
an effective sense of justice, that is, the capacity to understand, to apply 
and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of jus-
tice. The second moral power is the capacity to form, to revise, and ratio-
nally pursue a conception of the good. Corresponding to the moral pow-
ers, moral persons are said to be moved by two highest-order interests[:] 
to realize and exercise these powers .... These interests are supremely 
regulative as well as effective .... 
In addition, I assume that the parties represent developed moral per-
sons, that is, persons who have, at any given time, a determinate scheme of 
final ends, a particular conception of the good. Thus the model-
conception defines moral persons as also determinate persons .... 49 
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On the one hand then, individuals in the OP are rationally autonomous because they are 
subject to pure procedural justice, and they are guided by highest-order interests because 
they are in rational pursuit of specific conceptions of primary goods. 
Reasonability. Rationality. and Full Autonomy. On the other hand, full autonomy is 
characterized by a distinction between the reasonable and the rational, and tempered by 
the presumption of background justice. The reasonable is "a conception of the fair terms 
of cooperation, that is, terms each participant may reasonably be expected to accept, pro-
vided that everyone else likewise accepts them. [These terms] articulate an idea of re-
ciprocity and mutuality .... "5° The reasonable is then Rawls's basic concept of justice as 
fairness embodied within the individual: each of us is capable of reason, and this capac-
ity for reason is instructive in our intuitive and our considered notions of what is and is 
not fair. Implied here is that the reasonable contains what would commonly be called 
responsibility: responsibility to act in an appropriately moral fashion according to the 
precepts and notions dominant in society, and responsibility to accept the consequences 
of one's actions whether they were morally informed and correct or not. 
The rational, by contrast, "expresses a conception of each participant's rational ad-
vantage, what, as individuals, they are trying to advance."51 It is Rawls's conceptual and 
theoretical mechanism for imbuing individuals with the drive to choose and pursue a 
sense of the good that would actually be of benefit to them. The constraints of back-
ground justice subsume this distinction: "[I]t is only if the basic structure satisfies the re-
quirements of background justice that a society treats its members as equal moral per-
sons."52 So full autonomy is "a moral ideal and part of the more comprehensive ideal of 
a well-ordered society," whereas "rational autonomy is not ... an ideal at all, but a device 
of representation used to connect the conception of the person with definite principles of 
justice."53 So persons as moral agents in Rawls's scheme are allowed to be neither lib-
ertines nor altruists; either choice might accord with full autonomy (though this is 
doubtful), but neither would accord with rational autonomy. 
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A point of clarification. Later when I discuss rationality and practical rationality, 
this does not refer only to Rawls's conception of "the rational." As a more generic term, 
"rationality" entails Rawls's use of the moral person as discussed above. 
The Conception of the Person: Foundational or Derivative? This suggests a signif-
icant change in the concept of the person since Theory. In Theory, the person as an OP 
participant chose the principles of justice and allowable conceptions of the self as a 
rational or prudential agent similar to subjects found in rational/social choice theory or 
classical economics. There Rawls avoided ethical or moral motivations for persons in the 
OP so that the concept of person "enjoyed at most a derivative status .... The ideal of the 
person was not the foundation, but rather the outcome, of the theory of justice."54 But 
now, with the idea of the person as a moral agent being a central concept of J AF, the 
person "plays a direct rather than a derivative role." So people in JAF are now seen as 
moral agents when they enter the OP in that "their choices are seen as pursuing, or 
expressing, basic features of moral personality," and that the constraints of rationality are 
no longer constraints upon individual choice (personal composition of the choosing 
subject, so to speak); they become instead "representations of the moral personality of the 
individuals themselves."55 The importance of this move for Rawls's general conception 
of persons cannot be over-emphasized; it is one of the most important and significant 
changes in his theory. 
To summarize: the moral person in JAF is a hierarchically- or lexically-ordered 
being who, depending upon the circumstances perceived and the interests in considera-
tion, will operate on one level of rationality or another. That is, according to the concepts 
of full and rational autonomy, the moral person is allowed only that palette of appropriate 
choices in a given situation, whether it is a situation in which to choose primary princi-
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pies of association (the OP), a situation in which to choose personal attributes (the con-
struction of the self), or any run-of-the-mill situation in which a person might fmd them-
selves choosing between different moral positions in a well-ordered society. But now, 
instead of choosing "the self' along with the principles of justice, the formal constraints 
upon the moral self are established prior to the choice of principles of justice. 
The Objects of and Some Objections To a Situated Moral Theozy 
''Three Points of Yiew." The model-conceptions situate JAF and limit it to modem 
democratic society. The theory now does not answer the larger question "What is jus-
tice?," but rather "What is justice for us?," the "us" meaning variously (a) the parties in 
the OP, (b) the citizens in a well-ordered society, or (c) observers/philosophers, i.e., peo-
ple interested in questions about justice and society. 56 Rawls is concerned here with 
what justice means when analyzed from these "three points of view" because "we" im-
plies the members of a liberal, democratic, constitutional, capitalistic society within a 
particular historical period. 
What is not clear about this conceptual tool is whether those different views are 
constitutive of a particular view, or if they are merely contingent views. Rawls gives us 
little indication one way or the other, although most critics have decided that Rawls relies 
upon a contingency-based view. But still, this does not decide the question as to whether 
membership in one of those views is a necessary or sufficient determinant of the 
opinions, beliefs, etc., that might be held by individual members. This ambiguity affects 
the manner in which citizens perceive, justify, and accept JAF. 
Preliminary Objections. The revised model-conceptions, while still subject to some 
of the objections raised against rational-choice theory ,57 share some procedural problems: 
which is prior, background justice, or the concept of the moral person? Given the restric-
tions of rational autonomy, how is full autonomy to be achieved? Certainly, "the reason-
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able presupposes the rational,"58 but how then are we to conceive the relation between 
full and rational autonomy? 
Preliminary Answers. Rawls proposes two answers to these objections that center 
on the distinctions he is wont to make about rational versus full autonomy and the reason-
able versus the rational. One is found in his discussion of the three points of view in 
"Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory."59 Rawls here carefully distinguishes 
between the roles of the conception of the person and of a theory of human nature: 
because the distinction between the reasonable and the rational is important to set 
Rawls's theory into motion and to situate it in a contemporary liberal democratic context, 
it presupposes an idea of a particular kind of rationality with which the participants in the 
OP enter prior to any discussion of principles. Certainly, such pre-conceived notions of 
rationality would carry with it more than that which is allowable under the veil of 
ignorance, even as revised. 
In that case, the conditions within the veil of ignorance are to be revised, a move 
that is allowable under reflective equilibrium. But this distinction between a conception 
of persons and a theory of human nature still logically holds. Rational autonomy is a 
conception derivable (in a sense) from the concept of full autonomy, and as such is a 
"higher level" test for the role of persons in society. It implies that the move from the OP 
to JAF in society has been made, and we now dealing with person in society, not within 
the OP. 
So Rawls's previous view of people in JAF- as "products of the OP and moral-ra-
tional considerations - has been altered so that persons as citizen-participants in the OP 
come to that initial social contract situation with more fully informed ideas of the concept 
of rationality in society, and what place a moral-rational actor would choose. The veil of 
ignorance is less thick than before with regard to knowledge of the basic structure and of 
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the concept of a self, but more thick with regard to personal contingencies (i.e., knowl-
edge about one's own self). 
''The Basic Liberties and Their Priority" 
A second response to the objections centering on the conception of persons is found 
in the Tanner Lectures, ''The Basic Liberties and Their Priority." This lecture is a 
response to criticisms leveled at JAF (primarily Rawls's conceptions of liberty and 
autonomy, and their relation) from other liberal theorists, especially H. L.A. Hart in his 
article "Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority."60 Hart is concerned mainly with Rawls's 
"account of the relationship between justice and liberty, and in particular with [the] 
conception that justice requires that liberty may only be limited for the sake of liberty and 
not for the sake of other social and economic advantages."61 Hart's contention, and what 
Rawls later develops in the Tanner Lectures, is an account of why participants in the OP 
would adopt the basic liberties and accept them in a lexical priority, and how those basic 
liberties are to be specified and substantively defined given a particular social order. 62 
The Revised Principles. Rawls's initial response was to revise the first principle. 
This revision, along with the conceptual additions of "Kantian Constructivism" allows 
Rawls to subtly alter his position: there is now "no priority to liberty as such," but only 
to certain basic liberties. 63 
1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. 
First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under con-
ditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. 64 
(I have emphasized the differences between this reformulated presentation of the 
principles and the former statement, infra, p. 4. Also, it should be noted that the 
principles are now grammatically presented in their lexical priority.) 
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This accords with Rawls's interpretation of the history of democratic thought,65 and 
also accords with his description of a four-stage institutional process of arriving at or 
agreeing upon principles of justice as outlined in Theory, § 31. The relevance of this 
move for our purposes is that this further constrains the reasonableness of the actors in 
the OP. "At each successive stage [in the four-stage process of the OP] the agents have 
less leeway as they are more and more constrained by the conclusions of previous stages. 
They have to act rationally, but as the task becomes less general and more specific, the 
demands of the Reasonable become stronger (and the veil of ignorance becomes thin-
ner)."66 This is part of Rawls's primary goal in the defense of his theory: to show that 
the Kantian enterprise is not merely an abstraction, but a conceptual way of incorporating 
Western- and especially American- concepts of freedom and equality as found in 
democratically-conceived and -operated institutions into JAF. 
Recalling the three points of view, we can see that Rawls emphasizes the view that 
" ... justice as fairness is addressed not so much to constitutional jurists as to citizens in a 
constitutional regime."67 In accord with the distinctions between the reasonable and the 
rational and between rational and full autonomy, Rawls emphasizes the "practical nature" 
of JAF. It applies, like positive law, to our very lives as regulative and regulating 
principles, discovered and formulated according to operations of reflective equilibrium 
and rationality. 
Additionally though, these conceptual re-definitions have altered the importance of 
Rawls's two principles of justice, particularly the second or priority principle. An essen-
tial part of the earlier theory was the priority of liberty, and the claim that liberty could 
only be attenuated for the sake of liberty. Revising the principles in light of criticism has 
indeed allowed greater room for the preservation of liberties, e.g., civil liberties and hu-
man rights. The revised priority principle now holds that liberty (of choice and the 
capacity for rationality) must be preserved for the sake of liberties (guarantees of freedom 
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to act in certain socially-sanctioned ways) or their potential, as opposed to the preserva-
tion of liberty merely for the sake of liberty (full autonomy unbound by rationality). 
Thus, the revised priority principle has become more essential and fundamental to the 
concepts of liberty and equality, particularly when compared to the difference principle. 
It now allows the individual a limited ability to choose his or her attributes according to 
the principles of rationality prior to the OP. 
Difficulties and Unanswered Questions 
Goods and Neutrality. Rawls's revised scheme for the OP in this second period af-
fects the way social goods are ordered, too. For example, because people come to the OP 
with moral knowledge, it is unclear how impartiality or neutrality in conceptions of the 
good would be maintained throughout the decision process. Rawls's answer to this diffi-
culty reveals his pre-occupation with the practical application of his theory. As William 
Galston notes, rather than arguing "that rational judgment about the worth of different 
conceptions of the good is impossible, ... he emphasizes the practical difficulties of insti-
tutionalizing a specific conception."68 But, again, the kind of ignorance that is now al-
lowed in JAF calls into question the neutrality of conceptions of the good. Additionally, 
Rawls offers no better reasons to accept limited ignorance over full information to ensure 
neutrality or impartiality. 
The Modified Aims of Political Philosophy. This period of development also dis-
plays Rawls's increasing concern for practical matters. But this is, as Galston notes, at 
odds with the professed Kantian nature of his enterprise: "For Kant, it is reason - not the 
need or agreement, not the circumstances of agreement - that determines the content of 
our appropriate social undertakings."69 However Kant may be interpreted in the history 
of ideas, this movement restricts the demesne of both liberal theory and political philoso-
phy. More immediately, for Rawls this move has not yet resolved the tension that he had 
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hoped to resolve in Theory: the tension between liberty and equality. Because of the 
limited Kantian nature of JAF, Rawls's desire to place equality (in the guise of 
participants under the veil of ignorance) above freedom (in the guise of the tensions 
between the reasonable and the rational, and rational and full autonomy) biases from the 
beginning the allowable conceptions of the good and the right: "Rawls's practical 
conception of political philosophy is, I suspect, governed by his overall practical inten-
tion- to uphold the principle of equality that stands at the heart of democratic culture."70 
JAF RESPONDS: THE ADVENT OF POLITICAL LffiERALISM, 1985-1989 
"Political. Not Metaphysical" 
The current conception of JAF is captured in Rawls's four most recently published 
articles: "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," "The Idea of an Overlapping 
Consensus," ''The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good," and ''The Domain of the 
Political and Overlapping Consensus."11 In these four articles, where JAF is radically al-
tered and ultimately transformed into political liberalism, Rawls again concerns himself 
with charges that despite the shifts in emphasis, his theory remains abstract and depends 
upon metaphysical and ontological claims about persons and the social structure that are 
normative, universal, and essential to JAF. 
A Kantian Enterprise? Rawls begins by explaining once again the Kantian nature 
of his enterprise. However, in distinguishing his theory from Kant's, Rawls notes that 
')ustice as fairness is not intended as the application of a general moral conception to the 
basic structure of society, as if this structure were simply another case to which that gen-
eral moral conception is applied." 
The essential point is this: as a practical political matter no general 
moral conception can provide a publicly recognized basis for a conception 
of justice in a modem democratic state .... 72 
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The objective has now become "not a conception of justice that is true, but one that can 
serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as 
free and equal persons." 
[W]e must recognize that. .. public agreement on the basic questions of 
philosophy cannot be obtained without the state's infringement of basic 
liberties. Philosophy as the search for truth about an independent 
metaphysical and moral order cannot, I believe, provide a workable and 
shared basis for a political conception of justice in a democratic society. 73 
This idea about the goal of political philosophy and how it conceives the role of the 
state - to provide a feasible basis for the promotion of a well-ordered society - gains 
prominence in Rawls's later work, as can be seen particularly in the idea of an overlap-
ping consensus. Implied in this new conception of the aims of political philosophy is a 
denial of constitutive claims regarding the essential nature and formative identity of per-
sons in political society. But this does not mean that a firm conception of the roles and 
characteristics of the person is unnecessary or unimportant for JAF. In a concise sum-
mary of his earlier position in "Kantian Constructivism in Ethics," Rawls explains the 
role of the moral person, both as a citizen and as a participant in the OP: 
1. [Persons are] free and equal in virtue of their possessing to the req-
uisite degree the two powers of moral personality ... , namely, the capacity 
for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. These 
powers [are] associated with two main elements of the idea of cooperation 
and the idea of each participant's rational advantage, or good. 74 
2. Persons are free in that they have moral powers to conceive and 
pursue a conception of a conceived good; are self-originating sources of 
valid claims; and have responsibility for their desired ends and claims as a 
limitation upon individual pursuits. 75 
Rawls wishes here to show that justice as fairness is a particular and not a compre-
hensive moral doctrine, one that is valid for us because it is situated within and derived 
from a democratic culture. Furthermore, it accords with our basic intuitive and our con-
sidered and reflective judgments as to what justice is and how it operates; because we are 
able to agree on some basic political ideas and concepts that are subsumed by our 
democratic culture, we can appeal to these ideas in the effort to promote specific 
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decisions and policies, simultaneously promoting social unity and stability. So the 
concept of the person has become of secondary but still crucial importance to JAF. The 
person remains derivative of the social structure and situation of justice, and is not "pre-
formed" as William Galston has noted.76 So while it is true that the importance of the 
basic structure to J AF has increased while the conception of the person has diminished, 
the person remains important. 
Additional Model-Conceptions 
It is at this point that Rawls adds some model-conceptions to help explain the way 
persons are conceived in a liberal political society. These are a "reasonable moral 
psychology," and the "historical and social conditions of modem democratic societies."77 
The reasonable moral psychology is a summary of the two moral powers and higher-
order interests introduced in "Kantian Constructivism" and reiterated in "Justice as 
Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical." To this, Rawls adds the idea that as people act as 
moral agents with these controlling concepts in mind, they will grow to trust each other 
more and more, thus helping to establish and engender an overlapping consensus. 
Legitimacy and confidence, both in our political theory and its application to our 
institutions, are thus contingent upon sustained cooperation. 
Secondly, democratic societies are characterized by the permanent presence of 
pluralism in a culture that resembles a Humean state of moderate scarcity, a condition 
that can be overcome either through state tyranny or mutual cooperation. Obviously, 
mutual cooperation is preferable to tyranny. This emphasis on the basic structure and the 
conditions that would promote cooperation for economic and material gain as well as 
tolerance and neutrality towards visions of the good is Rawls's idea of an overlapping 
consensus: "[It] is not a happy coincidence, even if aided as it no doubt must be by 
historical good fortune, but is rather in part the work of society's public tradition of 
political thought."78 
Political Liberalism 
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These additional model-conceptions lay the groundwork for the more complete pre-
sentation of political liberalism. The ideas behind political liberalism flow from Raw 1s' s 
concern to return to a classical conception of political philosophy that is more or less 
strictly political and does not address epistemological or psychological questions per se. 
Political liberalism hopes to overcome two objections - skepticism and indifference, and 
the lack of social or political support to assure compliance with the principles of justice-
in part by answering two objections. 79 First, Rawls appeals to the principle of a 
reasonable moral psychology and its concomitant notions of trust and cooperation. 
Second, political liberalism requires citizens to affirm throughout the political society a 
uniform conception of themselves as free and equal citizens, and to accept that there are 
only some permissible conceptions of the good, or conversely that some conceptions of 
the good are not permissible. 80 I think it is important to see that political liberalism is, 
on this view, neutral in a particular way. To operate, it must have some agreement at the 
most basic level of political society, and the state must then employ something like 
"coercive neutrality," a neutrality of aim to ensure continuity and consistency in a liberal 
political culture. 81 Rawls refers to this as the "priority of the right over ideas of the 
good." (I shall have more to say about how this justificatory neutrality - the priority of 
the right over ideas of the good - operates in political liberalism in chapter 4.) 
Unity and Pluralism. But how can a particular political and moral conception 
achieve political stability and unity in the face of a pluralistic culture? Rawls provides an 
answer by eschewing some of the more traditional conceptions of justice. First, justice in 
a democratic society cannot be "a mere modus vivendi, dependent on a fortuitous con-
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junction of contingencies. "82 Those who seek to promote stability through the construc-
tion or imposition of a constitutional regime or modus vivendi merely manage the conflict 
inherent in a pluralistic society; they do nothing to help promote social stability and de-
velopment because they do not refer to agreement on the most fundamental political con-
cepts. What Rawls seeks here is a conception of justice that articulates the values and 
ideals of a democratic constitutional regime, not a system of constitutional design formed 
to guide the construction of political institutions as means of controlling group or 
individual interests.83 An important objection to Rawls's position is that a modus vivendi 
need not be based upon "a fortuitous conjunction of contingencies." Rawls's own 
examples of the English Revolution of 1649 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 could 
certainly be interpreted that way, as "mere historical fate," as it were. But there are other 
historical reasons and arguments that should persuade us otherwise. 84 So it is not clear 
that a modus vivendi is not a viable basis for a political culture. 
Rawls answers this by saying that a modus vivendi can be the historical beginnings 
of a political culture that is governed by the principles of JAF, but that a modus vivendi 
could never amount to anything but that. However, my point is that a modus vivendi is 
able to incorporate the ideas of JAF, but not necessarily to the extent that an overlapping 
consensus strives for. 
Secondly, JAF in the liberal-democratic conception is a particular moral concep-
tion, one that Rawls is at pains to distinguish from other more traditional and compre-
hensive doctrines such as utilitarianism and perfectionism. "[A] political conception of 
justice invo1ves ... no prior commitment to any wider doctrine. It looks initially to the ba-
sic structure and tries to elaborate a reasonable conception for that structure alone."85 
This is congruent with some of Rawls's earliest concepts of a political and moral 
theory of association, namely that political and moral philosophy should be similar yet 
distinct in some fundamental ways.s6 That is, Rawls still appears to be "looking for a 
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way of adjudicating between the competing claims of different interests. "87 Justice on 
any account requires "the establishment, within the structure of a practice, of a proper 
balance between competing claims."88 This thread of Rawls's thought has remained 
relatively constant. But Rawls now emphasizes, like the above distinction between 
political and moral philosophy, that his theory is "best understood [and was only intended 
as] a political rather than a moral doctrine- and as such is committed to no metaphysical 
theses. "89 
Particular-Political vs. Comprehensive-Moral Conceptions 
This distinction does not by itself resolve the problem. While JAF "is intended as a 
political conception of justice,"90 it contains and is to a large degree fueled by metaphysi-
cal and ontological conceptions regarding ethical theory and moral insight In particular 
it implies, as Michael Sandel has amply demonstrated, that these metaphysical and onto-
logical premises in Rawls's theory commit him to a particular conception of the self and 
its relation to political society. Be that as it may, Rawls insists upon a distinction be-
tween "a political conception of justice and a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or 
moral doctrine"91 as a basis for a political theory of justice. 
The distinction is largely" ... a matter of scope," i.e., a matter of how encompassing 
and fundamental a conception of the good is to a conception of justice. It is in this man-
ner that Rawls understands the Kantian maxim of the right prior to the good. The politi-
cal idea of the good is focused on or by a rationality of the kind defmed in "Kantian 
Constructivism": the rational advantage of pursuing a particular conception of the good 
tempered by social cooperation (or the reasonable which presupposes the rational).92 But 
the pursuable social goods, as categorized, are still those things contributing to individual 
autonomy and conceptions thereof, and are further constrained by their permissible con-
tribution to a well-ordered society. So there are necessarily some pursuits of the good 
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that in a neutral liberal society cannot be allowed due to the particular construction of 
neutrality of aim or outcome. That is, the basic structure must be designed (1) to exem-
plify and promote neutrality, which means that (2) (a) the basic structure cannot promote 
one vision of the good over another or any others, nor (b) can the basic structure inhibit, 
prohibit, or otherwise denigrate one vision of the good over others. 
There is another distinction here, between a vision of the good - which this cer-
tainly is - and an account of neutrality that allows a particular vision of the good - which 
this is also. This kind of neutrality is not itself a morally neutral conception of neutrality 
or the good. It is instead a morally biased yet acceptable justification of a neutral 
procedure that allows pluralism, yet de-emphasizes intolerance. 
Rawls does not imply that JAF is intended to be an "all inclusive" liberalism, one 
that accepts pluralism without question. Loss of "certain forms of life" is indeed 
lamentable, but "any society will prove uncongenial to some ways of life. But these so-
cial necessities are not to be mistaken for arbitrary bias or injustice.''93 Nor, apparently, 
are they to be mistaken for non-neutrality. 
Fiye Facts of Political Sociolo&y 
This conception of neutrality is refined when Rawls again emphasizes that political 
liberalism is determined or situated within an existing liberal culture.94 The existing 
liberal culture is characterized by "four general facts of political sociology and human 
psychology," facts about which we are presumably agreed, or at least accept as not 
fundamentally controversial. First, plurality- diversity and the resulting conflict of 
divergent ideas and pursuits of the good - is a permanent feature of modem democratic 
societies. Second, "only the oppressive use of state power can maintain a continuing 
common affirmation of one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine." 
Third, "an enduring and secure democratic regime ... must be willingly and freely 
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supported by at least a substantial majority of its politically active citizens." Fourth, "the 
political culture of a reasonably stable democratic society normally contains, at least 
implicitly, certain fundamental intuitive ideas from which it is possible to work up a 
political conception of justice suitable for a constitutional regime."95 
A fifth general fact is added shortly thereafter: most of our important decisions will 
not reach anything like full consensus, even given the conceptual bases and limits of rea-
sonable and rational discourse.96 These five facts become the empirical basis for political 
liberalism which, in tum, demonstrate the altered perception of the aims of political phi-
losophy for Rawls. The "burdens of reason" upon rational discourse and agreement serve 
as bases for political liberalism and the public conception of justice; reason can serve as a 
basis for agreement, even though we may disagree as to substance; so we can agree to in-
stitutions and even to their "kind," but not necessarily to their substantive and normative 
content.97 Political philosophy is then to articulate this possibility, and promote the con-
ditions for its acceptance and growth. 
Anticipated Objections. In keeping with these distinctions of moral versus political 
philosophy on the one hand and comprehensive versus (particular) political conceptions 
of justice on the other, Rawls proceeds to address four possible objections to the "idea of 
social unity founded on an overlapping consensus of a political conception of justice. "98 
First, despite the observation that a liberal democratic society is composed of "conflicting 
and indeed incommensurable comprehensive conceptions of the meaning, value and 
purpose of human life (or conceptions of the good)," still the idea of an overlapping 
consensus is not a modus vivendi, or a mere treaty between competing interests; it is a 
moral conception that includes and relies upon citizens, society, and the sense of justice 
as derived (agreed upon) by that society.99 Second, such a conception does not imply 
indifference or skepticism; the idea of an overlapping consensus instead implies that 
individuals must indeed hold these conceptions as part of such an idea. "Rather, we 
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appeal to a political conception of justice to distinguish between those questions that can 
be reasonably removed from the political agenda and those that cannot .... "100 
Third, agreeing upon the idea of an overlapping consensus does not mean that we 
must accept either politics as a modus vivendi or as a comprehensive doctrine; these are 
not the only available or viable choices. Describing an overlapping consensus entails the 
use of "free public reason" to "identify the fundamental roles of political values in ex-
pressing the terms of fair social cooperation consistent with mutual respect between citi-
zens regarded as free and equal," and helps to uncover "a sufficiently inclusive concor-
dant fit among political and other values as displayed in an overlapping consensus."lOl 
The fourth objection is the purported utopian character of the idea of an overlapping 
consensus: "that there are not sufficient political, social, or psychological forces either to 
bring about an overlapping consensus (when one does not exist), or to render one stable 
(should one exist)."102 Rawls answers this by noting the three elements of a political 
conception of justice: 
[F]irst, a specification of certain basic rights, liberties and opportuni-
ties (of the kind familiar from constitutional democratic regimes); second, 
an assignment of a special priority to those rights, liberties and opportuni-
ties, especially with respect to the claims of the general good and of per-
fectionist values; and third, measures assuring to all citizens adequate all-
purpose means to make effective use of their basic liberties and opportuni-
ties.to3 
So the three positive aspects of the political conception of an overlapping consensus 
are that they first determine and fix the basic rights and liberties, and assign them a prior-
ity in order to avoid conflict about their content and place within a constitutional regime; 
second, given the conflict inherent in a pluralistic political culture, these positive aspects 
avoid conflict by justifying the placement and content of these basic rights and liberties 
and their priority through an appeal to free public reason, removing them from justifica-
tion by appeal to any particular comprehensive moral doctrine, thereby placing them be-
yond political conflict; and finally, they encourage mutual cooperation and reasonable-
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ness, which reciprocally strengthens the ideas of free public reason and the policies and 
institutions resulting from these background considerations.104 
CONCLUSION 
Rawls's development of the idea of political liberalism reveals two primary shifts in 
his thought: first, while he is moving away from a liberally moral comprehensive 
doctrine that had guided his theory, he still maintains some of the core values of that 
Kantian doctrine. Second, Rawls seems to be more and more concerned with order and 
stability in his embellishments and revisions of a liberal theory of justice. But in moving 
from Theory to these later articles Rawls has, despite refmements that have significant 
consequences, left his two principles of justice as fairness intact. He has chosen instead 
to address the issue of how the principles operate in society, i.e., he has focused on 
context, not content. It is in the application and explication of these applications that 
Rawls's more controversial moves have surfaced. 
Clearly Rawls has increasingly emphasized the procedural aspects of political phi-
losophy in the development of his theory. This is indicated in the greater concern for the 
feasibility of his procedure, i.e., the "practicality" of the theory in, say, the construction of 
institutions, as opposed to the desirability of the theory, or how it withstands assessment, 
tempered by our considered judgments, in the theory's endeavor to distribute goods 
"fairly." Rawls implicitly denies to political philosophy a "search for truth," the subject 
that has dominated most philosophic subdisciplines and endeavors. 
Another way to say this is that after Theory, Rawls had a choice of directions in 
which to move his theory. He could have moved towards a more individualistic theory, 
one that more fully accounted for people's moral psychology and would allow sufficient 
room for individual make-up, etc.; or he could have (as he chose to) moved towards a 
theory that is more historically- and community-based. But even this move has drawn 
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fire from his critics. First, there were the emendations to his theory resulting from liberal 
critics. Then there were the critiques offered by philosophers and theorists postulating 
and formulating a theory of political association on radically alternative bases, the 
communitarian theorists. It is to two of those theories that I now tum. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ONTOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF 
MICHAEL SANDEL 
Nothing we do can be defended absolutely and fmally. But only by 
reference to something else that is not questioned. Le. no reason can be 
given why you should act (or should have acted) like this, except that by 
doing so you bring about such and such a situation, which again has to be 
an aim you accept. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 
Richard Arneson has recently commented that "[p]erhaps the most thorough ex-
tended critique of Rawls's theory is still Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice";2 I think this statement continues to accurately describe the state of critique in the 
development of JAF. Focusing on the internal structure of Rawls's conception of the 
person in a liberal political society, Sandel analyzes the epistemological, ontological, and 
metaphysical aspects of Rawls's conception of the person within the structure of what is 
called "deontologicalliberalism," a name that emphasizes Rawls's debt to Kantian ethics. 
Rather than being a critique of rationality in modern moral, social and political thought, 
this critique focuses on the internal structure of Rawls's arguments, and the justifications 
for liberalism and JAF. 
The various arguments historically relied upon to justify liberalism have been re-
evaluated since the inception of Rawls's Theory. Liberalism no longer has to rely upon 
the more "traditional" justifications for a neutral liberal state - experimentalism and 
skepticism - that have been advanced by some of the greatest historical political thinkers 
that we now consider to be liberals. 3 In a very significant way, this point has been made 
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all the more clear in Michael Sandel's critique: contemporary deontologicalliberalism is 
greatly in Sandel's debt if not for clarifying the terms of the debate, then for 
circumscribing and delimiting the conceptual limits of a liberal conception of the person. 
However, while Sandel's argument is largely in opposition to Rawls's theory and 
the model-conceptions and the way they are used (the difference principle, the argument 
for a construction of the person that does not rely upon a conception of desert, and the 
novel use of the social contract), these are aspects of Sandel's argument I must put aside 
in order to address a narrower focus: the liberal construction and placement of the person 
in society, and the communitarian objection to that construction. 
Sandel's critique generates three distinct but inter-related claims: "descriptive 
claims which stress that people are social beings; normative claims which celebrate the 
value of community and solidarity, and a meta-ethical claim emphasizing that political 
principles should mirror 'shared understandings.' "4 I am primarily concerned with the 
descriptive and normative claims. In particular I want to show how these claims are 
advanced in Sandel's theory in contradistinction to liberalism, and why and how such 
claims (a) fail as a result of the confusion of separate descriptive claims, but also (b) in 
confusing those claims with other normative claims. Additionally I will show that while 
the descriptive and normative claims do account for our way of understanding and doing 
politics and political theory, Rawls has adequately answered the pertinent aspects of this 
part of Sandel's critique, and has thus overcome a fundamental communitarian criticism. 
I will proceed as follows. Before examining Sandel's critique, I will make the 
deontologicalliberal and communitarian positions more clear by characterizing them in a 
general, if truncated form. I will then examine Sandel's critique as it has been stated in 
his primary work, Liberalism and the limits of Justice. Here I will explore the claims 
that Sandel makes against Rawls's theory, claims that are advanced through a critique of 
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the conception of the person that Sandel says Rawls must rely upon in order support the 
major point of his theory -justice as fairness. 
In the second section, I will examine the underlying claims that fuel Sandel's 
critique. These underlying claims - the justification for the communitarian position -
have been variously called the social thesis, the social embeddedness thesis, the social 
fixedness thesis, etc. I will examine only one form of this idea as it presented in Sandel's 
(and later Alasdair Macintyre's) work, the social embeddedness thesis. Here I will note 
that Sandel must rely upon a rather weak form of this claim, a claim that at once 
disallows some of his criticisms of Rawls and also allows Rawls to respond adequately 
and convincingly to Sandel's critique. 
I will then examine several of the most common liberal objections to Sandel's 
critique to see which of these liberal responses are apt, and which are not. Obviously, 
Sandel's critique has provoked a passionate response not only amongst deontological 
liberals, but also amongst liberals who are sympathetic but not always in agreement with 
Rawls and his project. I will conclude by noting that Sandel's critique has provided more 
food for liberal thought than have some liberal theories, and perhaps even more than 
some liberals would care to admit. 
COMMUNIT ARIANISM AND LIBERALISM: 
A STUDY IN CONTRASTS? 
Deontologicalliberalism is a theory about justice and the fundamental place that 
justice occupies in contemporary Western moral and social ideals. The core thesis of this 
form of liberalism is stated as the idea that 
... society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own 
aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is 
governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular 
conception of the good; what justifies these regulative principles above all 
is not that they maximize the social welfare or otherwise promote the 
good, but rather that they conform to the concept of right, a moral 
category given prior to the good and independent of it. s 
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JAF and political liberalism seek to defme, discover, or create moral standards that 
can subsume a culture. However, such a project makes little sense if, as understood by 
communitarians, moral values do not precede a culture but are instead seen as being 
constituted by that culture. For the communitarians, practice precedes theory; liberal 
theory then not only asks the wrong questions, it gets the wrong answers. The job of 
political theory is not one of discovering principles through the use of an "ideal situation" 
(Rawls's OP) that may lead to some sort of fair or just association; it becomes rather the 
effort to describe our associations critically, and in so doing take the developments of 
social and political history seriously. 
Liberals, on the other hand, have traditionally valued diversity, pluralism, tolerance, 
and freedoms and rights of various kinds; these have been prized as vehicles or means 
towards the pursuit of a self-developing and self-constructing political and metaphysical 
being. 6 In so doing, liberalism defines rights as the vehicles or means for attaining that 
good prior to any conception. The "right thing to do" must, for Rawls, be given lexical 
and moral priority over any concept or conception of a substantive idea or ideal of the 
good. 
The Communitarian Challen~e 
Opposed to this liberal political idea is the communitarian concern of trying to 
describe a culture that cannot adequately define or promote a conception of the person 
(however conceived), the society, and the relation of the two. Morality is in effect not 
something in the abstract, something known from without or prior to political society or 
political association. Morality, and especially any meaningful concept of political 
morality, must be created in the historical tradition of a culture and derived from analysis 
of the practice of that particular culture. Laws and social rules of conduct - the things we 
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agree to do or even agree upon - are thus not derived from abstract principles of reason 
and imposed upon the culture in the manner that liberals, following Locke, Kant and Mill, 
wish to advocate. Laws and mores are instead an integral part of- they are constitutive 
of- living and associating within a particular culture, a particular tradition that over the 
course of history comes to define a people and a way of life. In a sense, Rawls 
epitomizes the communitarian criticism that our theory allows if not encourages 
disagreements in morality, ethics, and politics. To the communitarian, "the foundation of 
morals lie not in philosophy but in politics."7 
A clarification is in order here. Communitarians do not deny that any ordered 
society - for Rawls, this would be a "well ordered society" - cannot have laws and rules 
as an heuristic or defming element. To be sure, the rules and laws of a society are some 
of the things that one can use to describe and identify essential aspects of any society. 
What is objected to is the idea of discovering or formulating principles and rules of 
association if those laws are seen as rules derived from the "pure application of reason." 
A Response: Clarifyin~ the PrQject of Liberalism 
Political liberalism responds to this objection by incorporating some of these 
criticisms, primarily formulated in the social embeddedness thesis, into its theory. As a 
descendent of deontologicalliberalism, political liberalism then has several 
distinguishing characteristics. In a straightforward moral sense, deontologicalliberalism 
focuses on the idea that justice is a if not the primary value in modern society: "[t]he 
demands of justice outweigh other moral and political interests, however pressing these 
others may be. Justice on this view is not merely one value among others, ... but the 
highest of all social virtues, the one that must be met before others can make their 
claims."8 Secondly, the principles of justice - the ways in which we conceive of our 
rules of association amongst individuals and in our institutions - are to be justified in 
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such a way that those principles do not rely upon any particular vision of the good; justice 
in a liberal society above all must be neutral and independent in such a way that it cannot 
promote or inhibit any particular vision of the good. 
So far, this is not terribly controversial. A crucial portion of the liberal-
communitarian debate has focused on whether or not such a conception of neutrality and 
independence of the principles of justice is not in itself a vision of the good. (This is a 
crucial question, but one that I can only address peripherally at best in Chapter V.) In this 
chapter, I will be concerned with how a defmition of neutrality has been understood by 
Michael Sandel, and how political liberalism has responded to this interpretation and 
critique. One response has been to revise but not substantially alter the conception of 
neutrality in JAF. This has benefited both sides of the debate, as all are at least referring 
to the same kind, form, or definition of neutrality. Another response has been to promote 
and advance the aspects of neutrality and toleration in liberal theory, which has more 
closely linked those arguments concerned with state control and coercion with those 
arguments that are centered more on the construction and placement of the person in 
society. 
But there is an additional characteristic of the role of justice in a liberal society, and 
this is the place where controversy between the liberal and communitarian positions often 
begins. Justice presumes that one of our important values in society - freedom, or 
autonomy - will be supported by relying upon neutrality and toleration as a justification 
for the primacy of such a particular conception of justice. "Only when I am governed by 
principles that do not presuppose any particular ends am I free to pursue my own ends 
consistent with a similar freedom for all."9 So on this deontological formulation, justice 
is closely linked to our conceptions of people (selves) in political society, our conception 
of what is fair with respect to treating other peoples (our associations, institutionally and 
personally, with other selves), and our intuitive notions of what is fair. 
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Now, we should note that this way of putting the question - the right prior to the 
good -leads to a common criticism of liberalism: that "[as] the right is prior to the good, 
so the subject is prior to its ends."lO Because we view individuals as beings that must be 
accorded equal status with respect to each other, and because we value those aspects of 
human life that are associated with the political, we must then - in a very real ontological 
and metaphysical sense - value a conception of persons and individuals above our 
conception of how we must treat those individuals. On this way of putting the argument, 
JAF and political liberalism have already lost: we cannot say that we value the 
(procedural) right over the (substantive) good, because if we value persons prior to 
associations of them, then we are placing a conception of the good - the priority of the 
person - over and above our ideas of how those persons should associate - the right. 
Obviously, this way of characterizing the liberal-communitarian debate does not get 
us very far. Rather than posing better questions about how we conceive of justice and the 
implications and consequences that such a conception has for persons and society, we 
have already answered them. With this in mind, I would now like to explore Sandel's 
claims against Rawls in greater depth and detail, and see what is so objectionable about 
JAF' s conception of persons. 
ONTOLOGY AND PERSONS IN JAF 
Sandel's Two-Pron~ed CritiQue 
Turning to Sandel's critique, we find two attacks against Rawls's construction of 
the person, and how that person is conceived within political society. The first unpacks 
and exposes Rawls's construction of the choosing subject in the OP, and why such a 
construction fails. The second examines the place of the self in society, and how Rawls, 
despite claims to the contrary, relies implicitly upon a "transcendental" conception of the 
self, and not one composed of "self-distanced yet chosen" attributes. I will begin with 
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Sandel's understanding of Rawls's conception of the choosing subject, and particularly 
how that subject is "constructed" in the OP. 
The Self and Its Ends. Sandel notes that Rawls's approach to the person as a 
subject of possession - a person with "veiled attributes" - assumes some features about 
the concept of the person: 
For justice to be the first virtue, certain things must be true of us. We 
must be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a 
certain way. We must stand at a certain distance from our circumstance, 
whether as transcendental subject in the case of Kant, or as essentially 
unencumbered subject of possession in the case of Rawls. Either way, we 
must regard ourselves as independent: independent from the interests and 
attachments we may have at any moment, never identified by our aims but 
always capable of standing back to survey and assess possibly to revise 
them.ll 
Of course, for justice to be so important to us, there must be conflicting claims over 
what is right and good in society, as well as conflicting claims to distributive justice: 
who gets what, when, and how. The distributive aspect aside, J AF recognizes that 
conflicting claims are one of the most important considerations of justice: plurality, or 
the social fact of numerous and disparate notions of what is right and good must be 
accounted for in our political relations. That is, we must allow if not promote state-
sanctioned pluralism. Reflective equilibrium plays an important role here: it judges be-
tween those "reasonable and plausible" convictions about justice on the one hand, and 
those of our "more considered" or philosophically examined notions on the other.12 
This is what Sandel calls deontology's liberating project: the ability to liberate the 
self from his or her assets and attributes through the construction of a metaphysical way 
of conceiving the individual, i.e. those things we commonly think of as "who we are and 
what we do." Rawls proposes this detached version of the self in order to identify certain 
principles of association that would be "fair" (i.e., without regard to social status, race, 
color or creed, etc.) to show that these principles are in accord with the ideals of justice. 
Rawls assumes that if all players - representatives in the OP- begin from a position 
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where ignorance would preclude some kinds of knowledge of one's self that would most 
certainly skew the outcome of a particular procedure - social status, wealth, intelligence, 
etc.; the results of the "natural lottery"- then the outcome is "fair'' in that all persons start 
from the same position. 
But by distinguishing the self from its ends in the OP, and by insisting upon the 
right over the good, Sandel notes that this implies that the self is prior to its ends. Indeed, 
this claim is acknowledged by Rawls in Theory: 
We should not attempt to give form to our life by first looking to the 
good independently defined. It is not our aims that primarily reveal our 
nature but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to govern the 
background conditions under which these aims are to formed and the 
manner in which they are to be pursued. For the self is prior to the ends 
which are affirmed by it; even a dominant end must be chosen from among 
numerous possibilities .... We should therefore reverse the relation 
between the right and the good proposed by teleological doctrines and 
view the right as prior.B 
Rawls insists, along with most liberals, that relations between people should not be 
based upon the vagaries and uncontrollable developments that characterize history and 
politics: we should not allow institutions to treat people and classes thereof only as 
means to an end. We must instead construct a way to view institutions- or even 
reconstruct those institutions - in a way that will accord with a theory of justice, a theory 
that accounts for our considered notions of fairness and equality. This assumes that there 
must be selves of a sort that are prior to the ends that may be chosen. 
The priority of the self over its ends means that I am not merely a 
passive receptacle of the accumulated aims, attributes, and purposes 
thrown up by experience, no.t simply a product of the vagaries of 
circumstance, but always, irreducibly, an active, willing agent, 
distinguishable from my surroundings, and capable of choice. To identify 
any set of characteristics as my aims, ambitions, desires, and so on, is 
always to imply some subject 'me' standing behind them, and the shape of 
this 'me' must be prior to any ends or attributes I bear.l4 
Radically Disembodied or Radically Situated? The "self-prior-to-its-ends" can then 
be understood in at least two different ways. The first is a moral or a "must" self which 
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"reflects the imperative to respect above all the autonomy of the individual, to regard the 
human person as the bearer of a dignity beyond the roles that he inhabits and the ends he 
may pursue." IS This is obviously the more commonly understood Kantian self, a person 
to be respected as an end in himself, and never only as a means. 
But the second Rawlsian notion is one "in which the self 'must' be prior to the ends 
it affirms - prior in the sense of independently identifiable - and this is an 
epistemological requirement."16 Such a self is thus more than simply a "concatenation of 
various contingent desires, wants, and needs" because then the self would be different 
with any change in the attributes; the "attributively defined self' is then not an option that 
Rawls endorses. ''The possessive aspect of the self means that I can never be fully 
constituted by my attributes, that there must always be some attributes I have rather than 
am."11 
But neither can we have a coherent conception of the self that is "radically 
disembodied," i.e., defined as completely separate from its attributes. Behind the veil of 
ignorance, the self could not logically or coherently be in any place, so to speak, that 
would make sense. Such a radically disembodied self would have no experience; it 
would have nothing to strive for- no motivation - and would not have any way of 
distinguishing and deliberating about what can and cannot be chosen as a principle of 
justice. There would be no person as such because this conception does not allow for "a 
person" to exist on Sandel's interpretation, only the possibility of the attributes of such a 
person. Without some background information to situate the self, the task of formulating, 
accounting for, or discovering principles of justice would appear to be meaningless. 
So Rawls has a choice of direction between two divergent constructs of the person 
in which to move his theory: the person as a moral subject who can stand back or 
"remove himself' from his attributes and thus be able to choose principles of association 
and justice from a standpoint of relative ignorance; or a conception of the person so 
radically disembodied from their attributes that choices made by such an individual 
would appear without basis, that is, "completely" arbitrary. 
The OP and the Deriyation of the Self: Objections 
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Following this distinction, Sandel claims that both definitions fail. The first fails 
because it emphasizes too greatly the role of the OP in the construction and placement of 
the person. Sandel questions whether or not this conception "achieves genuine 
detachment from existing wants and desires" because it emphasizes "the account of 
primary goods or some other aspect of the thin theory of the good and argues that it is 
biased in favor of particular conceptions of the good and against others."18 Clearly, this 
is a central claim against Rawlsian liberalism, one that Sandel (unfortunately) does not 
pursue beyond this: that through the careful set-up of the OP, Rawls is not able to define 
the right over the good after all. Instead of enabling the procedural aspects of the right to 
take precedence over normative aspects of the good, the OP becomes a good in and of 
itself thereby stripping it of any unusual or unique philosophical or metaphysical strength 
that could be derived from a claim of neutrality, arguably the aim of the OP all along.19 
(As will show in Chapter V, this argument fails because Rawls, and Larmore with him, 
essentially subvert this claim by noting that political liberalism, as an outgrowth of JAF, 
is not a moral conception of the good per se, but rather a morally neutral manner in which 
to justify a procedural and a substantive conception of the right and the good. 
Additionally, this confuses or mistakenly attributes to JAF and political liberalism a 
definition of neutrality that is inapposite; this too will be addressed in Chapter V.) 
But we should note carefully the consequences of some changes that have been 
made in Rawls's position since Sandel's publication with regard to "social context" The 
OP does not now describe an "ideal" situation, devoid of any social context or any socio-
historical attributes from which a person can derive some "place." Rather, Rawls notes 
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that our political practice is, in a very real sense, "grounded"; we have limited options 
available to us as those options have come to us through the circumstances of history, and 
have tended to shape our social, political, and individual preferences.20 The OP is then 
an heuristic, not a constructive or definitive device. "So what is (and always has been) at 
issue for Rawls is 'background justice' in already existing societies."21 
The original position, then, is a device which serves to draw out the 
principles of justice appropriate for a polity which (implicitly) holds to 
these models of the person and of the well-ordered society. It does this 
because it is constructed and peopled in way which reflects the values 
implicit in the two model conceptions of the person and the well-ordered 
society ..... 
[So the] question has a context. And that context is society; or at least 
society as it has been modeled in the OP.22 
The second objection is that the notion of the OP is certainly too abstract, not as a 
purely metaphysical matter, although that too is true. More importantly, it is too abstract 
because if the OP is to allow persons to derive principles of justice from an analysis of 
future contingencies, it cannot do this because of its own procedural restraints and 
epistemological consequences. 
Such an objection would most likely take issue with the veil of 
ignorance on the grounds that it excludes morally relevant information, 
information necessary to generate any meaningful results. It would argue 
that the notion of the person embedded in the original position is too 
formal and abstract, too detached from contingency to account for the 
requisite motivations. 23 
So, "[w]here the first objection complains that [Rawls's] thin theory of the good is too 
thick to be fair, the second contends that the veil of ignorance is too opaque to yield a 
determinate solution."24 
Dispossession and Clnldifference. Mutual disinterest between the person and his or 
her ends and between persons is then a key factor. There must be some "metaphysical 
space" between subject and object. This idea "is not an assumption about what motivates 
people, but an assumption about the nature of subjects who possess motivations in 
67 
general .... It concerns the subject of interests and ends, not the contents of those interests 
and ends, whatever they may happen to be." 
In Rawls's view, any account of self and [its] ends must tell us not one 
thing but two things: how the self is distinguished from its ends, and also 
how the self is connected to its ends. Without the first we are left with a 
radically situated subject; without the second, a radically disembodied 
subject.25 
Thus, the moral person is "a subject with ends he has chosen, and his fundamental 
preference is for conditions that enable him to frame a mode of life that expresses his 
nature as a free and equal rational being as fully as circumstances permit."26 These two 
ways of viewing the self as apart or distinct from its ends creates an essential but 
unresolved tension that Sandel calls a form of "dispossession" or "disempowerment." 
Again, the first holds the self and its ends at some distance from each other, while the 
second seeks to collapse or minimize this distance. But the aspect of mutual disinterest, 
once properly understood,27 alleviates the tension here. 
All interests, values, and conceptions of the good are open to the 
Rawlsian self, so long as they can be cast as the interests of a subject 
individuated in advance and given prior to its ends, so long, that is, as they 
describe the objects I seek rather than the subject I am.28 
Choices and Ends ... ? But this dilemma is avoided only to face another: given that 
interests, values, and conceptions of the good can only be "cast as the interests of a 
subject in advance," the Rawlsian self is first incapable of choice due to the lack of 
choice allowed in the OP, and second is no longer "independently identifiable and prior 
to its ends," because it relies instead upon an intersubjective conception. 29 
The distinction here between the construction of intersubjective and intrasubjective 
conceptions of the self is important. An intersubjective self allows for the conception of 
more than simply one "self' when referring to some kinds of moral situations, i.e., fam-
ily, communal or national obligations of a moral nature. Intrasubjective conceptions are a 
conceptual tool that allow the existence of multiple aspects of a self or even "selves 
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within a self' in some moral situations, primarily to promote and carry out moral dis-
course. An example of the former would be a person who has received contrary advice 
from two friends about some action that a person (the subject) is supposed to take; an 
example of the latter might be the metaphorical "angel and devil" sitting atop a subject's 
right and left shoulders, dispensing advice appropriate to their respective positions. 
Sandel notes that 
[w]hile Rawls does not reject such notions explicitly, he denies them 
by implication when he assumes that to every individual person there 
corresponds a single system of desires ... , [that] the problem of conflating 
desires does not arise in the individual case, and the principle of rational 
prudence can properly govern one's conduct towards oneself.30 
So individuals in the OP are incapable of choke for several reasons. First, the individual 
is conceived as distant from interests and conceptions of the good. 
The motives attributed to the parties in the original position neither 
reflect the actual motivations current in society nor determine directly the 
motives of persons in a well-ordered society .... 
One consequence of this distance is to put the self beyond the reach of 
experience, to make it invulnerable, to fix its identity once and for all. ... 31 
This removal of the self from its ends has consequences for any conception of a link 
between the good (or available goods) and a public life: 
[1] A self so thoroughly independent as this rules out any conceptions 
of the good (or of the bad) bound up with possession in the constitutive 
sense. 
[2] It rules out the possibility of any attachment (or obsession) able to 
reach beyond our values and sentiments to engage our identity itself. 
[3] It rules out the possibility of a public life in which, for good or ill, 
the identity as well as the interests of the participants could be at stake. 
[ 4] And it rules out the possibility that common purposes and ends 
could inspire more or less expansive self-understandings and so define a 
community in the constitutive sense, a community describing the subject 
and not just the objects of shared aspirations.32 
I have already noted that on a revised understanding of the role of the OP in JAF, 
we must assume that society is a "given," that people do come from a particular society 
with particular rules and understandings of politics and people; i.e., there is a certain way 
that "things are done" in a society that makes sense - may only make sense - to the 
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inhabitants of that society. Now, this does not dispel the four negative characteristics 
about liberalism and modem life that Sandel is wont to raise. But it does provide a basis 
from which to question his position, and analyze what Sandel is really saying. This I 
must postpone for a while until section 3, ''The Social Embeddedness Thesis." 
... Or Ends Witbout Choice? A second objection to Rawls's choosing subject is 
developed when Sandel notes that Rawls sets up the OP so that the individuals have little 
choice but to decide upon the principles of justice as formulated, i.e., that the subject is 
no longer identifiable and prior to its ends. 
The aim is to characterize this situation so that the principles that 
would be chosen, whatever they tum out to be, are acceptable from a 
moral point of view. The original position is defined in such a way that it 
is a status quo in which any agreements reached are fair. 33 
The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that 
any principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure 
procedural justice as a basis of theory.34 
We could take the generous view, as Sandel initially suggests, and read these 
passages rather "liberally" and accept that such a procedure would indeed be fair. But 
"there is another, less expansive reading of [the situation of the participants in the OP] 
which gives considerably less scope to their enterprise." 
On this view, "any agreements reached" in the original position are 
fair, not because the procedure sanctifies just any outcome, but because 
the situation guarantees a particular outcome. But if the principles agreed 
to are just because only (the) just principles can be agreed to, the 
voluntarist aspect of the enterprise is not as spacious as would first appear. 
The distinction between pure and procedural justice fades, and it becomes 
unclear whether the procedure "translates its fairness to the outcome" or 
whether the fairness leads to the right result35 
Thus, not only is the self proposed by Rawls incapable of choice because it cannot 
deliberate and reflect upon the bases of choice, but the options available to the individual 
are constrained in such a way as to move the choosing self towards only one option. The 
self is not allowed to choose so much as the choices are determined for it.36 
The Claims Re~ardin~ Persons. Justice. and the Community 
Sandel's argument can be summarized by noting the several points of 
correspondence found between Rawls's moral theory and his theory of the person. 
Where the morality of right corresponds to the bounds of the self and 
speaks to that which distinguishes us, the morality of good corresponds to 
the unity of persons and speaks to that which connects us. On a 
deontological ethic, where the right is prior to the good, this means that 
what separates us is in some important sense prior to what connects us -
epistemologically prior as well as morally prior. We are distinct 
individuals first, and then we form relationships and engage in co-
operative arrangements with others; hence the priority of plurality over 
unity. We are barren subjects of possession first, and then we choose the 
ends we would possess; hence the priority of the self over its ends. 37 
We must keep in mind that Sandel wishes to argue against this position, that he 
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wishes to argue for an intersubjective conception of the self, a definition that can sustain 
close scrutiny on the distinction between the object and the subject of possession. Again, 
this is an area of Sandel's argument that I cannot pursue. But we should note that to this 
end, Sandel argues against Rawls's and Dworkin's arguments advanced in favor of e.g. 
affirmative action on the grounds that either the conception of rights upon which 
affirmative action arguments are based ignores the community allegiances that we de-
velop in our lifetimes; Rawls and Dworkin provide no good reasons to rely upon "more 
general social concerns" as opposed to relying upon specific community concerns when 
evaluating claims as to where individual attributes lie; and that by relying upon a false 
idea of community - placing some attributes in "society as a whole" instead of within the 
individual- they either contradict the Kantian injunction against using others only as a 
means to an end, or they evade the contradiction by failing to distinguish the ends and the 
self sufficiently. 38 
Three Conceptions of Community. These distinctions of the relation of self to 
community, and deontologicalliberalism's failure to adequately provide and maintain 
and adequate distinction, are shown more clearly in Sandel's three definitions of 
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community. The first is called an "instrumental view"; it is one that Sandel and Rawls 
both correctly dismiss. It is a notion of a "private community," one "where individuals 
regard social arrangements as a necessary burden and cooperate only for the sake of 
pursuing their private ends." The second, a "sentimental view," regards the scheme of 
social cooperation as a good in itself, one in which participants have shared fmal ends; 
this is the strong sense of community that Sandel claims Rawls relies upon. In the 
instrumental view, community "is wholly external to the aims and interests of the 
individuals who comprise it," whereas in the sentimental view community is completely 
internal to the subjects "in that it reaches the feelings and sentiments of those engaged in 
a cooperative scheme."39 
But these can be distinguished from a third sense of community, one that is 
constitutive of the conceptions of identity "as defmed to some extent by the community 
of which they are a part For them, community describes not just what they have as 
fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose ... but an attachment 
they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity."40 
Conceptions of the Relation of the Ri~ht and the Good. This corresponds roughly 
to Sandel's characterization of Rawls's use of the relation of the right to the good. We 
should recall that Rawls promotes the right over and above the good. Again, this relation 
like the others reviewed by Sandel, can be viewed in three different ways: the right as an 
antecedent prohibition upon conceptions of the good ("the principles of justice ... are not 
[then] subject to our agency; they apply whether we like them or not. .. "); the good as an 
arbitrary or indeterminate decision from the result of contigencies, while the right is again 
determined previously; and the view that the priority of the right as "the need for some 
ultimately 'unchosen' background as a precondition of choice in conceptions of the good. 
This is the epistemological priority that deontological ethics carries over in a moral 
priority."41 
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In each of these instances of correspondence in Rawls's moral and political theory, 
Sandel implies that there is a discrepancy between the assumptions about and use of the 
person in Rawls's moral theory that subsume his political theory, and what that person 
can coherently and epistemologically "look like" under that conception. To Sandel, there 
is at best a confusion and at worst a fatal flaw in Rawls's theory regarding how the person 
"fits" into the construction of the liberal society where "justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions." But before evaluating Sandel's claim as a whole, we must first examine 
more closely what Sandel means when he says that people must be viewed as radically 
situated and intersubjective selves. 
THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS THESIS 
I have noted that Sandel, along with other communitarians, relies on a set of 
descriptive and normative claims that have been variously labeled as the social 
embeddedness thesis, the social thesis, the cultural options thesis, the idea of shared 
relations, etc. Some theorists tend to rely upon a particular view of this set of claims and 
how they are to be understood in modern political theory. So, for example, Simon Caney 
taxonomically places Sandel and Macintyre in the "social embeddedness thesis" camp, 
Charles Taylor in the "social thesis" camp, and Michael Walzer in the "cultural options 
thesis camp."42 (The distinctions between these different claims are not important here, 
as I will be addressing only Sandel's and Macintyre's arguments against Rawls's form of 
deontologicalliberalism.) For simplicity's sake, I shall discuss only the embeddedness 
thesis, or that narrower claim that "a persons' character is shaped by their social [and 
therefore moral] context."43 
The social embeddedness thesis is the idea that people are constituted by their social 
context, i.e., that people 
... conceive their identity - the subject and not just the object of their 
feelings and aspirations - as defined to some extent by the community of 
which they are a part. For them, community describes not just what they 
have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they 
choose (as in voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not 
merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity. 44 
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It then has as much to do with the self-conception of the person as it does with the self-
society relation. How then ought political theory to conceive of these relations, and how 
do Sandel and Rawls do so? In what ways are they different, how do they claim 
distinction from each other, and can these differences be sustained? But before we can 
discuss the way and Sandel and Rawls discuss this, we must note two important 
distinctions. 
Metaphysical or Political Bein~s? 
We can distinguish first between two conceptions of the self made under this 
embeddedness thesis: these are, for lack of better terms, a "metaphysical" claim and a 
"political" one.45 The metaphysical claim we must reject; it assumes that liberalism is a 
metaphysical theory, or makes claims that must either be subsumed or justified by some 
greater metaphysical assumptions about the self and its relation to society. 
Liberalism cannot be construed in this way. Certainly, liberalism has under some 
philosophers assumed a fundamental conception of the kind of person that is necessary 
for the theory to make certain claims. While I cannot pursue this claim, we should be 
careful to note that liberalism as a political theory has historically tried to distance itself 
from such claims. So when most liberal theorists write about liberalism, they "do not 
mean a vague Zeitgeist or the outlook of modern man but a clearly identifiable cluster of 
political principles and positions defended by, among others, Milton, Spinoza, Locke, 
Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire, Smith, Kant, Madison, and J. S. Mill .... 'Liberalism' is as 
good a term as any for this shared body of political purpose and moral principles."46 
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This does not mean that liberals have not made metaphysical claims; indeed, some 
have done so as part of a moral or an epistemological theory, or within a different kind of 
argument altogether, and this perhaps erroneously. (Locke's theory of government, 
bolstered by his theory of human understanding, can be plausibly and most coherently 
viewed this way. Kant's moral theory too is an example of this kind of conflation.) 
What I want to say is that we must distinguish claims that have been made and 
vindicated by liberal thinkers as matters of moral and political theory from claims that are 
more concerned with social and "constitutive" relations. We can see that Sandel has the 
latter concern in mind when he writes that a person's identity consists in "those qualities 
most plausibly regarded as essential to a person's identity- one's character, values, core 
convictions, and deepest loyalties."47 
Wholly or Partially Determined Social Bein~s? 
Secondly, the embeddedness thesis is ambiguously understood under two different 
guises. One conception is that individuals are partly shaped by their community or social 
context, in which case they have the conceptual ability to distance themselves from the 
dominant conception of what a person should be; this is the "partially embedded" thesis. 
The other or "wholly embedded" thesis is that people are wholly determined by their 
community or social context, in which case they cannot have the conceptual ability to 
distance themselves from the dominant conception of what a person should be. 
A similar point has been expressed by Patrick Neal and David Paris. 48 They note 
that the concept of "shared relations" has different meanings for liberals and 
communitarians. But a misunderstanding of the conception of shared relations that is 
found in liberalism leads communitarians to attribute to liberalism a metaphysical sense 
of the good and the self, a conception which misses the point of a liberal conception of a 
political self. 49 
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Liberalism can generally be understood as having a contingently-based conception 
of shared relations, which means each person is a "self' that "exists" beyond the reach of 
society's influence. This should not be construed to mean that the content (normative or 
other) of a self- a person's "beliefs and preferences"- is not unaffected by society; this 
would be patently false and would "ignore the most mundane facts of socialization."50 
Any ideas about liberalism that rely upon such a conception rely upon a false 
understanding of the dominant liberal conception of the self. 
Communitarianism, on the other hand, generally relies upon an essentially based 
conception of shared relations in society. This means that "the identity of each self is 
partially or wholly constituted by the relation."51 Now, we could dismiss this claim as a 
mere sociological aphorism that "a person's character is shaped (but not determined) by 
cultural context"52 However true, that statement is relatively uninteresting; but we 
should note an important shared feature: neither conception bears any direct or obvious 
relation to any particular set of normative political commitments. 53 
Now, these conceptions of the self- contingent and essential - are rather abstract. 
And due to this one important similarity, we know two things about the conception of the 
self in liberal and communitarian constructions. First, these descriptions have to do not 
with the normative content of the concept of person, but instead with how the self-society 
relation is conceived logically and coherently. Secondly, that these different ways in 
which the self-society relation is conceived have different consequences for that 
normative content; that is, while the normative content of the person is in some ways 
limited to the description of the concept of person being used, still there is no one single 
or definitive kind of person that must be used according to that description. "Conceptions 
of essentially and contingently shared relations are conceptions of how relations are 
shared, and correspondingly of how the self is defined and understood."54 
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Oscillation Between Conceptions 
Sandel seems to want to affirm both the partially- and wholly- embedded theses. 
This is particularly apparent in his discussions of the radically disembodied as opposed to 
the radically situated subject. On the wholly embedded construction, Sandel writes that a 
subject (the person) acquires ideals of association (self-command) "not by choosing what 
is already given but by reflecting on itself and inquiring into its constituent nature, 
discerning its laws and imperatives, and acknowledging its purposes as its own .... It 
succeeds by restoring the shrunken space between self and ends." So the relevant 
question for a subject (person) to ask is "not what to choose, ... but rather who I am, how I 
am to discern in this clutter of possible ends what is me from what is mine. Here, the 
bounds of the self are not fixtures but possibilities, their contours no longer self-evident 
but at least partly unformed. Rendering them clear and defining the bounds of my 
identity are one and the same."55 
But at times Sandel supports the partially-embedded construction of this thesis. 
This is apparent in his idea of a constitutive community. 
For a subject to play a role in shaping the contours of its identity 
require a certain faculty of reflection .... What is required is a certain 
capacity for self-knowledge, a capacity for what we have called agency in 
th . . 56 e cogn1t1ve sense .... 
Additionally, people have the capacity for self-reflection: 
Unlike the capacity for choice, which enables the self to reach beyond 
itself, the capacity for [self] reflection enables the self to tum its lights 
inward upon itself, to inquire into its constituent nature, to survey its 
various attachments and acknowledge their respective claims ... and so 
gradually, throughout a lifetime, [allows the self] to participate in the 
constitution of its identity.57 
As Caney notes, this ambiguity between different versions or constructions of the 
social embeddedness thesis is significant: 
[W]hile it is plausible to say that a person's character and core 
commitments are partly shaped by their community, it is implausible to 
suggest that they are wholly determined by their community and that we 
cannot attain any critical distance. Sandel's own test of what is the best 
conception of the self- an appeal to that which accords best with our self-
understanding - surely supports the partial thesis and not the wholly 
embedded thesis. We do think of ourselves as being able to distance 
ourselves from parts or our community.58 
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Having clarified the social embeddedness thesis and Sandel's use of it, we can see 
that this concept has only limited application. But we can see further that on a reading of 
this thesis that Sandel implicitly supports, there is some agreement on the way in which 
the self-society relation must be viewed in political theory. Granted, we are left with a 
somewhat dissatisfying conclusion at this point: that "it is a sociological fact [if not a 
truism] that a person's character is shaped (but not determined) by cultural context"59 
But in examining some of the liberal responses to Sandel's critique in the next section, I 
will show that this ambiguity in Sandel's conception of the social embeddedness thesis 
weakens, but does not render powerless- does not dismiss- his critique. 
LffiERAL RESPONSES 
Many contributors to the debate have commented on the nature and focus of 
Sandel's extended critique. The differences of opinion and assessment here are almost as 
numerous as the interpretations of Rawls's work itself: some agree with Sandel, others 
fault Sandel for certain of his errors but not others, some disagree with his critique but 
nevertheless recognize its value and importance, while others still disagree with him 
almost completely. 
The objections to Sandel's cri.tique that I will address fall roughly into four 
categories. The first addresses the objection that some liberal defenders have raised: that 
Sandel is unfair because he either misinterprets Rawls's theory, or else he fails to account 
for developments that have taken place in Rawls's thought post-Theory. A second 
objection follows from the above interpretation of the understanding and use of the social 
embeddedness thesis, both as used in Sandel's own theory and his critique. A third 
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objection, really an observation of a point of similarity between Rawls and Sandel, notes 
that on this reading of the social embeddedness thesis, Rawls and Sandel can actually be 
seen as not so far apart in their respective epistemological stances. Finally, on an 
understanding of the person, we can see more clearly how Rawls and Sandel are truly 
different by examining the different interpretations and uses of the political conception of 
the person. 
Objection One: "lnterestin~ Mjsreadin~s" 
An early criticism is that Sandel does not take into account crucial developments, 
revisions, or additions in Rawls's theory. 6° This is a common accusation, and rests on a 
view of the discrepancy (chronological as much as anything else) between Sandel's ac-
count of the person in JAF and Rawls's developments following Theory, particularly in 
the Dewey Lectures and Tanner Lectures. Thus Wallach's statement: "Because so much 
of Sandel's critique depends on Rawls's theory relying on a metaphysical conception of 
'the moral subject,' Rawls's remarks in "Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical," 
along with those in "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," published two years 
before Sandel's book, tend to place Sandel's book qua Rawlsian critique in the category 
of interesting misreadings of A Theory of Justice."61 
I believe that this response misses the point of both Rawls's project and Sandel's 
critique. Sandel does not say that Rawls has committed himself to a conception of the 
person and then devised a theory of justice from such a construction however perceived. 
Rather, Sandel claims that Rawls's project of providing a basis for institutional justice 
implicitly commits him to a conception of the person or kinds of people we must be in 
order to live in a liberal society where "justice is the first virtue of social institutions."62 
Again, "[f]or justice to be the first virtue, certain things must be true of use. We must be 
creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a certain way .... "63 
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Thus, "Rawls's liberalism presupposes a philosophical conception of persons as es-
sentially autonomous choosers of all of their private ends and values, none of which 
define their identities, their sense of 'who they are. "'64 That is, Sandel's critique, aimed 
at both the Kantian theoretical and the practical justifications for social justice, 
demonstrates that in some very significant and conceptually fundamental ways Rawlsian 
liberalism contains a conception of the person that either leads us to misunderstand 
ourselves in practice, or does not allow us to coherently reflect upon the content and 
justification for moral and practical insight. 
Additionally, as I noted above in passing, this criticism rests upon a view of the 
chronological discrepancy between Sandel's critique and Rawls's revision in light of that 
critique. It would be difficult to sustain an objection that does not take into consideration 
the development of a theory over time, and in timely response to legitimate critique. So 
while "the starting point of this philosophical inquiry is not the OP but the prevailing 
moral beliefs and intuitions of modern liberal democratic societies,"65 we can understand 
this objection as a successful defense by Rawls against claims of "rootlessness" or the 
formulation of principles justice through the application of pure reason. 
There is, however, a closely related objection that I think is valid: that Sandel 
essentially ignored a part of Rawls's theory that was gaining prominence in the Dewey 
Lectures (1980) but was not emphasized until the Tanner Lectures (1982) and after. That 
part was Rawls's de-emphasis of Kantian expressivism in describing the role of persons, 
and emphasizing the modus vivendi view, which makes more sense of the attachment of 
social and primary goods to persons that Rawls wishes to make. It additionally paves the 
way for political liberalism. This objection I will continue to address in the next section, 
"Objection Two: Context and Constitution," and in Chapter V.66 
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Objection Iwo: Context and Constitution 
Many if not most liberals object to Sandel's assertion that the community is 
constitutive of the self. Indeed, many liberal defenders have taken Sandel to task here for 
his lack of justification, i.e., the few places where he definitively proposes an alternative 
to the liberal construction of the individual as a choosing self. The second objection then 
goes something like this: (1) identifying my community can be distinguished from 
identifying my place within it; (2) Sandel has not provided us with any argument 
substantiating or justifying the claim of the individual as constituted by the community; 
(3) a persuasive answer to either of these would not lead to a justifiable claim that "my 
context defmes who I am. "67 
[I]t looks like an exaggeration to say that my social context constitutes my 
identity, however constitution is understood .... Quite clearly I can identify 
with my community; furthermore, I can be identified by my place within 
it. But this does not mean that my context defmes who I am. 68 
This argument against the placement of "shared conceptions" in our social and 
political understanding prior to the reasonably articulated principles and notions of right 
or good is a central issue in the debate. Where do we "place" our considered reflections 
of the self-political society relationship when we consider the basic questions of political 
association? Clearly it is correct to see Sandel placing society and its practices prior to 
the articulation and acceptance of principles. 
The priority of the self over its ends means that I am not merely the 
passive receptacle of the accumulated aims, attributes, and purposes 
thrown up by experience, not simply a product of the vagaries of circum-
stance, but always, irreducibly, an active, willing agent, distinguishable 
from my surroundings, and capable of choice. 69 
Sandel goes on to distinguish two ways that the self-prior-to-its-ends can be 
conceived under Rawls's proposal: as a moral imperative in order to reflect and secure 
autonomy and respect, and as an epistemic need or requirement to distinguish the subject 
from its situation. 70 Without the epistemic distinction, which accords a difference in the 
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constitution of the self between having and being (that is, "I have x, y, or z" cf. "I am x, y, 
or z"), it becomes impossible to distinguish what is me from what is mine, and we are left 
with what might be called a radically situated subject. 71 Without the moral distinction, 
we would not be something that is desirable under the deontological conception: we 
would not be bearers of dignity beyond the roles that we inhabit and the ends we are 
allowed to pursue. 72 
Now this recalls the social embeddedness thesis, and here (as before) we should 
note that a strong liberal response is to raise questions about the structure of social vs. 
political relations; that is, questions about the communitarian' s use of the terms self, 
having, constitution, and the like. On this liberal objection, communitarians such as 
Sandel have difficulty clearly distinguishing what the object of critique is when debating 
the various constructions of the self: does the self "have its attributes," or is the self 
simply "its attributes"? Further, though, is such a question truly necessary to our 
understanding of political theory? 
Liberalism, and political liberalism in particular, does not need a "deep" or 
"constitutive" moral conception of the self beyond some of these basic assumptions that 
Sandel and Rawls are agreed upon. So there are three good reasons to either ( 1) reject the 
claim that liberalism (and JAF in particular) ignores our social or communal 
embeddedness, or (2) note where Rawls has responded to this claim adequately by 
revising his theory into political liberalism. The first reason we encountered above: that 
on any account of justice, we can argue that Rawls is very aware of the derivation of 
justice from within a social or tradition-oriented understanding; that is the point of 
Rawls's example of The Wars of Religion and England's Glorious Revolution in his later 
works. Additionally, we can note, as have Simon Caney and Stephen Holmes, that 
historically many liberals - Locke and Kant among them - have explicitly endorsed some 
fonn of the partially-embedded social thesis.73 
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This communitarian criticism is often portrayed as the liberal's desire to cling to the 
autonomous individual at the expense of communal attachments. But Rawls does not -
indeed never has - endorsed any conception of the individual that is so strong that it 
would place autonomy above political concerns. That is, Rawls has never worked from 
the conception of an existential individual, one who "creates himself from whole cloth." 
Rawls could have moved in this direction after Theory; he could have developed a 
"theory of the person," one that concentrated on the psychological and anthropological 
aspects of the person. But he did not. Instead, he chose to develop a line of thought that 
dealt with the question- still unresolved- of the person-political society relation. In so 
doing, Rawls has emphasized the political aspect of his theory. The theory is now less 
"Kantian" in that it is not a moral theory of persons in politics; it is a theory of politics 
that accounts for the place of persons. Charles Larmore has put the idea like this: Rawls 
has moved away from the Kantian expressivism that seemed to dominate his theory 
towards a theory of politics that is more concerned with the relations of persons in 
politics, hence the emphasis on modus vivendi form of argument.74 Stated this strongly, 
we can clearly see that Sandel's objection cannot be that Rawls is promoting the 
individual via autonomy at the expense of the community or society. But once clarified, 
it is difficult to see precisely what Sandel's objection is. 
Second, even though this aspect of his theory has been de-emphasized in Rawls's 
more recent theoretical developments, the whole point of the original position is to 
remove from consideration those social considerations that are so important to people that 
they would skew any fair and "neutral" conception of justice. 
[T]he reason why information as to which community one belongs to is 
excluded is precisely because cultural attachments are so important to 
people. Were [they] to be included, people could then tailor the principles 
to favour their own views at the cost of others. Thus, information is 
excluded so that persons may live in accordance with their cultural 
commitments .... That such knowledge is hidden behind the veil of 
ignorance reflects Rawls's appreciation of how strongly people are 
attached to their ends. 75 
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Third, "[t]here is copious textual support for the thesis that Rawls adheres to the 
embeddedness thesis."76 While I cannot re-rehearse this claim here, my exposition of 
Rawls in Chapter 1 clearly shows that Rawls does pay close attention to this claim and 
incorporates it into his theory. 
But there is textual support for the claim that even before Sandel's critique had 
raised the issue that Rawls had explicitly endorsed a form of the partially-embedded 
social thesis. Indeed, Rawls does this in two related ways: as early as 1975 he denies 
that JAF relies upon some form of abstract individualism, and acknowledges that JAF 
relies in a fundamental way upon the existing institutions and practices that are essential 
to any understanding of the social embeddedness thesis. 
[Abstract individualism] is defined as the doctrine that the fundamental 
aims and interests of individuals are determined independently from 
particular social forms; society and the state are regarded as institutional 
arrangements that answer to these antecedent individual ends and 
purposes, as specified by a fixed and invariant human psychology. In 
contrast to this view, the theory of a well-ordered society stresses that the 
interests and ends of individuals depend upon existing institutions and the 
principles of justice they satisfy. Moreover, the parties in the original 
position are presumed to know whatever general truths characterize the 
dependence of individuals on their social background. The account of 
primary goods does not deny these facts, long recognized by social theory 
and common sense. 77 
Indeed, "apart from our place and history in a society, even our potential abilities cannot 
be know, and our interest and character are still to be found."78 
However, the change that has had the greatest significance and impact for Rawls's 
liberal theory of justice, a change that took place as early as 1980, is also the clearest 
indication of Rawls's endorsement of the partially-embedded social thesis: grounding his 
theory in the practices of a modern, liberal, democratic, capitalist society.79 
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Objection Three: Of Distinctions and Difference 
This is closely related to a third objection: that Rawls and Sandel may actually be, 
despite first appearances, in agreement in some fundamental ways. Rawls and Sandel 
both agree that persons actively participate in the act of their own constitution; 
epistemologically, Sandel's claim of a self constituted by its desired ends and Rawls's 
view of the self prior to his or her ends acknowledges that idea that both accept the 
person as prior to his or her ends. 80 Thus, there is a fundamental philosophical consensus 
on the nature but not necessarily the placement of the self. 
Rawls wishes to place the right prior to the good in social and personal constitution 
in order that, under the conditions of the veil of ignorance in the OP, they may not know 
- that is, are not allowed to know - crucial information that would certainly bias the 
procedure. The metaphysical and epistemological aspect in Rawls's OP is crucial to his 
conclusions about the desirability and feasibility of justice as fairness in society. 
Sandel's critique, on the other hand, claims that given this composition or constitution of 
the choosing/self-constituting self in the OP, the self cannot arrive at an analysis of the 
available methods for distribution of goods,, let alone choosing the procedural and 
epistemological methods that would render Rawls's theory coherent. 
Gutmann, for example, correctly states Sandel's central argument as an exposition 
of Rawlsian liberalism's "mistaken metaphysical and meta-ethical views," and that 
"because its foundations are necessarily flawed ... we should give up the 'politics of right' 
for a 'politics of the good.' "81 However, Sandel takes a wrong turn in attributing to 
Rawls a meta-ethical claim "that the foundations of justice must be independent of all 
social and historical contingencies without being transcended."82 Referring to claims by 
Rawls and others that liberalism does not presuppose a metaphysics, Gutmann states 
The major aim of liberal justice is to find principles appropriate for a 
society in which people disagree fundamentally over many questions, in-
eluding such metaphysical questions as the nature of personal identity. 
Liberal justice therefore does not provide us with a comprehensive moral-
ity; it regulates our social institutions, not our entire lives. 83 
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Gutmann's characterization of communitarianism as placing political philosophy in 
a position of being forced to choose between conceptual opposites - a "tyranny of 
dualisms" - may be appropriate here: "Because the [ communitarian] critics misinterpret 
the metaphysics of liberalism, they also miss the appeal of liberal politics for reconciling 
rather than repressing most competing conceptions of the good. "84 
Now, some will object that Sandel's point is just that: liberalism, and particularly 
Rawlsian liberalism does "regulate our entire lives" because it predetermines the choices 
available for sociability, i.e., what is acceptable political behavior, and what is an 
appropriate place to start theorizing about politics. But this criticism can be easily turned 
around: liberals have often complained against communitarianism (especially in other 
guises) that it identifies a community in opposition to others as much as it identifies what 
consists and coheres a particular community. Some liberals have even gone so far as to 
note that there is a fundamental intolerance that underlies communitarianism, an 
intolerance reminiscent of totalitarianism and fascism. 85 Clearly these kinds of criticisms 
are disingenuous, and should be more closely examined before they are articulated and 
incorporated into any serious response to legitimate criticism. 
Objection Four: A&ainst a Political Conception 
A fourth objection is that Sandel "never indicates why he thinks the self must be 
politically created."86 Now certainly we have seen from the discussion of the social 
embeddedness thesis and some of the above clarifications that our context helps to form 
and establish our identity on any moral, political, or sociological understanding, although 
only to a limited extent. That is, we cannot rely upon a theory that presumes or assumes 
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that people do have pre-fonned or fully-formed preferences and motives in some sort of 
pre-social environment or ideal situation. 87 
Sandel's objection focuses on the idea that we must consider the political 
background of persons when referring to any scheme of justice; i.e., any scheme that can 
adequately account for people as subjects of justice, so that people in a political 
community (or other jurisdictional entity) come to the actual bargaining table deeply 
informed of their political motivations. The liberal response is that such deeply-formed 
commitments and attachments - those truly radical and fundamental parts of the 
composition of subjects that distinguish individual selves - must be left behind, and for a 
very good reason. Those constitutive attachments are to be removed from consideration 
because they are so important to people. To accord persons a place at the bargaining 
table in the OP on the condition of the positions they hold (desert based upon contingent 
attributes) is not accord people with equal respect as persons, but only to accord equal 
respect to the positions that those people happen to hold. That is, for political and 
theoretical purposes there is a difference between persons and the ideas, beliefs and 
opinions that they (will and must) hold. 
I will develop this idea further in Chapter V, but for now we should note that there 
is a distinct and important difference between respecting persons and respecting the ideas 
they hold. In our political and theoretical concerns, we can respect the zealot or the true 
believer as person: they are human beings capable of a capacity for reason, and capable 
of exercising that capacity. That they choose not to exercise that capacity as a matter of 
faith, i.e., beyond rational understanding, is of no consequence except that such a basis 
for decisions about politics cannot be shared by all. Because we cannot agree with their 
reasons for doing x in a political situation, we need not respect the ideas that such persons 
hold, only their ability as a person to hold an idea. Again, the prima facie reason is self-
evident: persons who advance zealously-held beliefs do not respect others of differing 
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opinions. They do not respect other people as people, nor do they respect the ideas that 
other people hold. Such persons do not have any account of tolerance and justice in their 
system of belief. They cannot give good reasons - either justifiable reasons or reasons 
that rationally persuade us - and thus the motives for their intolerance and lack of mutual 
respect are insufficient to warrant a claim of intolerance. 
While this may to some liberal defenders and detractors alike sound like intolerance 
(which it is: intolerance of the intolerant),SS or paternalism (which it is not), I will here 
suggest that while this may not be an inaccurate defense of liberal toleration (an 
important and essential aspect of liberalism), it is a defensible and reasonable, if not 
feasible and desirable justification. 
CONCLUSION 
In examining and evaluating a small part of Sandel's extended critique, we should 
not forget its object or purpose. Sandel's critique, as I have noted in the chapter title, is 
ontological. It is not, as Charles Taylor has recently pointed out, a theory of advocacy; 
its primary purpose is not the promotion of a particular way of seeing, but instead 
showing the many different ways in which such issues can be seen. "Taking an 
ontological position does not amount to advocating something; but at the same time, the 
ontological does help to define the options which it is meaningful to support by 
advocacy."89 That is, Sandel's book is most important as a contribution towards 
understanding the relation between different models or conceptions of how we live and 
some of the various ways we view individuals and society. Given the choices available 
to us - as a particular body of peoples with a unique heritage about the relations of 
society-self and government-self; as members of a liberal, democratic, capitalist society; 
as people within the conditions of Humean relative scarcity and with the aspects of 
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plurality- how do we know what is available? That is Sandel's question, the point of 
inquiry upon which his argument is based. 
However, that is not to say that Sandel does not, during the course of his argument, 
advocate a particular view; he does. But it is not terribly difficult to distinguish his 
ontological arguments from others designed to persuade. Seen in this way, "the point of 
[Sandel's] argument, whether right or wrong, is to define the alternatives in an important 
choice." 
Sandel's point pushes us toward the issue of whether the kind of 
egalitarian redistribution Rawls recommends can be sustained in a society 
which is not bound together in solidarity through a strong sense of 
community; and whether, in turn, a strong community of this kind can be 
forged around a common understanding which makes justice the principal 
virtue of social life, or whether some other good does not have to figure as 
well in the definition of community life.90 
If anything, Sandel's point has been to give the liberal theorist some not altogether 
tasteful food for thought He has questioned the manner in which a particular view of 
individuals or selves has been conceived, and the relation of individual to society given 
several common conceptions of each. In turn, I have questioned one aspect of Sandel's 
critique that is central to those claims he wishes to advance beyond his ontological 
argument. I have shown some places where Sandel's argument is certainly vindicated. 
But we can note other places where the ontological argument, when evaluating the liberal 
and opposed claims, falls short of being able to adequately distinguish between 
conceptions. 
I will next examine the theory of another prominent communitarian critic of 
liberalism, Alasdair Macintyre. Rather than questioning liberalism "from the inside," 
Macintyre criticizes liberalism from without. In comparing liberalism with other, more 
tradition-oriented understandings of the self-society relationship, we can learn a great 
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deal not only about the workings of theory, but also about how it makes sense to view an 
historically-contingent self. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE 
AND TilE VIRTUE OF TIIEORY 
Tradition is not something a man can learn; not a thread he can pick up 
when he feels like it; any more than a man can choose his own ancestors. 
Someone lacking a tradition who would like to have one is like a man 
unhappily in love. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 
A significant challenge to liberal theory is aimed not at the intrinsic arguments of 
the liberal conception of the person as is Sandel's critique of J AF, 2 but at the fundamental 
structure of liberal thought. In particular, this communitarian challenge asserts that lib-
eralism, as a product of modernity, misunderstands the deep levels of association that 
must inform our political theory in order to make sense of our political practice. By pro-
moting false ideas of the aims of theory and the assumptions that guide our theory-cre-
ation, liberalism renders our conception of selves incoherent, incomplete, and 
insufficient. 3 Liberalism, as the claim goes, portrays the self variously as an individual 
who is a wholly autonomous creature, or a being that is the result of purely contingent 
circumstances without relation to historical circumstance, or similar incoherent 
formulations. Somewhere along the way we have forgotten how to conceive of ourselves 
logically and conceptually as political creatures. We have forgotten what it is to be a 
people who live according to and are informed by a tradition of inquiry that not only 
constitutes us and allows us to determine who we are and what we do, but informs us of 
the correct choices we must make in politics, and how we must make them. 
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One of the strongest proponents of this anti-liberal thesis is Alasdair Macintyre. He 
provides a fresh insight into what informs - and what should inform - our moral and 
political theory. Macintyre is deeply opposed to much of what he sees in liberal society 
and liberal philosophy. In this chapter, I will address the pertinent aspects of Macintyre's 
theory that run through two of his recent works that have drawn much critical attention: 
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, and Whose Justice? Which Rationality ?4 Both 
of these works are notable (if not laudable) for their broad-ranging and in-depth 
arguments that cover a variety of disciplines and subdisciplines. 5 Macintyre addresses 
many topics in these two works. Amongst other areas of thought he draws upon analyses 
and conclusions from moral theory, the history of ideas, the philosophy of social 
sciences, and contemporary political philosophy. I will discuss only those pertinent 
aspects of his theory as they relate to his critique of modernity and liberalism, and how 
this critique is informed by his view(s) of rationality. 
Like Sandel's critique, Macintyre's theory cum critique generates three different 
kinds of philosophical claims: descriptive claims about what kind of people we are, 
normative claims about the value of community and solidarity in our personal and 
political lives, and a meta-ethical claim that emphasizes the view that political principles 
should mirror "shared understandings."6 As with my discussion of Sandel, I will be 
primarily concerned with the descriptive and normative claims. In particular I want to 
show first how these claims are used in his theory as assumptions about persons and 
goods; second, how these assumptions are advanced in Macintyre's theory in 
contradistinction from and opposition to liberalism; and third why and how such a claim 
fails primarily as a result of confusions not only of these separate descriptive claims, but 
also in confusing those claims with other normative claims. 
I have characterized Macintyre's position as a "theory cum critique" for one obvi-
ous reason: Macintyre relies upon the conclusions from his theory as a basis for compari-
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son with modem political liberalism. By looking at Macintyre's theory, I will examine 
and discover what fuels his critique; by critiquing his theory, I will show how some of 
Macintyre's assumptions do not accord with the theory he promotes, nor do they accord 
with the conclusions he draws from his critique. There are then some conclusions that 
Macintyre draws that we must question: some we will accept, but some we must reject. 
I will proceed by first examining the primary aspects of Macintyre's theory that 
pertain to and are advanced in support of his critique of liberalism and modernity. I will 
then review a fundamental supposition in communitarian theory, the social embeddedness 
thesis. Here I will note how Macintyre uses this idea and how it informs his theory and 
critique. 
With these important distinctions in mind, the third section will examine 
Macintyre's critique of liberalism through his account of rationality: I will address how 
Macintyre characterizes JAF and compares it with other traditional conceptions of 
rationality, and especially how well this comparison proceeds and succeeds. This 
analysis will be continued in the fourth section, where I will compare and contrast these 
accounts of rationality, and note the consequences of these accounts on the conception of 
the person, and on accounts of the good and goods. 
THE CALL: A RETURN TO VIRTUE 
Three Theses 
There are three theses in Macintyre's thought. The first is a thesis about the link of 
history and political thought. This is the thesis that the history of ideas has developed 
through ways of understanding that Macintyre calls traditions of inquiry, or simply a 
tradition. Here Macintyre discusses various traditions and their respective conceptions of 
justice and rationality, and notes that the way we think about justice and rationality has 
changed not only with these several traditions, but that these conceptions have been 
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formed through and make sense only when considered from within the historical and so-
cial context of that tradition. Several commentators have noted that this discussion of the 
history of ideas is neither terribly controversial nor objectionable.7 This aspect of 
Macintyre's theory is beyond the scope of my argument and personal competence. 
The second plank of Macintyre's theory is his epistemological thesis about the con-
cept of rationality that informs and is informed by a tradition. This thesis too is not terri-
bly controversial or objectionable, 8 although there does appear to be less consensus here 
about Macintyre's idea of a social science than with his interpretation of the history of 
political thought. I shall not quarrel with this aspect of his work, but shall address the 
conception of rationality proposed by Macintyre in order to follow his argument and ap-
proach his critique of liberalism. 
However, the third plank of Macintyre's theory and his culminating argument, is a 
critique of contemporary ethical and political theory and practice. This argument seems 
to mischaracterize the state of liberal theory and modem culture (particularly the role that 
rationality plays in this culture), and leads him to some dubious conclusions. It is as if 
the first two planks of his theory do not quite fit with this third and final one. 
"A DiSQuietin~: Su~:~:estion" 
Macintyre begins by suggesting that what we today call the social sciences have 
suffered nothing short of an apocalypse, but one without any clear road to salvation.9 He 
suggests that a destruction of what had previously been known and accepted as true and 
valid statements regarding our moral theories, convictions, judgments and actions has 
taken place. This apocalypse has left our moral and consequently our political theory in 
the state of chaos and disarray we experience today.lO 
Dia~nosis... Macintyre offers a diagnosis and cure for what he sees as the ills of 
modern liberal society resulting from this apocalypse.11 To be fair, his analysis is 
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"primarily diagnostic rather than prescriptive. He has little to say about how we might 
reconstruct a viable notion of justice in modem circumstances."12 Nonetheless, his diag-
nosis is that somewhere on the road to modernity we lost our way, having lost the 
conceptual map that might point us to a place we wish to go. In abandoning and rejecting 
the Aristotelian notions of right actions and the good, we have lost the ability to act 
rightly and seek an objective good in any rational manner. In Aristotelian terms, we have 
forgotten the necessary link between goods and goodness . 
. . . And Cure. The cure is that we must return to such Aristotelian ideas and ideals: 
we must radically alter our theory of political association as well as the moral notions and 
justifications we have for them. The gist of Macintyre's project is contained in the title 
of his earlier work After Virtue, which is a rather clever play on words. Macintyre first 
wants to make the reader aware that as philosophers, we are discussing politics and 
morality in a post-Aristotelian state; that is, we are discussing the basic questions of polit-
ical philosophy in an age that falls after the conception of virtue was a dominant and 
central consideration. Second, notwithstanding this post-apocalyptic state, we should try 
to recapture and actively seek a place for virtue and the virtues in contemporary political 
philosophy, so Macintyre is seeking - or after - virtue. 
Moral Disa~:reement. Macintyre notes that moral disagreements can generally be 
characterized in three different ways. First, they can be due to conceptual incommensu-
rability, in which case the fundamental assumptions of the rival justifications for moral 
actions are at odds. Secondly, they can be due to an appeal to rival criteria that are 
claimed to be impersonal. Examples here would be appeals to power and authority, or 
appeals to duty, honor, or even happiness. Finally, moral disagreement can be due to an 
appeal to rival historical doctrines or practices that have persuaded us as valid and true 
arguments about the nature of ethics and ontology .13 
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Modernity: Liberalism and Emotiyism. Tied to this, Macintyre claims that 
modernity has come to accept or internalize the basic tenets of emotivism, which, crudely 
put, is the idea that our actions and desires are merely the products of the expression of 
will or desire. In earlier writings, Macintyre has noted that this is an idea that stems in 
part from an Hobbesian reformulation of the sophists' claim: a justification for actions 
consists in "being instructed as to what action will produce for us most of what we now 
want. ... "14 In emotivism, moral decisions are not founded upon any rational basis; the 
rational or logical justification of moral actions and decisions is thus an empty concept 
from the start. But Macintyre notes that because emotivism views all decisions as the 
product of choice-preferences, it "is thus a theory which professes to give an account of 
all moral judgments whatsoever."15 Emotivism is then a philosophical way of expressing 
a sophisticated and universalized moral relativism: "What I have suggested to be the case 
by and large about our own culture - that in moral argument the apparent assertion of 
principles functions as a mask for expression of personal preference - is what emotivism 
takes to be universally the case."16 
To this end, he offers a characterization of practical reasoning or rationality accord-
ing to the members of a liberal political order- be they philosophers or (other) ordinary 
folk - in his liberal-emotivist practical syllogism: 
I want it to be the case that such and such; Doing so and so will enable 
me to achieve its being the case that such and such; There is no other way 
of so enabling me which I prefer; Doing so and so will not frustrate any 
equal or stronger preference. 17 
Macintyre then links this consequentialist view of rationality with his historical argument 
about the discontinuity of thought that sprang from the Enlightenment: "The incoherence 
of our attitudes and our experience arises from the incoherent conceptual scheme which 
we have inherited."18 So to Macintyre, the ideas and conceptions of rationality as devel-
oped through a tradition have a direct and formative influence upon our current ideas: we 
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either accept former traditions, or we reject them. Macintyre is clearly saying that the 
modem view of ethics makes little sense because we have rejected a tradition of thought 
that renders ethical and practical reasoning coherent. What then comprises Macintyre's 
moral theory? 
Practices. A Unified Life. and Traditions 
Macintyre's moral theory proceeds in three stages. 
A first [stage] which concerns virtues as qualities necessary to achieve 
the goods internal to practices; a second which considers them as qualities 
contributing the good of a whole life; and a third which relates them to the 
pursuit of a good for human beings the conception of which can only be 
elaborated and possessed within an ongoing social tradition.19 
I will briefly discuss these three stages in order. 
Practices. A practice for Macintyre is "a cooperative human enterprise in which 
goods internal to the enterprise are achieved in the course of exercising the standards of 
excellence appropriate to the enterprise."20 A practice then assumes that a group of peo-
ple - a community - has grown together through ties beyond kinship in order to promote 
a ways and means of association that is a good all of its own, not a good that is merely the 
result of that association. 
This is the important distinction between internal and external goods.21 Using the 
game of chess as an example, Macintyre defmes an internal good as a certain quality or 
excellence of playing the game of chess only for the sake of playing the game; i.e., to be 
as good a chess player as one could possibly be would be an internal good. This is con-
trasted with external goods, which in the game of chess might be psychological or even 
material gains realized from playing the game well, such as fame or fortune. External 
goods are thus a kind of by-product of the practice. Macintyre stresses that virtue and 
right action require that we seek to do things - that is, we ought to do those things - not 
by looking towards those external goods, but primarily to internal and more appropriate 
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goods. This leads to a provisional definition of virtue: it is a quality or characteristic that 
is necessary for the achievement of internal goods under an account of those practices and 
internal goods. 22 
Why begin moral inquiry from an examination and account of practices? It is be-
cause "the exercise of the virtues is not only worthy for its own sake," but more impor-
tantly because our conception of and respect for the virtues grows as they are assimilated 
into our practice. The virtues are not mere skills, or a means to an end. Neither are they 
categorical imperatives - moral rules that are conceived a priori and binding at all times 
- as conceived by Kant. Internal goods are achieved by exercise of the virtues and not 
merely or only the end result of that practice. The study of practices reveals the excel-
lences, goods, and virtues of that practice. 23 
The Unity of a Human Life. The second, more complex stage in Macintyre's the-
ory is the idea of the unity of a human life. This is explored and demonstrated by an 
extended analogy of the literary concept of dramatic narrative. Macintyre notes that the 
idea of a human life- "the self' -conceived as a story is missing in almost all 
contemporary philosophies, analytic and political philosophy in particular.24 
This idea of a "narrative self' or "narrative subject" requires that we presuppose 
two interdependent ideas: the self as a subject of a story (not an object), and that as a 
subject within a social, historical, and political context we are only co-authors of our own 
lives. 25 Thus, "I am not only accountable, I am one who can always ask others for an ac-
count, who can put others to the question. I am part of their story, as they are part of 
mine. The narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives."26 We 
should note here that this is not so different from the political liberal's account of ratio-
nality and "offering good reasons," which is closely linked to liberalism's ideas of auton-
omy and equal respect: "To have respect for a person is to view him as capable of elabo-
rating beliefs that we would respect. "27 
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The unity of a life then bears some resemblance to two notions found in the me-
dieval idea of a quest. First, people on a quest set out with a purpose or goal, a telos. A 
telos was inspirational: in a quest, the purpose was to find the object of desire, or the ob-
ject that would fulfill some purpose in and of itself. But it was not merely the attainment 
of that thing that was the purpose of the quest: the purpose was the quest itself, which 
leads to the second notion. The telos was not a wholly determinate or pre-determined 
goal; it was a conception of the good that developed over time, experience, and reflection. 
A quest is then "always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and 
in self-knowledge."28 So the quest, as an analogy for a human life, serves to clarify what 
we must do to shape and refine that goal, but also what we must do to seek and attain that 
telos. 
Additionally, that telos is socially and not individually formed; we are what we be-
come in large part because we are products of a particular culture, or a way of life. So in 
answering the question "What is the good life for me?", Macintyre implies that we can 
make sense of this only if we simultaneously ask "What is the good life for man?" 
Macintyre thus claims, in an oft-noted and -quoted phrase, his second provisional con-
clusion about the virtues: ''The good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good 
life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to 
understand what more and what else the good life for man is. "29 Some commentators 
have noted that "while at first sight this definition appears less than illuminating," we 
should here bear in mind Macintyre.' s larger argument, so that "when placed in the con-
text of the third part of Macintyre's account-the role of tradition" the point is clarified, 
if still somewhat vacuous.30 It is from inherited and historically interpreted traditions that 
an individual begins and follows his quest for the good life. This raises the idea of the 
social embeddedness thesis, which will be discussed below. 
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Traditions vs. Modernity. This third stage of Macintyre's theory, which is explored 
in depth in his subsequent work Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 9 is where we come to 
understand what relevance practices and unified narrative lives have to the concept of the 
self, and the central place that Macintyre argues virtues should occupy in political and 
social philosophy. 
A tradition for Macintyre is not simply a way of doing things: it is "more than a 
coherent movement of thought. It is such a movement in the course of which those en-
gaging in that movement become aware of it and of its direction and in self-aware fashion 
attempt to engage in its debates and to carry its enquiries forward."3 1 I shall have more to 
say below about Macintyre's idea - which I think for the most part is correct- of the de-
velopment of a tradition, and how a tradition (or the members thereof) cognizantly 
change and grow in response to problems encountered. But for now we should note that 
a tradition is "a way of seeing" peculiar to a culture which contains a specific language 
that can but does not necessarily preclude intelligibility in trans-traditional, trans-
historical, and trans-cultural conversations. 
Another feature of a tradition is that it can grow or mature, and as it does so it en-
counters problems that challenge the assumptions9 reasoning9 and conclusions that had 
previously been accepted by the members of that community sharing in that tradition.32 
But while a tradition is self-cognizant, it cannot know the outcome of any particular de-
bate it might be involved in, e.g., a debate that could be potentially destructive for that 
tradition. So traditions tend to "run into" problems as a matter of course, problems that 
can be attributed to the epistemological stance of that tradition. 33 For Macintyre, a tradi-
tion of inquiry is not unlike a unified human live, or a story unfolding through time. An 
analogy might help here: a biography written prior to the death of the subject (or the 
subject's retirement from that activity to which they contributed) might be interesting, but 
certainly incomplete and therefore possibly flawed or even incoherent. 
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Macintyre implies that a tradition either transcends the period of time in which it 
arose and became dominant, or it dies in the attempt.34 Now we cannot question this 
claim because we think that Macintyre may have left out one "explanation" of the devel-
opment of a tradition of inquiry. So because Macintyre does not mention e.g. the possi-
bility of a synthesis of traditions, or that traditions may live out their spans in ignorance 
of each other and therefore of their incommensurable claims (mutual understanding is, 
after all, necessary before disagreement can logically take place),35 we cannot say that he 
has missed the point. But we can respond, as has Emily R. Gill, that Macintyre's account 
of the goods of excellence and effectiveness - internal and external goods, respectively -
that conflict is a necessary part of any and all traditions. "It is clear from [Macintyre's] 
own account. .. that conflict characterizes all traditions .... We can see in his account that 
all traditions define goods of excellence as well as those of effectiveness, and that conflict 
within traditions is over how the goods of excellence are to be defined and achieved."36 
Some Preliminazy Objections 
What I suggest here is that Macintyre's idea about the development and history of 
tradition-oriented modes of inquiry does not provide an adequate basis from which to ad-
equately and accurately critique liberalism in general and JAF in particular. That is, there 
is a tenuous link in Macintyre's thought between his version of the history of political 
philosophy, his account of rationality and intelligibility, and his critique of liberal and 
modem thought that relies on some radical and questionable assumptions about a particu-
lar view of politics and association. What I will argue for is that Macintyre, in the link of 
these three parts of his theory, has misunderstood and therefore misrepresented liberalism 
and Rawls by relying upon a faulty conception of these basic assumptions. However, I 
can only address the link between Macintyre's argument for a particular conception of ra-
tionality and his argument against liberalism. 
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These tenuous links raise a common criticism against Macintyre: that his character-
ization of liberalism is at once too broad and too narrow. As Emily Gill has noted: 
Macintyre's conception of liberalism, I believe, is at once too broad 
and too narrow. It is too broad because he "identifies 'liberalism' with 
'modernity,' as if there were no important illiberal strands within modem 
culture." Or rather, he asserts that conflicts with liberalism have been re-
formulated as debates within liberalism .... His conception of liberalism is, 
on the other hand, too narrow. The goods valued by the liberal self, in his 
view, are only valued as expressions of preference, and the skill valued by 
the liberal social order is the ability to bargain. 
I will, of necessity, concentrate on the latter claim against Macintyre to see in what ways 
this makes sense; this involves an analysis of Macintyre's use of the terms self, 
rationality, goods and the like. We will them more clearly see how these concepts are 
inter-related in Macintyre's theory. 
I have noted three primary aspects of Macintyre's theory and also his assumptions 
regarding emotivism and its link with liberal rationality, two important parts of 
Macintyre's theory that are brought up to emphasize his dissatisfaction with modernity. 
While I have noted that much of what his theory offers is indeed worthy of consideration 
and should be considered by liberal theorists, we should evaluate these claims very care-
fully to note where they are applicable and where they are not. I will now explore an 
implicit part of Macintyre's communitarian argument that is used not only to justify his 
position, but constitutes the basis for his attack on liberalism. This is the social 
embeddedness thesis. 
THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS THESIS 
Macintyre's tripartite theory, along with his caricature of liberal-emotivist practical 
rationality, assumes a bundle of descriptive claims about human nature that I referred to 
previously as the social embeddedness thesis 37 On this reading, the social embeddedness 
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thesis has as much to do with the self-conception of the person as it does with the self-
society relation. But before we can discuss the way Macintyre understands how this 
assumption operates both in his and in liberal theory, we should briefly recall the claims 
of the social embeddedness thesis. 
Two Distinctions 
First, there is the distinction between metaphysical and political conceptions of per-
sons. A metaphysical conception of the person assumes a very close relation between the 
person and their conception of the good to the extent that such goods are determinant of 
the character of that person. The metaphysical sense is an effort to describe the person in 
a moral-anthropological-historical manner, one that assumes this close relation between a 
person and their conception of the good. A political conception, on the other hand, as-
sumes this position too; people's psychological and moral compositions are important 
and vital to any conception of people. But it does not regard these personal, 
comprehensive-moral factors as important to the self-political society relation. That is, 
one's personal make-up- moral, spiritual, communal identity, etc.- are assumed in 
political liberalism, but they are not used as a basis from which to decide questions of 
vital importance in political society: distribution of goods, resources, and the like. 
This turns upon a second distinction: how "fully" are people "composed" by their 
surroundings, their community? Liberals point to a partially embedded or contingently-
based conception of the self: a person is socialized into accepting their native tongue and 
society as a norm or standard, a standard which is often confused with the idea that that 
standard is "good" or superior in some way. But by allowing a person to be only partly 
determined by their society, liberalism allows some space for the person to question and 
choose for themselves those aspects and values in society that are "good" for him. 
Communitarianism, on the other hand, assumes a very close relationship here. This 
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wholly determined or essentially-based conception of self has little choice: only those as-
pects of society that are present in the person's community and education are available as 
paths to be chosen in a life. Alternative pathways are present, but they cannot be chosen 
as they often at some fundamental level irreconcilable with the individual's more basic, 
more substantial commitments - communal ties, moral education, etc. 
In sum, there are two points. First, "[c]onceptions of essentially and contingently 
shared relations are conceptions of how relations are shared, and correspondingly of how 
the self is defined and understood."38 Second, neither conception bears any direct or ob-
vious relation to any particular set of norm~tive political commitments. 39 
Between Conceptions 
Macintyre oscillates uncomfortably between the two conceptions of an essentially 
and a partially constituted self. At the price of inconsistency, it is not clear that he 
commits himself to one or the other. Despite his disclaimer that he is "not arguing that 
the concepts of narrative or of intelligibility or of accountability are more fundamental 
than that of personal identity .... The relationship is one of mutual presupposition ... ," it is 
at times apparent that he prefers the wholly embedded thesis. This is apparent when 
Macintyre describes the source of our commitments; e.g., "[T]he relationship between 
me, my social identity, and my good will preclude ... re-evaluation .... "4° Or again, 
I am never able to seek the good or exercise the virtues only qua indi-
vidual ... .! am someone's son or daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle; 
I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profes-
sion; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for 
me has to be good for one who inhabits these roles.4l 
But at other times Macintyre seems to adopt a contingently-based conception. 
Sometimes even the fact that a person is embedded in communal practices "does not en-
tail that the self has to accept the moral limitations ... of those forms of community."42 
Or, to put it another way: 
I do not want to suggest that there is anything peculiar to the present in 
[defining persons in opposition to bureaucratic modes of control] ... .It is 
often and perhaps always through conflict that the self receives its social 
definition. However, as some theorists have supposed, that the self is or 
becomes nothing but the social roles which it inherits. The self, as distinct 
from its roles, has a history and a social history and that of the contempo-
rary emotivist self is only intelligible as the end product of a long and 
complex set of developments.43 
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Here we must remember that this "long and complex set of developments" refers not only 
to the history of the concept of self that Macintyre traces throughout, but also to the pro-
cess that individuals engage in when living a meaningful life, one rendered coherent by 
partial embeddedness within a tradition. 
Again, to emphasize this ambiguity in Macintyre's thought: 
"[T]he story of my life is always embedded in the story of those com-
munities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to 
try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform 
my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the 
possession of a social identity coincide. Notice that rebellion against my 
identity is always one mode of expressing it."44 
That is, Macintyre is saying we can choose to reject our roots or adopt an "alternative 
lifestyle" that places one in the position of continually attempting to justify life choices -
one's very existence -without the epistemological and morally relevant tools to do so; 
we can choose to be different than we are, but only at the price of personal moral confu-
sion and incoherence. 
We can see then that Macintyre adopts a form of both kinds of the social embed-
dedness thesis. At times he adopts one version, at times another. This, in itself, is not to 
be condemned. What is unusual, and what we should question about this use of the social 
embeddedness thesis are the conclusions that Macintyre draws from this dual use, and 
why he thinks that this conception of the individual is in some way different to or supe-
rior to the liberal view of the self. I do not mean to suggest that at base Rawls's view of 
liberalism and Macintyre's community and morally-guided theory are the same. I do 
mean to suggest that they are in some ways similar in that they do rely upon the same 
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claims; the object is to discover those claims, and see what conceptual sense we can make 
of them. 
Why does Macintyre think that viewing the self the way he does is superior to the 
liberal view of the self! To answer this, we must look at Macintyre's view of rationality, 
and how rationality is closely tied to goods and persons. I will return to the consequences 
that this view of the social embeddedness thesis has on Macintyre's critique in the next 
section. I will then defend Rawls's view of rationality in opposition to Macintyre's, and 
show why liberalism's account of persons and rationality is persuasive. 
ACCOUNTING FOR RATIONALITY 
Because virtue and the nature of the virtues has changed, politics and the art of po-
litical association and governing have changed too. "Politics, as Aristotle conceives it, is 
a practice with goods internal to itself. Politics, as James Mill conceives it, is not."45 
Macintyre traces one of the most significant points of this change back to the 
Enlightenment, with its emphasis on Cartesian rationality and empiricism as opposed to 
Aristotelian practical rationality. 
The Role of the Virtues In Modernity 
Macintyre here qualifies an earlier position. In After Virtue he had stated that 
modernity has specifically rejected virtue-oriented theories or accounts of the virtues that 
were central to the formations of conceptions of the good and the right. He now notes 
that the concepts of virtue and the virtues do have a place in modernity, but that that place 
has changed significantly since the formulation given it by Aristotle.46 
Under that earlier conception, a virtue is derived not only from those practices and 
individuals that are indicative of a people or culture, but also from the traditions peculiar 
to that culture. The way that virtue and the virtues have changed can be seen by looking 
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at the Enlightenment's treatment of these concepts, particularly David Home's "quite new 
conception of the relationship of virtues to rules." Hume' s conception has had three con-
sequences, only the second which need concern us.47 
Virtues are indeed now conceived of not, as in the Aristotelian scheme, 
as possessing a role and function distinct from and to be contrasted with, 
that of rules or laws, but rather as being just those dispositions necessary 
to produce obedience to the rules of morality. The virtue of justice, as 
Home characterizes it, is nothing but a disposition to obey the rules of jus-
tice.48 
As previously noted, this idea seems a return to one of the primary ideas found in 
Stoicism. ''The virtues are now not to be practiced for the sake of some good other 
[than], or more than, the practice of the virtues itself. Virtue is, indeed has to be, its own 
end, its own reward and its own motive."49 In modem times, virtue and rationality have 
become linked in a different and distorted way: virtue is now "to be generally understood 
as a disposition or sentiment which will produce in us obedience to certain rules, [and ra-
tionality an] agreement on what the relevant rules are to be [which] is always a prerequi-
site for agreement upon the nature and content of a particular virtue."50 So the concept of 
virtue exists today; Macintyre's objection is that our modem concept of virtue is content-
less or meaningless as it stands. 
Aspects of Rationality in Liberalism 
Macintyre seeks to clarify the liberal ideas of justice and rationality by expanding 
upon his earlier characterization of the liberal-emotivist syllogism. He offers an exami-
nation and critique of the structure of debate that is carried on in a liberal culture at a 
theoretical level and in practical politics by noting four separate levels upon which the 
emotivist assumption operates in liberal theory and politics, presented in order from most 
apparent to most deeply ingrained in modem society.51 
Eour Leyels of Debate. First, different individuals and groups express their views 
and attitudes in their own terms. That is, debate is not actually carried out; there is no ar-
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gument and counter-argument. Instead, rival claims and views are asserted and counter-
asserted. "Nonrational persuasion displaces rational argument."52 
Second, a tallying and weighing process is envisioned and put into practice where 
the expressions of preference are taken into account, and not the coherence or rationality 
of the claims. But this requires a prior step, Macintyre's third characteristic, that the pro-
cedures and rules that govern the second step are themselves the outcome of rational de-
bate, a debate that is only slightly different The second level then relies upon the idea of 
rationality derived from some sort of philosophical discovery that has already been 
agreed upon. 
Fourth and finally, the rules and procedures in step two become codified and legally 
encoded. These laws are then given the sanction of the state through enforcement of or-
der. To Macintyre, this means that the lawyers are the clergy of the secular liberal soci-
ety.53 
Plura}ity and Rationality. These characteristics- a multiplicity of conceptions of 
the good and the subsuming rationality- form Macintyre's primary complaint against 
modernity. Their combination leads to interminable conflict about how to best justify 
those disparate conceptions. We have no primary shared moral principles from which to 
discuss moral and political issues reasonably and rationally. Consequently, moral con-
sensus, let alone informed discussion, is precluded from modem politics. 
We should note that Macintyre's use of the terms reasonable and rational differ 
somewhat from Rawls's. Rawls uses these terms to define a conception of what it is to 
be a rational creature. To be able to participate in a discussion about politics assumes that 
one can discuss things at a reasonable level of sophistication (the issues will at least be 
clear), and that one has a basic understanding of the way arguments proceed, as well as 
some basic tools at one's disposal in order to articulate and defend a position. 54 
Macintyre uses these terms as a description of the manner in which a tradition proceeds. 
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Rationality on Macintyre's use is more concerned with a or perhaps the way of seeing; on 
Rawls's use, it is a way to account for ways of seeing that can be envisioned, given plural 
conceptions of the good. (Here we must remember that Macintyre does not deny 
pluralism or plurality; he only denies it as a basis from which to form principles of 
association.) 
At this point we can understand Macintyre's earlier unfinished argument against 
emotivism: it has reduced our moral thinking to the premise that actions, regardless of 
consequences, can be interpreted and understood simply and merely as Nietzschean ex-
pressions of will or volition. Bereft of a tradition of thought that entails a controlling 
concept of virtue, "there seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our 
culture."55 We argue interminably about what is a- or the - correct moral point of view 
without looking to (or creating) a rational basis upon which to build a consensus, let 
alone creating a yardstick of measurement to evaluate different moral positions. 
The three above-mentioned aspects of liberalism and modernity - individualism, the 
lack of a concept of desert to inform theory, and the incommensurability of truth and va-
lidity claims to which we can appeal in the event of conflict- coupled with Macintyre's 
characterization of the development of debate and rationality in liberalism create a recipe 
for social disaster. To Macintyre, "[m]odem politics is civil war carried on by other 
means, and [the Supreme Court case involving reverse discrimination claims in Regents 
of the University of California v.] Bakke was an engagement whose antecedents were at 
Gettysburg and Shiloh."56 
Analo~:y and Dichotomy 
But what precisely is Macintyre comparing here? If Macintyre wishes to compare 
and contrast the various traditions he has presented for study, then certainly we can agree 
with him that "in each of them intellectual enquiry was or is a part of the elaboration of a 
114 
mode of social and moral life of which the intellectual enquiry itself was an integral part, 
and in each of them the forms of that life were embodied with greater or lesser degrees of 
imperfection in social and political institutions which also draw their life from other 
sources." We can also agree with Macintyre when he says that these different traditions 
"differ in their catalogs of the virtues, in their conceptions of selfhood, and in their meta-
physical cosmologies," and we can agree that "these traditions have very different histo-
ries in respect of their relationships with each other" so that "there is no standing ground, 
no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, accept-
ing, and rejecting reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some particu-
lar tradition or other." That is, between a dialogue of two traditions, "logical incompati-
bility and incommensurability may both be present."57 
But what are we to make of his argument that "[i]t is indeed a feature of [the ac-
count of traditions and rationality] that in one way or another all of [those accounts] have 
survived so as to become not only possible, but actual, forms of practical life within the 
domain of modemity."58 How is this to be reconciled with his earlier complaint against 
modernity and liberalism, that we have no traditions of inquiry from which to draw upon 
in order to make some sense of the practices of our lives? On the one hand Macintyre is 
celebrating the ability of modernity and liberalism to accommodate various conceptions 
of the good and methods of inquiry, or liberalism's ability to accommodate plurality. On 
the other, he condemns the kind of rationality that enables liberalism to do just this be-
cause it engenders an individualism. that appeals to the way people view their contingent 
attachments: the necessary ability from people draw a conception of rationality from 
which to judge and evaluate their development as a person within any particular tradition. 
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A Question of Justification 
One way to view this is to examine how Macintyre sees the resolution of practical 
and rational conflict. He notes that the idea of a proof in philosophical discussions and 
disputes is relatively barren; but this does not mean that we cannot know with certainty 
the truth of some matters in moral and political theory. 59 That is, truth can be decided 
through the settling of certain philosophical issues, but that is something that happens 
only when "the contending parties ... have stood back from their dispute and asked in a 
systematic way what the appropriate rational procedures are for settling this [or that] par-
ticular kind of dispute."60 But he tempers this by adding that many will disagree with 
this account, particularly a "motley party of defenders" of liberalism.61 But on the whole, 
debate on these issues of political philosophy have not borne out this last statement. For 
example, many theorists, accept (with some reservations, e.g., the portrayal of David 
Home's role in the Enlightenment) Macintyre's historical argument in the presentation of 
the several traditions of thought. 62 Indeed, most liberal thinkers agree with the bulk of 
his account of rationality and intelligibility, found mainly in his latter book. 63 
Further, we should note that Macintyre's distinction between proof and justification 
is quite similar in many respects to Charles Larmore's distinction of the same in his latest 
article, Political Liberalism. 64 The admonition to "stand back from the dispute and ask in 
a systematic way what the appropriate rational procedures are for settling this [or that] 
particular kind of dispute" bears a striking resemblance to the second of Larmore's two 
norms of political liberalism, that of rational dialogue: 
In discussing how to solve some problem (for example, what 
principles of political association they should adopt), people should 
respond to points of disagreement by retreating to neutral ground, to the 
beliefs they share, in order either to (a) resolve the disagreement and 
vindicate one of the disputed positions by means of arguments which 
proceed from this common ground or (b) bypass the disagreement and 
seek a solution of the problem on the basis simply of this common ground. 
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Now Larmore is not entirely clearly how this neutral ground is to be recognized, or 
if it is even attainable. (This criticism I shall discuss when I address the problems of neu-
trality in political liberalism in Chapter V .) Macintyre is even less so. He asserts that at 
some point in the development of modem civilization (he places this point in the 
Enlightenment era), humankind "forgot" the lessons of ancient Greece in how to proceed 
in a rational way when two sides appear to be opposed on a particular issue. Yet given 
his account of traditions of inquiry and the conception of rationality that must inform 
those traditions, he denies himself the ability to return to such a conception. 
I must forestall one objection to my account of Macintyre. I am not saying that 
Macintyre has not provided us with a procedural or conceptual account that would guide 
us in "recapturing the past." That is not Macintyre's purpose. Aside from the impossibil-
ity of such a project, such a complaint against Macintyre's procedure in his critique 
would be disingenuous. True, communitarian criticism of liberalism has been mainly de-
structive, not constructive. What I am saying are two things: first, that his diagnosis of 
modernity and liberalism denies him the ability to advance his prescriptive claims. 
Second, his account of rationality, as it informs and fuels his critique of liberalism, 
catches him on the horns of an additional dilemma. It is at this place in his theory -
where Macintyre links his argument for a view of rationality and intelligibility with his 
argument for a tradition-, virtue-, or rationally-oriented theory of his own devising- that 
Macintyre has drawn so much critical attention. 
The Christian Dilemma 
Perhaps this is too quick; a comparison may help here. Macintyre, as we have seen, 
abhors an instrumental or consequentialist view of rationality, a view of rationality that 
views life choices in terms of choices that will maximize an individual's or society's 
interest, whatever that may happen to be. He denies consequential rationalism because it 
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affords no place for the good in the view of a human life. But he ultimately relies upon a 
view of rationality and human nature that is designed to try to dodge the same kind of 
"captive dilemma" that has plagued Christianity since Aquinas:65 "If I believe in God, I 
shall go to heaven and reap eternal rewards; if I do not believe, I shall go to hell and reap 
eternal damnation. On the whole it is best to believe because I will then certainly reap 
untold rewards, as opposed to not believing and only having a chance of reaping limited 
rewards in this mortal life. Because I have a choice between two things to do- one good, 
one evil - and because I am rewarded to do good, I shall do good. It is in my best inter-
est." 
Macintyre wants to dodge this dilemma because he too wants a choosing agent, one 
that is grounded in society retains and exercises the characteristics of choice with regard 
to life plans, experiences, conflicting moral conceptions, and decisions as to how best to 
resolve those conflicts. It is in the account of these- one's "life narrative"- where we 
can make sense of that telos Macintyre wants to consider. 
But again, why rationality? It is ultimately because Macintyre believes, like the 
liberal, that an account of rationality lies at the heart of understanding human nature, and 
one must understand human nature - a theory of human nature must be assumed - in or-
der to understand man's actions and his ability to account for those actions. Turning to 
Macintyre's critique, it makes all the more sense. He does not want to view man as con-
tinually upon the horns of a dilemma: free but not free; autonomous, but only to a limited 
extent. He does not want to see rna~ as being forced to maintain an uncomfortable posi-
tion in relation to society: what Mend us has called "distance yet proximity," or the need 
for the agent to be both detached from yet embedded in his world. 66 He wishes for man 
to transcend politics by understanding what is good for man, not by considering that 
which we may consider right This view of man more than anything is what has led sev-
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eral critics to note that Macintyre too is a liberal; a reluctant liberal, but a liberal nonethe-
less.67 
I have shown how Macintyre's view of rationality displays a fundamental similarity 
with liberal accounts of the person, the very object that Macintyre wishes to discredit. 
But Macintyre's argument still retains a great deal of power; his arguments for a particu-
lar view of the social sciences have been favorably received, for the most part. Given this 
similarity in view and assumptions of liberals and communitarians with regard to the 
conception of the person, how does Macintyre derive such an uncomplimentary picture of 
modern man and morality. 
Perhaps a great deal of the power behind Macintyre's argument is from the way he 
combines his critique with his theory. But such characteristics are common in anti-liberal 
criticisms, as Stephen Holmes has noted. Amongst other kinds of "historical errors," 
Macintyre has engaged in what Holmes calls antonym substitution, another name for un-
fair or inaccurate terms of comparison.68 Referring to Macintyre's characterization of 
liberal theory as "implicitly [defined] as the sum total of all the ideas going around in 
contemporary 'liberal societies,' " Brian Barry has commented that " .. .in contrasting lib-
eralism with his other traditions [Macintyre] does not play fair. He fails to compare like 
with like .... Given that these are the terms of comparison, it is hardly surprising that lib-
eralism does not make a good showing."69 Instead of comparing sociological theories of 
management with political theories of the construction of the state (and those first princi-
ples necessary for a state to exist in a society with a common tradition of liberal and re-
publican thought), Macintyre should look to the moral bases of the traditions he examines 
in the effort the see what if anything is comparable and commensurable with modem lib-
eralism. He should do this not in the effort to merely say that one theory is more coherent 
and therefore superior, but to understand what in the past can and does make sense to us, 
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and what we can and should reconsider in our political theory today. That is, not only is 
Macintyre's argument and characterization of liberalism unfair here, it is disingenuous. 
Or, as Emily Gill has succinctly put the point: 
I agree with Macintyre's conviction that the virtues and practical ratio-
nality can only be understood within the context of particular historical 
settings which condition this understanding .... ! disagree, however, with 
his assertion that liberalism contains more interminable debate than other 
traditions and has fewer resources for resolving such conflicts. 70 
THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM AND RATIONALITY 
Macintyre's characterizations of the modern conceptions of virtue and rationality 
introduces his critique of Rawls's and, by comparison, Robert Nozick's theories.71 There 
are three points here. First, by comparing the two liberal theories Macintyre drives home 
his point about the incommensurable nature of contemporary moral and political philoso-
phy and discussion in general. But this move is questionable. Nozick's book had at least 
two purposes: to criticize a view of persons and society that he thought was hopelessly 
vague or empty, and to build a theory that would allow for a strong individualism yet not 
engender conflict by promoting "mini utopias." In order to offer a critique of Rawls's 
position, it was first necessary that Nozick understand Rawls's theory. In order to offer a 
counter-theory, it was necessary that there be some basis for comparison between the two 
theories. They may have incompatible conclusions and suggestions for practical politics, 
but at bottom the two theories are not so dissimilar; contra Macintyre, they are not in-
commensurable. 
Second, Macintyre notes that Rawls makes no allowance for the concept of desert 
in his theory; there is no place for individual merit in our social relations. "Individuals 
[on Rawls's account] are thus ... primary and society secondary, and the identification of 
individual interests is prior to, and independent of, the construction of any moral or social 
bonds between them."72 And this is akin to his third point: that this primacy of individ-
120 
ual interests promotes a rampant "sociological" individualism. It encourages us to view 
others not necessarily as others in the sense that they are like us7 but as others in the sense 
that they are strangers, indeed as "predatory strangers" who prey upon and exploit the 
weaknesses of others for personal gain. 73 
Of Hetero~eneity and Plurality: Stren~th or Weakness? 
These three points engender a lack of any dominant conception of the good. Rather 
than having a single conception of virtue derived from a tradition, modernity suffers from 
this multitude of conceptions. 
[W]e have all too many disparate and rival moral concepts, in this case 
rival and disparate concepts of justice, and that the moral resources of 
[our] culture allow us no way of settling the issue between them rationally. 
Moral philosophy, as it is dominantly understood [today], reflects the de-
bates and disagreements of the culture so faithfully that its controversies 
tum out to be unsettlable in just the way that the political and moral de-
bates themselves are.74 
To Macintyre, this is incommensurability; I have shown that distinct or disparate 
views need not be seen as incommensurable, but can instead be seen as incompatible or 
merely controversial. To Macintyre, though, this "incommensurability" is characteristic 
not only of our contemporary moral, philosophical, and political debates, but it also 
shows our inability to understand and truly appreciate the moral claims of other cultures, 
either contemporaneous or historic. This idea is very important to Macintyre's theory 
and his critique. It is a point he raises several times in various guises. On modernity's 
understanding of the concept of justice, he states: 
So the understanding of the rules of justice [as the expression of the 
desires of those not yet educated into the justice of the polis] has to be re-
jected [along with] any account of justice or right which prescribes that the 
desires of every individual are equally to be taken into account in deciding 
what it is right to do. 75 
Likewise liberalism, with the emotivist syllogism at its base, conceives of justice it-
self as an instrumental tool to balance between differing conceptions of justice: 
The liberal norm is characteristically ... one according to which differ-
ent kinds of evaluation, each independent of the other, are exercised in 
these different types of social environment. The heterogeneity is such that 
no overall ordering of goods is possible. And to be educated into the cul-
ture of a liberal social order is, therefore, characteristically to become the 
kind of person to whom it appears nonnal that a variety of goods should 
be pursued, each appropriate to its own sphere, with no overall good 
supplying any overall unity to life. 76 
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Macintyre here cites Rawls and notes that he too is aware of the undesirable conse-
quences of a total lack of a formative or dominant conception of the good. However, 
Macintyre thinks that Rawls's idea of neutrality commits liberalism and JAF to a form of 
neutrality that is at once too weak to command allegiance, yet too strong to allow the de-
sired individual freedoms so dear to liberals. The point can be put another way: that lib-
eralism is understood as another competing vision of the good has been acknowledged by 
many current liberal theorists. (This claim I will discuss more thoroughly in Chapter V.) 
What is significant here is that while liberalism views this as a source of strength (it al-
lows for strong versions of neutrality and autonomy), Macintyre views it as a weakness 
(it allows for no dominant conception of the good, and it encourages social discord). 
We should be careful to note that Macintyre's view of liberal neutrality and ratio-
nality has at its base a false dichotomy: liberalism either relies upon or derives an in-
strumentalist notion of rationality due to pluralistic conceptions of the good, which forces 
it to acknowledge the equal foundation of all such claims. But this view of liberalism-
as a "tyranny of dualisms" - inaccurately presents a choice of opposites, neither of which 
should command our allegiance. 77 By presenting liberalism in such a dualistic, dichoto-
mous way, "[t]he critics thereby do a disservice to not only liberal but [also] to communi-
tarian values, since the same method that reduces liberalism to an extreme metaphysical 
vision also renders communitarian theories unacceptable. "78 
Gutmann's point should be carefully noted. In arguing against the liberal concep-
tion of the good and the self- what Sandel and others have called the "unencumbered 
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self' - Macintyre implies that there is only one good or one kind of good that would be or 
fulfill the telos of a certain role. But "[o]ne reason it does not follow [that what is good 
for me has to be THE good for one who inhabits these roles] is that none of these roles 
carries with it only one socially given good." That is, "we cannot accurately say that our 
roles determine our good without adding that we often choose our roles because of the 
good that is attached to them."79 So not only is Macintyre's claim that liberalism is with-
out rational foundations or any coherent account of the good inaccurate, but it does not 
follow from his own account of rationality and goods. 
Liberalism As A Tradition 
It would be easy but disingenuous at this point to say that Macintyre has simply 
misunderstood Raw Is's theory and political liberalism. Instead, we can better appreciate 
Macintyre's position and Rawls's theory by noting that Rawls's third and fourth period in 
the development of his theory owe a great deal to the communitarian critique in general, 
and Macintyre's critique in particular. This does raise a minor point, mentioned previ-
ously. That Rawls has been unwilling to disagree with his critics and point out clear 
cases of mistaken readings indicates his willingness and desire to reach an overlapping 
consensus. 80 But to say that Macintyre has misunderstood Rawls would be too easy; it 
would be to dismiss a legitimate critique that must be accorded proper respect. That is, 
Macintyre does not deny that liberalism is a tradition; what he denies is its coherence and 
explanatory power.81 
Justification and the Social Thesis. Because there is a link between the descriptive 
and normative claims in Macintyre's theory, we can see that there is a problem of 
justification, one that is shared by liberals and communitarians. Patrick Neal and David 
Paris note that his problem centers around the placement of some concepts, e.g., rights 
and freedoms, within an historical context that must be interpreted to be understood. 82 
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The confusion can result from liberals incorporating one or another aspect of the 
communitarian critique into a liberal theory (that we must ascribe to a modified sociolog-
ical or social embeddedness thesis), or from communitarians insisting upon the idea that 
as a philosophical conception of the self liberalism negates our shared understandings by 
promoting an individualist conception. But few liberals deny that "we should look to the 
community for shared understandings about the self or principles of justice," and many 
communitarians wish to emphasize just this point. "As 'rival hermeneuticists,' the two 
sides may not agree about what the community's 'historical understandings' are, or ought 
to be, but they do agree that these understandings are the fundamental phenomena with 
which the theorist necessarily works."83 
And therein lies the confusion. On the one hand, if we accept Rawls's view that 
political theory ought to be a descriptive and practical, (i.e., primarily a political task of 
finding what is both feasible and desirable in our political culture and theory), then need 
we accept the way he feels that this should be justified on the theoretical or philosophical 
level?84 On the other, must we accept Macintyre's view of political theory as the jus-
tification for a particular view of "the right informed by the good"? "Clearly the debate is 
not merely about how the liberal community happens to understand itself; it is also about 
how it ought to view its 'shared understandings.' Again, the former question is more 
political, the latter more philosophicai."85 
This point has been made differently by Charles Larmore. He notes that much of 
what we take to be understood and accepted moral practices and conventions (norms) are 
socially derived: "Becoming a moral agent depends upon social conditions of training 
and practice that we do not control ourselves." 
In general, our humanity requires that we do not lead our lives as 
merely a sequence of desires satisfied or disappointed, but rather that we 
shape and interpret our activities and experiences in terms of overarching 
rules and purposes; only in this way do peculiarly human values and 
significances become intelligible and accessible. 86 
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It is in this way that liberalism and a political conception of justice and the self, properly 
understood, undermine the communitarian claim against liberalism's lack of coherence: 
because it is not derived from an historical culture or tradition-oriented mode of inquiry, 
it is necessarily denied commensurability and therefore intelligibility. 
Towards a Political Conception. So there are three good reasons to reject, either on 
an account of rationality, or an a view of social embeddedness, the communitarian criti-
cism that liberalism (and JAF in particular) ignores our social or communal ties. The first 
we encountered above: that on an account of justice, we can argue that Rawls is very 
aware of the derivation of justice from within a social or tradition-oriented understanding. 
This point has pushed Rawls to reconsider the justification of his theory. So the 
examples of, say, The Wars of Religion and England's Glorious Revolution as used in his 
later works show how much Rawls has conceded to the communitarian position, 
particularly on the historical view of rationality. 
Second, we must question the role of goodness and goods in communitarian theory 
and critique. Even though this aspect of his theory has been as heavily emphasized in 
Rawls's more recent theoretical developments, the whole point of the original position is 
to remove from consideration those social considerations -comprehensive, moral, or re-
ligious conceptions of justice and the good - that are so important to people that they 
would skew any fair or "neutral" conception of justice. 
The reason why information as to which community one belongs to is 
excluded is precisely because cultural attachments are so important to 
people. Were [they] to be included, people could then tailor the principles 
to favour their own views at the cost of others. Thus, information is 
excluded so that persons may live in accordance with their cultural com-
mitments .... That such knowledge is hidden behind the veil of ignorance 
reflects Rawls's appreciation of how strongly people are attached to their 
ends.87 
Third, "[t]here is copious textual support for the thesis that Rawls adheres to the 
embeddedness thesis."88 While I cannot rehearse this claim here, my exposition of Rawls 
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in chapter I clearly shows that Rawls does pay close attention to the way individuals con-
ceive of and are informed by their social environment; it is also clear that Rawls incor-
porates this partially-embedded social thesis into his theory. The clearest indication of 
Rawls's endorsement of the partially-embedded social thesis is his move of grounding 
JAF in modem, liberal, democratic, capitalist society, a change that took place as early as 
1980. This move has had the greatest impact on JAF and the account of rationality that 
supports it. 
DISPARATE VIEWS, DISPARATE RATIONALITIES? 
I have presented Macintyre's theory in the effort not only to understand it, but more 
importantly to understand his critique of liberalism, modernity, and his account of ratio-
nality. I have noted where Macintyre relies on some unsubstantiated claims about the 
source and nature of social commitments and our "embeddedness" within the practices 
and traditions of inquiry found in our modern, liberal culture. 
Additionally, I have noted that Macintyre's account of rationality, relying as it does 
on the virtues and a particular account of traditions of inquiry, raises the question of how 
a dualistic or dichotomous analysis scan work without being itself caught upon the horns 
of a dilemma. I have noted some places where Macintyre errs in the conclusions he 
draws from his theory, primarily from relying upon too strong a form of the social em-
beddedness thesis. I have also noted some other of his claims that should be questioned 
because they rely upon similar theoretical errors or historically inaccurate interpretations 
of liberalism. 
I do not mean to discount Macintyre's remarkable achievements in his historical 
recounting of moral and rational inquiry found in various traditions. But, as many have 
noted, Macintyre suffers just like the rest of us; he too is a product of modernity, and 
while he may wish to subscribe to a particular view (Macintyre ascribes to 
Aristotelianism cum Thomism) that criticizes modernity for a lack of virtues, still his 
understanding of that tradition is itself a product of the modem liberal culture he 
inhabits. 89 
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We are, in a sense, "stuck" with liberalism. That point Macintyre has amply 
demonstrated. And in some sense his diagnosis is accurate: liberalism on many analyses 
tends to engender the kind of sociological individualism that appears to have overtaken 
our culture: it encourages the conceptualization and assertion of rights as shields or 
cloaks or "trump cards" that are intended to stop certain governmental actions that would 
encroach upon an individual's liberty; it encourages the "primacy of privacy,"90 or an 
extremist view of the "right to be let alone." But as I have demonstrated, this is not a 
productive way to view liberalism, nor is it a conducive way to understand the value of 
political philosophy - liberal or communitarian - in a liberal culture. 
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CHAPTER V 
POLffiCAL LIBERALISM 
Who knows the laws according to which society develops? I am quite 
sure they are a closed book even to the cleverest of men. If you fight, you 
fight If you hope, you hope. 
You can fight, hope and believe without believing scientifically. 
Let us be human. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Up to this point I have been concerned with two things: the development of JAF' s 
conception of the person in response to communitarian criticisms, and clarifying what 
those criticisms are in order to see which are apt. I have expressed these concerns by ex-
amining and analyzing the concepts of the social embeddedness thesis, rationality and 
morality, as well as the various model-conceptions found in JAF. Specifically, I have 
shown how liberalism cannot be construed, or how it does not make sense to view and 
critique liberalism, and how JAF has responded to those criticisms that are accurate by 
adapting the theory to account for a stronger yet sustainable version of the social embed-
dedness thesis, a concern that has increased as the theory has developed. 
This naturally leads to an important question: since I have shown what a political 
conception of the person does not look like, what does it look like? In what does the con-
ception of the person in political liberalism consist? An oft-noted criticism of liberalism 
in general is that it relies upon a "conception of the person," or that it must have a "full" 
view of human nature or the human condition in order to operate: that men must be an-
gels or devils, or beings "constructed" in a particular way in order for liberalism to oper-
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ate. I will here argue implicitly that this view is largely mistaken: liberalism need as-
sume very little about human nature in order to operate and successfully command 
allegiance. Of course, there are social and historical conditions under which liberalism 
appeared, and under which it can operate and flourish. There are also ways to view indi-
viduals if we wish to accord them with certain characteristics, e.g., equality, autonomy, 
and rationality. In my analysis of JAF and communitarianism, I have implied where 
these concepts are found in the respective theories, and that both theories- indeed most 
political theories have some conception of these characteristics of persons implicit within, 
either positive or negative - rely upon them in different formulations. But this should not 
lead us to assume that liberalism needs a full view of the person in order to make sense in 
theory and practice. It needs a view, and that view is one that is both acceptable to oth-
ers, and superior to the communitarian formulation. 
Ethics or Epistemolo~y? 
One way to view this situation is to ask whether liberalism relies upon ethical or 
epistemological considerations: does liberalism ultimately rely upon our conceptions of 
morality, or upon our view of persons as creatures of a particular kind, related to the 
world in only a specific or certain kinds of ways that "make sense"? A concern with 
ethical problems would indicate that liberalism is more pragmatic, or more concerned 
with the here-and-now problems of living in a pluralistic society; viewing liberalism on 
an epistemological basis would indicate that political liberalism is more concerned with 
figuring out what people are, rather than how they can and should act towards each other. 
Liberalism is of course a political theory: it does not and need not account for all 
aspects of the person, but it must at least account for those aspects that have to do with 
politics. What aspects of persons then have to do with politics? I will show that liberal-
ism need not justify itself by making claims about "the nature of persons." What is im-
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portant is how we view people, so that the way we associate - the way we do politics and 
think about it - can account for and create a logical and coherent place for persons. 
A simpler way to say this is that there are distinctions between the concept of the 
person in religion, in psychology, and in politics. In a way, to say that political liberalism 
has a "conception of the person" is slightly misleading. But at base, liberalism - and po-
litical theory - must assume some things about persons in order to account for them co-
herently and completely. In this chapter, I will show how political liberalism views the 
person, and in doing so has (in some very limited ways) transcended the current debate 
by adopting some communitarian concerns, and continued with the job of politics: 
managing conflict by appealing to moral considerations. 
Political liberalism is in part a response to the criticism that the neutral conception 
of the good envisioned by Rawls is not just a neutral conception of the good: it is simply 
another conception of the good that promotes principles of association - the right - over 
any substantive conception of the good in order to achieve neutrality and fairness 
amongst competing conceptions. Instead of relying upon a neutral conception of the 
good, political liberalism offers a neutral justification of that conception of the right as a 
means of promoting a conception of the good which can include toleration, neutrality, 
etc. It is a moral conception, but it is a minimal moral conception that can command alle-
giance and provide for a degree of social stability and predictability unavailable to com-
munitarianism, without subjecting or denying some visions and pursuits of the good. 
The crucial question then is whether in constructing this moral view of political so-
ciety they have not simply posited (or simply "injected" or "snuck into" the theory) a 
"full" idea of the person that happens to accord with their theory, or whether they have 
assumed some characteristics of persons that are necessary but (at base) uncontroversial 
in order to begin political theory. Obviously, I will argue that they make the latter move: 
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political liberalism assumes some things about people, and then gets on with the job of 
politics. Only then can we ask if such a conception is intelligible. 
I can here only suggest some of the ways to resolve some of the tensions regarding 
the inter-relations of these various concepts within liberalism. To do more is beyond the 
scope of my inquiry here, which is to show why and how a liberal conception of the self 
(as opposed to a communitarian one) should command our allegiance. That is, while I 
put forth the concepts that subsume and constrain liberalism, I address these with the idea 
that they are superior to communitarian versions of them, not that they are the best 
available within political theory in general. 
Structure of the Chapter 
Because of the length and complexity of the issues and concepts involved here, I 
would like to begin by briefly reviewing the substantive issues in the argument up to this 
point. I will again suggest what I have implied before, that liberalism and communitari-
anism are compatible in some ways, and in others not. But this by itself shows that the 
two positions are not incommensurable. 
In the second section, I will examine some of the basic concepts of liberalism, and 
show how a liberalism based upon the concept of autonomy is central to political liberal-
ism as a foundation. This analysis will be continued in section three, where I show that 
while neutrality and a conception of rationality are both necessary parts of liberalism, 
they are best and most coherently understood as aims or guiding purposes of liberalism, 
not as bases or foundations. 
I will follow this in section four by noting how political liberalism incorporates this 
view of the person into a neutral justification of the kind of good that liberalism pro-
motes. I will conclude by noting how, by recognizing its own limitations, liberalism has 
pushed the argument past the current debate, and onto the question of politics. 
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A REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT, AND SOME CONCLUSIONS 
Raw}s Reconsidered 
In Chapter IT, I reviewed Rawls's theory as it has developed in response to critiques 
both from within and without. I noted the development of the model-conceptions in JAF, 
and how those amended model-conceptions have allowed JAF to withstand some 
criticisms. (We have only been concerned with the criticisms of those theorists loosely 
labeled as communitarians, and even then only with two theorists and their theories cum 
critiques.) Given the account of the person that Rawls proposed in Theory, he had a 
choice of two directions in which to move his theory. One alternative was towards a 
"tougher-minded application of the individualist method,"2 which would have continued 
a line of thought that emphasized the rational choice and maximin elements in Theory. 
This alternative would have committed him to developing a highly-laden normative 
theory based upon rational choice in order to justify any fuller conception of the 
individual- a "more thickly constituted self'- than rational choice has been account for 
to date. Further, it would have necessitated the development of the model-conception of 
the OP and its accompanying model-conceptions, and the account of rationality that 
parties would choose principles of justice under the veil of ignorance, i.e., the rational 
pursuit of individual interests. 
I say "would have committed him" because it is obvious that Rawls did not move in 
that direction. Instead, he developed a different aspect of his theory that allowed him to 
place persons within a socio-historical context, a context from which to choose those 
principles and those goals and life-plans that would be important to them, i.e., those for-
mations of comprehensive ideals that would make life satisfying to a person for highly 
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individual reasons. This allowed Rawls to account for a "fuller" conception of the indi-
vidual person that could be considered apart from politics. Individual and group or 
community conceptions of the good are then still available, but what subsumes a society 
are those political principles (democracy, the rule of law, the acknowledgment of insti-
tutions that guide political and social change and development but respond to constituent 
pressures, etc.) grounded in rationality, a tradition or heritage of political thought, and 
common belief, not individual or comprehensive moral ideals. In a sense, the second of 
two intuitive arguments that Rawls suggested early in Theory have become more impor-
tant in understanding and accepting political principles of justice: if a principle accounts 
for our considered moral judgments about what is just or unjust, then this is a good reason 
for accepting that principle. That is, political liberalism, as it has developed from JAF, is 
promoted by individuals because they can rely upon others to accept the principles as rea-
sonable; such support would generate support and thus create stability; and it would be-
come a basis for equal (or mutual) respect in a political system.3 
Some have claimed that in this move towards a more "communitarian" approach 
Rawls has made some significant concessions to the communitarians. This is not to say 
that his theory has become communitarian, or is any more appealing to communitarians. 
It would be more accurate to say that the developments in JAF have allowed it to 
accommodate those communitarian claims that render the idea of the person more 
coherent and consistent. 
Sandel Reconsidered 
In Chapter III, I surveyed and analyzed Sandel's critique of Rawls, and showed 
where Sandel's critique was justified, and where it was not. Additionally, I pointed out 
some of the model-conceptions that have developed in JAF to push it towards a more 
"communitarian" justification. Many of these changes in JAF were due either to 
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criticisms from the left (other liberals who either endorsed Rawls's view but wished to 
somehow make it stronger)~ or from the right (the communitarian criticisms that I now 
address). But it is important to note that on a fundamental level (the social embeddedness 
thesis), Rawls and Sandel are in agreement: persons can derive choices from their social 
context, and their social context sets the limits of available pursuits of the good that are 
feasible and intelligible to the individual. Again, liberals hardly deny the applicability or 
"truthfulness" of the social embeddedness thesis. 
Rawls's response to Sandel's critique has been a kind of implicit acknowledgment 
of that "shared spirit." But I also made the argument that Sandel has a two-pronged ar-
gument against the liberal conception of the person which, like other communitarian criti-
cisms, relies upon a conflation of descriptive, normative, and ethical claims. The first 
prong of Sandel's argument claimed that Rawls's conception of the person was, like 
Kant's, "contentless" because it had only an "empirically unconditioned sense of duty" to 
the social world; that is, the only thing that kept people from being less than human was 
Kant's distinction between the "noumenal" and the "phenomenal" worlds, and the duty 
that people have to be rational, or human. The Kantian view insisted upon that concept 
of rightness as prior to and controlling of any conception of the good; hence the Kantian 
categorical imperative and Rawls's formulation of it in the phrase "the right prior to the 
good." This view has obviously been altered by Rawls. As Larmore notes, 
It is not necessary that we see this separation of the person from his 
conception of the good as itself representing an ideal of the person, a self 
prior to the ends that it chooses. That is the Kantian interpretation of the 
original position. But the modus vivendi view of justice offers a different 
and more economical rationale.4 
Rawls's response noted that we need not rely only upon the idea of rationally au-
tonomous persons in the (unjustifiable) sense that Kant understood persons. That is, in 
1980 (only slightly before Sandel's critique came out in 1982) and certainly immediately 
after in Rawls's "Dewey Lectures," we see a shift in thought from an expressivist view-
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one that relies upon or is justified by this Kantian interpretation of persons - towards an 
emphasis of the modus vivendi view, one that is premised upon pluralism and the need to 
incorporate a strong but base-level neutrality. While this strain of Kantianism still retains 
a hold on Rawls's thought- "the desire to express our nature as a free and equal rational 
being can be fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right and justice as having first 
priority"5- still the project of grounding JAF in socio-historical circumstance and relying 
upon neutral political principles are indications of Rawls's desire and need to account for 
the social embeddedness thesis. Why political liberalism needs a conception of neutrality 
I shall discuss below. For now, we need to note that this shift has taken place, one that 
responds to and answers the communitarian criticism of "contentless" persons. 
The second prong of Sandel's argument was that viewing the self as prior to its ends 
"ignores the phenomena of character and of the intersubjective constitution of the self."6 
That is, liberalism ignores the kinds of attachments to a vision of the good life that we 
make in our lives that we simultaneously share with others. But again, this criticism has 
been answered by Rawls. It is essentially a distinction between people as members of a 
group and members of the state. Citizens "do not view themselves as inevitably tied to 
the pursuit of the particular conception of the good and its final ends which they espouse 
at any given time."7 To Larmore (and I think in his interpretation of Rawls here he is 
correct), this does not mean that 
... our highest personal ideal must be to conceive of ourselves as prior to 
our ends, without any constitutive attachment to a conception of the good. 
It means, instead, that the political system treats persons as not necessarily 
tied to any particular conception of the good, that is, apart from status and 
ascription .... Outside the political realm, however, things may be 
different. 8 
Sandel then ignored a significant change in JAF, a change that has placed his cri-
tique in doubt: Rawls's recognition of embeddedness, and the adoption of a less expres-
sivist justification of JAF, one that relied more upon a modus vivendi view of moral and 
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political conflict, answers many of Sandel's (and Macintyre's) objection regarding lib-
eralism's lack of embeddedness, e.g., incoherence and incompleteness. Again, we should 
remember that this view was implicit in Theory and the writings immediately following; 
it was not until the Dewey Lectures, that is after Sandel's critique was published, that 
Rawls emphasized this aspect of JAF. But we must take care to note that this is the view 
that has commanded Rawls's, and arguably liberalism's, attention since then. It is for 
these reasons that Kymlicka notes "both [Sandel and Rawls] accept that the person is 
prior to her ends. They disagree over where, within the person, to draw the boundaries of 
the 'self .... "9 
Macintyre Reconsidered 
My critique of Macintyre in Chapter IV, as compared to that of Sandel, was 
primarily negative: I noted places where Macintyre's theory cum critique either 
misrepresented liberalism, or where he could be viewed as a liberal himself. I 
approached Macintyre's critique by noting first how he understands Aristotelian practical 
rationality to take place in an ideal setting, and then examined how he understands mod-
ern liberal practical rationality. I noted some conceptual discrepancies in Macintyre's 
analysis cum critique, and gave liberals good reasons to question, if not reject, 
Macintyre's prescription. 
I then moved to an examination of how Macintyre understands the person-society 
through that set of common assumptions, the social embeddedness thesis. There I 
reached the conclusion that Macintyre, like Sandel, understands this relation ambigu-
ously: persons in his theory are at times partially embedded, at other times fully so. This 
embeddedness is important to Macintyre because he wants to make a very close tie be-
tween rationality and morality. But this tie, he claims, can only be understood through an 
examination of socio-historical practices, like the re-telling of a tale that has become 
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mythic in a culture: it is understood by all that share that culture, but might be unintelli-
gible to others from without. I argued there for the point that we should not accept 
Macintyre's criticisms because he misunderstands the complexity of liberal thought and 
rationality, and what this has to do with morality in the modem world; that is, despite 
Macintyre's critique of liberalism, he too is a liberal. 
This is clear in one of Macintyre's crucial phrases, "the good life for man is the life 
spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are 
those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man 
is."10 It displays Macintyre's deep-seated yet disguised commitment to plurality and 
autonomy: that people must be allowed to pursue the good life as they know it to be, and 
that political society must provide (but not necessarily promote) the conditions for that 
kind of autonomy. That is, the commitment to goods, goodness, and rationality commits 
Macintyre to embrace liberal and individualistic principles, a move he does not wish to 
make: Macintyre's dilemma is that he wishes to accord persons freedom, yet does not 
wish to accord persons that freedom under conditions derived through consequentialist 
moral reasoning, the only alternative he is capable of seeing. The desire for a socially-
oriented view of intelligibility is over-riding in Macintyre's view, and that obscures his 
recognition of the value of change and development - self-determination and liberty - in 
social and individual lives. That is, "Macintyre's argument is epistemological founda-
tionalism carried over to the realm of morality."ll 
What I mean to say is that the communitarian critique is not "all wrong," as some 
liberal defenders have suggested. There are some points of consensus, and there are cer-
tainly some places where the two sides are agreed about some things. (They have been 
referred to as "rival hermeneuticists" in some aspects.)12 How then are we to distinguish 
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between these claims, especially when we consider the question of the construction of 
persons in political society? 
I do not intend to evaluate the debate in terms of which side has "won," or "scored 
the most punches," so to speak.13 I have already noted where two representative commu-
nitarian theories have not succeeded in their critiques of liberalism: either through 
Rawls's concessions that had been implied in the theory and emphasized later, or by ana-
lyzing the way the rival theories view the social context for the individual. Rather, I wish 
to go beyond that question, a question that I think is now largely decided. The question 
before us now is how does political liberalism understand itself, given that there are some 
things we are agreed upon about persons? 
FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF POLffiCAL LffiERALISM 
In this section and the next, I will examine the commitment to several ideas that are 
used to justify liberalism: equality, neutrality and freedom, and freedom's constitutive 
ideas of autonomy, liberty, and self-determination.14 But we must frrst ask what kind of 
individual must be presupposed in political theory, and specifically political liberalism. 
By this I do not mean the specific characteristics of the person (those will be discussed 
shortly), but rather what can be assumed in order to begin. 
Conceptions and Persons 
Political liberalism does not rely upon what Steven Lukes has termed an "abstract" 
individual: simply a way of conceiving the individual that is not morally neutral. It is 
more than simply "the relevant features of individuals determining the ends which social 
arrangements are held ... to fulfill .. .independently of social context." It is more than the 
idea of persons "having certain sorts of wants and purposes, as acting on certain sorts of 
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motives, as having certain interests." Political liberalism must demand more of persons 
than that.15 
However, liberalism cannot demand too much. Certainly, individuals in modem 
liberal democracies view the state as resting upon the inter-dependent ideas of consent, 
representation, and the protection of interests, amongst others; the state responds in a 
(somewhat) reciprocal fashion. Yet certainly there is some place "in between" these ex-
tremes, some conceptual space that persons can be placed in political society, and be 
more than interest maximizers relying upon institutional limitations to power and the 
"goodness" of other men? 
Steven Lukes and Susan Mendus, each in their own way, have suggested just such a 
space.l6 To Lukes, such a person would be 
... the source of (yet to be discovered) intentions and purposes, decisions 
and choices, as capable of engaging in and valuing certain (yet to be 
discovered) activities and involvements, and as capable of (yet to be dis-
covered) forms of self-development. 
It is essentially a view of the person as 
... a human being having certain capacities [as opposed to psychological 
features which determine his behaviour], the degree and form of whose 
realization is left open for investigation. I? 
So seeing persons as persons in political society requires more than simply attribut-
ing to them certain fixed psychological states or universal attributes, e.g., as self-interest 
maximizers (which is not clearly of itself), as bearers of particular roles, or as only means 
to an end. We recognize people as individuals when we recognize that we must not view 
them abstractly - merely as concepts within a theory - but when we recognize that we 
must abstract from a socially given context that defines persons. IS That is, we must ac-
knowledge that there is a social background against which to view people, but that people 
must be seen at the same time as close to yet removed from that social background. 
(Mendus describes the condition as that of "distance yet proximity" to society.)19 What 
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then are the attributes or characteristics of "the person" in political liberalism? What 
must such a person "look like" in order to be more than merely a political conception? 
Di~nity and EQuality 
A vital plank of liberalism is equality. Many writers, including Rawls, Larmore and 
Lukes, note that equality essentially rests upon the idea of human dignity, or equal 
respect. Human dignity has attained "the logical status of a moral ... axiom which is 
basic, ultimate and overriding, offering a general justifying principle in moral argu-
ment."20 Larmore incorporates the idea of human dignity and equality in his norm of 
equal respect; Rawls notes that at bottom equal respect in tum relies upon self respect 
which is one of the, if not the, greatest good. 21 
All persons then are deserving of respect in virtue of the fact that they are persons; 
they meet minimal standards of the person as described by others, they share attributes -
physical, mental, psychological, political and ethical - with other human beings. This is 
the distinction that Lukes wishes to draw, a distinction that I think holds. 
Liberty 
We praise someone for his particular achievements and we admire 
someone for his particular qualities or excellences; whereas we respect 
him as a human being, in virtue of characteristics which he shares with all 
other human beings. [Further,] ... it is the existence of the characteristics, 
not the degree to which they are possessed or actualized, which elicits the 
respect.22 
Liberty is a complex and complicated concept. On most liberal accounts, it consists 
of at least the following ideas: autonomy, positive and negative freedom, and self-de-
termination. We must keep in mind that we are speaking of political freedom here, not 
merely psychological, social, or physical (bodily) liberty. 
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Positive Freedom. or Autonomy. Positive freedom (or autonomy) "derives from the 
wish on the part of the individual to be his own master." Berlin's characterization is 
classic: 
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external 
forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of 
other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be 
moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by 
causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, 
not nobody; a doer- deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not 
acted upon by external nature or by other means as if I were a thing, or an 
animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving 
goals and policies of my own and realizing them .... I feel free to the de-
gree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am 
made to realize that it is not 23 
But autonomy has its dangers. To claim to be a free agent and to try to make others 
aware of their own positive liberty at the expense of their negative liberty is nothing short 
of tyranny. That use of positive freedom is really an abuse: to be avoided if possible, 
and to be guarded against at all times. 24 
There are additional restrictions to this concept. Autonomy implies that people are 
conscious when they make decisions about themselves and their society (e.g., when they 
vote), and that they reflect upon their choices. Obviously, they must have real or actual 
choices. Alternatives for self-development cannot be of the lesser-of-two-evils kind, or 
even a "Hobson's choice," i.e., no choice at all. 
Ne~atiye Freedom. or Freedom from Coercion. The distinction between positive 
and negative freedom is the familiar one from Isaiah Berlin. Negative freedom is that 
idea that answers the question: "What is the [political or social] area within which the 
subject- a person or group of persons - is or should be left to do or be what he is able to 
do or be, without interference by other persons?" Positive liberty, a notoriously difficult 
concept, answers the question: "What, or who, is the source of control or interference 
that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?"25 
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Negative freedom is basically a freedom from, specifically freedom from coercion. 
"Coercion implies a deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in 
which I could otherwise act. You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are pre-
vented from attaining a goal by human beings."26 Negative freedom then is not absolute 
in the sense that inability to perform a particular task implies a lack of freedom. And it is 
not absolute in a second sense: absolute license is not a permissible defmition of freedom 
because absolute license - to do anything one might wish - would certainly deprive oth-
ers of their equal right to negative liberty. "[L]iberty in this sense means freedom from; 
absence of interference beyond the shifting, but always recognizable, frontier."27 Again, 
we must remember that it is political liberty we are speaking of. 
Generally, theories of liberalism - and political liberalism is no exception here -
rely upon a conception of negative liberty. But of course it is not as simple as this: ''The 
question has to be whether liberty - in any sense in which liberty is thought to be impor-
tant- is attacked or undermined whenever a rule of social conduct is enforced."28 So our 
conception of liberty must be informed by our social background for at least three rea-
sons: it accords with our historically-derived idea that liberty is not an absolute concept 
(it has its limitations, e.g., liberty is not license); it allows people sufficient room politi-
cally to be self-determinant (discussed next); and it accords with our ideas of minimal 
political neutrality. 
Self-Determination. Self-determination is that idea that if men are to be free, then 
they must be the authors of their own laws. A person "must himself create or prescribe 
the law to which he is obedient. (The agent must be independent both of the coercive ac-
tion and of the will of others.)"29 This does create some tension, as Norman Jacobson 
points out, in what we call "the human condition": as creature and creator, we experience 
friction between what we are and what we make. 30 
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But we must be careful not to confuse or conflate autonomy with common miscon-
ceptions of self-determination; we cannot make the concepts identical. Mendus lists three 
common errors. First, autonomy cannot be merely self-determination because such self-
determination can, like the conception of positive liberty, quickly tum into repression un-
der the guise of "guiding one's fellows towards freedom." Secondly, autonomy cannot 
be the mere satisfaction of desires or the presence of self-mastery over one's desires; 
mere satisfaction is not full enough to account for political liberty. Self-mastery could 
even be inconsistent, as in conflicting psychological states: I may not always know what 
I want since sometimes I may want to be a victim which is, of course, not rational as I am 
not then the master of my desires. Finally, self-determination cannot be considered 
without any reference to rationality; without it there is no standard or rationale according 
to which we may judge rational behavior.31 Self-determination is most simply the idea 
that" .. .I should as far as possible determine and control the course of my life, ... and that 
I should have the opportunity to bring to fruition certain characteristic human 
excellences. "32 
Political liberalism then has a concept of the person that is not merely an abstrac-
tion. It is a conception of the person that is based upon the "dignity of persons," or the 
basis of equality. This equality is not of the kind that demands that goods be distributed 
equally in order to treat people equally. Rather, it is the idea that because human beings 
are capable of attaining those characteristics, and because they are characteristics that are 
at base mutually agreeable and desirable, and because those characteristics help people to 
attain those goals in their lives (whatever they may be, although not all visions of the 
good are allowable), we accord these characteristics to persons, and equally so. We 
accord them respect on the grounds that they can choose and act autonomously, that they 
require a certain amount of space (privacy) in which to pursue goods, and that they are 
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capable of self-development Respect then entails treating persons as though they are 
capable of attaining and acting upon this conception of liberty. The denial of any of these 
kinds of freedom diminishes the freedom of the person (and the conception thereof) in 
politics. 33 
AIMS AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF POLillCAL LIBERALISM 
Political liberalism is committed to the idea that "we must apply the principle of tol-
eration to the idea of philosophy itself,"34 or that "political principles are to be 'neutral' 
with respect to controversial ideas of the good." This means that "neutral principles are 
ones that we can justify without appealing to the controversial views of the good life to 
which we happen to be committed."35 What then is the role of neutrality in political lib-
eralism? And what of skepticism, a "traditional" liberal defense? Further, we must ask 
how political liberalism views rationality. 
Skepticism 
There is a "traditional" justification of liberalism that says that we cannot know 
what is true, or right or good in moral terms, and therefore we should expect the state to 
enforce or disadvantage any particular conception of the good; skepticism relies upon the 
idea that "just because ideals and answers to issues may clash does not mean that we 
should conclude that there is no reason to prefer any of them, and so no government 
should seek to institutionalize them."36 But this indifference towards particular concep-
tions of the good does not get us very far. 
We need only note two points that distinguish liberalism and skepticism to see why. 
First, skepticism suggests that there is no epistemological or moral way to judge or eval-
uate the relative worth of a particular pursuit of the good; indeed, the Benthamite apho-
rism that "pushpins is as good as poetry" applies. There is no way to distinguish between 
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the truth of various positions, says the skeptic, so the state should not rationally attach it-
self to any particular position: the state should be indifferent between visions of the good 
life. "Skepticism entails pluralism, whereas objectivism entails intolerance."37 
Clearly, the liberal does not seek the truth as an end in political philosophy, but this 
does not mean that the liberal is committed to being a skeptic. The liberal wants to avoid 
intolerance, but that does not mean that to the liberal that there is no truth nor objectivity. 
It is only to stress that truth - and its counterpart objectivity- are less important to the 
liberal than is the value of allowing people to discover that truth for themselves, or allow-
ing people to choose paths to a good by themselves. The second point then is that 
"liberalism asserts what skepticism denies- that some values are superior to others."38 
As I have shown, that value is liberty. At the heart of things, skepticism is antithetical to 
other more important liberal tenets; liberalism cannot rely upon a concept that would cre-
ate an irresoluble conflict at its foundations. 
Neutrality 
For similar reasons, we should not think that neutrality depends upon or "collapses 
into" skepticism. After all, questions of truth - the basis of skepticism - are separate and 
distinct from questions of importance and belief.39 How then does liberal neutrality op-
erate? 
What Kind of Neutrality? First, we must note the different kinds of neutrality that 
are referred to in liberalism. The first is neutrality of purpose or intent, sometimes called 
procedural, reason-based, or justificatory neutrality. It is a requirement that governments 
not aim at disbenefiting certain groups of people simply because they have a particular 
conception of the good, or that the state cannot favor one conception of the good over an-
other.40 It is ultimately a doctrine of restraint, one that historically derives from John 
Locke's Letter on Toleration: the government should not persecute other religions sim-
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ply for religious reasons because true conversion can only be obtained when arrived at 
through true inner conviction, and not through force, threats or coercion. The govern-
ment should refrain from religious persecution as it is ultimately an unreasonable act. 41 
Neutrality of aim, outcome (or consequentialist neutrality), on the other hand, is 
more pro-active, a more "modem" notion, if you will. Consequentialist neutrality holds 
that the state cannot promote one vision of the good life over another, or over any others. 
The state cannot, as a consequence of its actions, work towards disbenefiting or disad-
vantaging a particular group of peoples simply because they have been identified as a 
particular group: ''The consequences of the laws should not be such as to discriminate 
against a particular group."42 More than a doctrine of state restraint, it is a doctrine that 
licenses limited state promotion of equality to a certain degree, or interference onto the 
political scene in order to equalize some inequalities. 
Two things to note about neutrality of aim or outcome. First, it limits its application 
only to those conceptions of the good that meet some requirements: they cannot be harm-
ful to the state or to other people within the state, and they must meet some minimal stan-
dards, e.g., standards of rationality and normative content. Second, neutrality of aim does 
not require that all pursuits of the good be equally promoted, or that all succeed. 
Neutrality of aim at its simplest says that "all should be able to enter the race; but this 
does not guarantee that all will win or even finish." At base, consequentialist neutrality is 
a claim quite similar to equality of opportunity. 
Political liberalism relies primarily upon a neutrality of aim or procedure 
Gustificatory neutrality).43 One reason is Rawls's strong commitments to liberties and 
primary goods. If Rawls were to affrrm a neutrality of aim or outcome, it would not al-
low sufficient "room" in his theory to accommodate pluralism and primary goods that are 
so important to his conception of persons. By allowing only certain kinds of goods nec-
essary to various visions of the good life, consequentialist neutrality would necessarily 
exclude a number of pursuits of the good that political liberalism could otherwise in-
clude.44 
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Differences in Political Liberalism on the Role of Neutrality. We should note that 
there are differences in the way justificatory neutrality is formulated by Rawls and 
Larmore. Referring to what neutrality does rather than how it operates, Larmore says that 
"political neutrality consists in a constraint on what factors can be involved to justify a 
political decision. Such decisions can count as neutral only [that decision] can be justi-
fied without appealing to the presumed intrinsic superiority of any particular conception 
of the good life."45 Further, political liberalism must rely upon a particular form of 
neutrality that splits the difference between those justifications that rely on comprehen-
sive moral or individualist ideals, and those that consign themselves to a mere Hobbesian 
modus vivendi. 46 
The differences are these: whereas Larmore emphasizes the procedural aspects of 
neutrality in political liberalism in order to maintain a neutral attitude towards various 
conceptions of morality, Rawls emphasizes the importance of normative-laden ideas of 
the good that can fulfill a person's conception of justice, yet leaves the comprehensive 
identity (the normative laden ideals) of that person "alone," so to speak. Political liberal-
ism refers only to what is required of people in a political sense, and it justifies this by 
relying upon a way of neutrally approaching moral conflict. (This is Rawls's method of 
avoidance, or Larmore's neutral dialogue.) To recall, Rawls distinguishes between pro-
cedural neutrality and neutrality of aim, but reminds us that we should not confuse this 
with consequentialist neutrality.47 So we should not confuse neutrality with equal oppor-
tunity, nor with the idea that all forms of life be represented in political life. 
Instead, Rawls carefully weaves together something like a combination of the two 
kinds of neutrality: ''The state is not to do anything intended to favor or promote any 
particular comprehensive doctrine rather than another, or to give greater assistance to 
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those who pursue it. ... "48 To make the point clearly: justificatory neutrality is not a jus-
tification of liberalism; it is a liberal good - a normative statement of right - that is a rea-
sonable and persuasive one. But it is an aim that allows Rawls (and Larmore, to an ex-
tent) to incorporate the idea of dignity of persons and its assumptions regarding equality 
to operate as a basis of liberalism. 
Some Problems with Neutrality. This disagreement over the scope of neutrality 
does not mean that neutrality should be abandoned as a basic liberal tenet. Indeed, it only 
highlights the liberal dilemma: "the need for neutrality is created by the fact of diversity 
[plurality], yet the application of neutrality is possible only on the assumption that di-
versity is underpinned by unity - at least about the propriety of the neutrality principle it-
self."49 As Charles Larmore has noted, "these classical liberal arguments for neutrality 
will convince, therefore, only those who believe some things about the nature of human 
flourishing that others will not accept, and for reasons that are not without any merit"50 
How then do we reconcile the need to justify liberalism, and yet retain the values of au-
tonomy and neutrality? 
Neutrality as an Aim. One answer is that liberalism is ultimately justified not by 
neutrality, but by autonomy. That is to say, neutrality might perhaps best be thought of 
not as a justification of liberalism, but as a guiding purpose, an "end result." Neutrality 
could then be viewed 
... as a practical aim of the liberal society - as answering questions about 
what liberals are for, rather than asking why they are for it. ... 
Instead of dismissing neutrality as an ambiguous and inadequately sup-
ported philosophical foundation, we should instead construe it as a guiding 
principle. 51 
This idea of neutrality as a guiding principle has been explored by Will Kymlicka. 
To Kymlicka, considering neutrality as the basis for liberalism misconstrues the claims of 
neutrality and liberalism. Neutrality and the state are not dependent upon a "viable and 
flourishing culture," nor is it dependent upon the idea of total lack of state assistance; af-
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ter all, if the state is to survive it must promote that particular idea of good- preservation 
of the state - above all others. The claims of neutrality here are not about differences in 
the claims of communitarians that present perfectionist visions of the state in opposition 
to liberally neutral state theories; the disagreement here is about the role of the state as 
opposed to the role of society. The claims are thus about social as opposed to state per-
fectionism. Liberals, it must be remembered, are wary of the state and wish to establish 
limits to state action, not promote state action and assessment of visions of the good. 
"What the liberal denies is that I should have to give ... an account of myself to the 
state."52 This is what is meant by using neutrality as an aim of liberalism, as opposed to 
using neutrality as a justification. This preserves a primary aim of liberal neutrality: that 
it "does not deny these shared social requirements of individual autonomy but, rather, 
provides an interpretation of them."53 
So neutrality cannot mean that liberalism is neutral with respect to morality. Again, 
"the point is rather that it claims to be neutral with respect to controversial views of the 
good life .... A more promising account [of neutrality] is that neutral principles are ones 
that we can justify without appealing to controversial views of the good life to which we 
happen to be committed."54 Being committed to pluralism, liberalism accepts the condi-
tions of plurality, which of necessity is not equally kind to all forms of life. But it does 
not accept that we base that acceptance of pluralism on individual or comprehensive con-
ceptions of the good life and political morality. 
We must find some other basis for political association if we are committed to plu-
ralism; hence Rawls's idea of an overlapping consensus and Larmore's idea of neutral or 
rational dialogue based upon common ground. Liberalism on this face ultimately relies 
upon the concept of liberty: that it is better for people to pursue their own way of life 
than for them to have a way of life thrust upon them. Liberalism ultimately relies upon a 
normative-laden concept of liberty (in Rawls's, Larmore's, and Mendus's nomenclature 
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this is autonomy) in order to justify the entailment of a "full" concept of the person, a co-
herent account of ethics, and the relation of persons to political institutions. 
Rationality 
We can now return to a topic that figured centrally in my critique of Macintyre: ra-
tionality. How does liberalism view rationality? If neutrality is an aim of liberalism, and 
if freedom (autonomy) best justifies liberalism, then what part does rationality play? 
What epistemological assumptions are made by liberalism in order to account for 
persons, but not posit them with a fully-formed idea of "what it is to be a human being"? 
Assumptions About Rationality. Liberalism assumes first that rationality means 
"being self-determined, where self-determination is a function of reasons, not of de-
sires .... Autonomy does not consist simply in doing what one wants: it consists in acting 
rationally, and we need a background against which to decide what counts as rational be-
haviour."55 We can dismiss the idea that liberalism and liberal people rely upon conse-
quentialist practical reasoning, or simple self-interest maximizers. Lukes would refer to 
this as economic individualism. 56 My critique of Macintyre demonstrated that there is 
more to modernity that simply accounting for one's interests. 
However, another assumption is that society must be comprehensible or transparent: 
"Intelligible justifications in social and political life must be available in principle for ev-
eryone, for society is to be understood by the human mind, not by the tradition or sense of 
a community."57 So there is a liberal need for social intelligibility; but liberalism "need 
not insist that everything shall be totally explicable."58 This accords with Rawls's ideas 
of the constraints upon the concept of right (in particular, the idea of a public conception 
of rules), and the way those constraints operate in JAF under the historical and social 
conditions of modem democratic societies, and the five facts of political sociology.59 It 
more importantly recalls Rawls's distinction between the reasonable and the rational. 
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One way to view this is suggested by Thomas Nagel. First, we must remember the 
distinction between justification and persuasion. Justification is a normative concept, i.e., 
one that implies a standard or rationale against which to evaluate things; persuasion is the 
art of rhetoric, or "winning the debate" regardless of reasons. So "arguments that justify 
may fail to persuade, if addressed to an unreasonable audience; and arguments that per-
suade may fail to justify."60 (The distinction is obviously between persons and the 
beliefs they hold as well as the reasons they hold those beliefs.) 
Secondly, the principles of justice are right because they are accepted; they are not 
accepted because they are independently morally right. Principles of justice meet a 
condition of minimal rationality: given a certain common moral motivation in addition to 
their more personal, private, and communal ends, the standard of rationality in politics is 
not what principles or institutions people will actually accept, but what would be 
reasonable for them to accept. This is a lower threshold for the presumption of rational-
ity; it is lower than theories that rely upon commonality (e.g., communitarianism) and 
convergence (e.g., absolute sovereignty) as a basis for justification and intelligibility, and 
certainly lower than comprehensive theories of morality (e.g., religion). "What is reason-
able to accept" is to be able to accept less than "the most reasonable option."61 It is a ba-
sis that all are capable of accepting, not a basis that will necessarily persuade all that it is 
acceptable. 
Nagel calls this public justification. Rawls, after Kant, calls this (or something very 
close to it) free public reason.62 It requires at least two things: 
[A] disagreement which falls on objective common ground must [first] 
be open-ended in the possibility of its investigation and pursuit, and 
[second] not come down finally to a bare confrontation between incompat-
ible points of view. I suggest that conflicts of religious faith fail this test, 
and most empirical and many moral disagreements do not. 63 
A minimum moral conception of rationality is needed in order to attain moral con-
sensus as well as a minimum political conception of justice. Rationality then plays a key 
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part in allowing some things such as civil rights, civil liberties, reasonable expectations of 
predictability in government actions, etc., to be considered essential to people in the polit-
ical arena, while other things such as personal faith and belief systems are not. They are 
not essential because there is no way that such faith- or morally-based reasons could at-
tain anything like consensus or command authority: lack of compatibility and intelligi-
bility preclude this. Such arguments would fail to persuade, but more importantly they 
would fail to be arguments based upon reason. 
What I want to say is that rationality occupies a similar place in the rationality-hu-
man nature question regarding the political conception of the person as does neutrality in 
the neutrality-autonomy relation. As neutrality is an aim in the state-to-person relation, 
rationality is an aim of persons in political liberalism; it is a constraint upon the actions 
they can take and justify. This conception of rationality does not rely upon the substance 
of those beliefs; i.e., it need not be normatively-laden, although some conceptions of ra-
tionality will inevitably be tied to goods and goodness. It does not make a conception of 
rationality dependent or determinant upon a conception of the good; it makes it 
contingent. Liberalism is of course only one conception of the good amongst many. But 
it is the manner in which that good is justified that liberalism draws its strength, and 
allows people their comprehensive conceptions of the good to flourish, without resorting 
to exclusionary definitions of persons and groups that communitarianism does rely upon. 
The assumptions of autonomy as a basis for liberalism and the way that liberalism 
views individuals are first, that human beings are capable of fanning a concept of ratio-
nality or a way of viewing life plans in order to make decisions about things that directly 
influence either them or their primary social goods. Secondly, individuals are capable of 
acting upon and revising a conception of rationality based in large part on the idea of (the 
concept of) rationality itself. Finally, this concept of rationality is agreeable because it is 
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mutually acceptable. This is a more full conception of the person-rationality link than is 
commonly thought to hold in liberalism, but it is one that Rawls explicitly embraces. 64 
AIMS AND NORMS OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
The Norms of Political Liberalism 
Political liberalism incorporates these minimal moral conceptions of persons and 
neutrality by referring to two basic, constitutive ideas, or norms. Charles Larmore has 
clearly expressed these norms as equal respect and rational dialogue. 
Egpal Respect. 65 This is the idea that people should be accorded equal respect and 
treatment not simply because they are "endowed with inalienable rights"; it is also more 
than the Kantian maxim to treat people "never as a means only but also as ends in them-
selves." The idea is rather that we treat people with equal respect because we recognize 
that people are capable of acting "on the basis of reasons" (they provide us with explana-
tions as to the motivation and purpose for action), and because nobody who can offer a 
good reason for action can offer a good reason for the application of force to coerce an-
other person into doing something they do not want to do. So we can distinguish between 
"political principles with which we believe people can be legitimately forced to comply," 
and those that are simply the exercise of force for coercion's sake.66 Conversely, equal 
respect holds that we must treat people with respect because they are beings capable of 
reason: "To respect another person as an end is to insist that coercive or political princi-
ples be as justifiable to that person as they are to us. Equal respect involves treating all 
persons, to which such principles apply, in this way."67 
Rational Dialo~ue. The second norm is called "rational dialogue." It assumes that 
conflict is part of- one of the prices of, if you will - the fact of plurality and that gov-
ernmental policies allow the existence of multiple yet disparate conceptions of the good 
to co-exist (pluralism). When issues arise that involve clashes between such disparate 
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conceptions of the good, rational dialogue recommends that people should retreat to some 
sort of neutral ground, i.e., the beliefs that they do share or might find in common, "in or-
der either to (a) resolve the disagreement and vindicate one of the disputed positions by 
means of arguments which proceed from this common ground, or (b) bypass the dis-
agreement and seek a solution of the problem on the basis simply of this common 
ground."68 
EQual Respect and Rational Dialo~ue: "Continuin~ the Conversation." Now a 
quick objection to this - a common communitarian objection -can be readily foreseen 
and forestalled: what if retreating to that neutral ground means temporarily denying 
one's beliefs that must be held in order to be a member of a particular group or commu-
nity? Questions of intelligibility aside, we must then refer to rationality and those things 
we do share: a commitment to pluralism, and freedom and all that it entails. We 
therefore need not respect the ideas and beliefs that people hold in the same way that we 
respect the people as people who hold those beliefs. 
So we need not accord the ideas that people hold the same kind and degree of re-
spect that we accord to people. Rational dialogue is a way to agree upon those ideas that 
are worthy of respect and contribute to rational dialogue in order to continue talking and 
associating with one another without resorting to force. There is then an important differ-
ence between respecting one's opponent and respecting the ideas they hold and use. 
''Tolerance of others who hold what one takes to be false ideas is one thing; tolerance of 
the ideas themselves is quite another."69 As Jean Hampton notes, even as confirmed a 
rationalist as Socrates would only have adopted the former definition.70 
One way to "continue the conversation" on matters vital to politics is then to avoid 
those areas about which we can have no reasoned agreement (or unreasonable 
disagreement). This should not be taken to mean that people will simply "agree to 
disagree": it is more than Pascal's dictum that "I may disagree with what you say but 
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will defend to the death your right to say it." Obviously in such a situation, the con-
versants have arrived at a point in the conversation where conclusions and premises are 
either incompatible or incommensurable, and nothing productive can result from the con-
versation, i.e., there would be no useful conclusions. That is not the meaning of 
"stepping away from the conversation," or applying the idea of neutrality to philosophy 
itself. Rather, what is meant is that there are some areas of life -some concepts, some 
discussions of goods, resources, and power and access vital to all forms of life - that will 
be controversial. Given that these are necessary to all forms of life, and given that there 
will be competition of resources over them, what political liberalism offers is a way to 
continue the conversation, by removing from the agenda those moral dictas and precepts 
that govern people's lives. 
This is necessary for several reasons, as both Rawls and Larmore have noted. 
Amongst others, it is because people's conceptions of the good can at times be so full that 
they are not able to envision other forms of life as legitimately holding purchase here on 
this earth; or sometimes people's conceptions of the good are full to the point that they do 
not accept other reasons as good reasons; or even that conceptions of the good are at base 
fundamentally incompatible. Political liberalism removes these ideas from the agenda in 
order to accord the people who hold those ideas equal respect, but not judge the ideas 
they hold with any lack of respect by acceding or not acceding to their demands. 
The obligation of equal respect then is to treat others equally without regard to the 
opinions or beliefs they hold. ~ore notes that this understanding of equal respect in 
political liberalism is much like the notion of mutual respect as found in Hegel's work. 
''To have respect for a person is to view him as capable of elaborating beliefs that we 
would respect."71 The conversation can continue about those things that are necessary 
and vital to speak about and make decisions regarding political association, and it accords 
equal respect to all forms of life by not disallowing people to enter the conversation. It 
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accords equal respect by limiting the subject of conversation, so to speak, about those 
things that are important to us and by laying some ground rules for debate. It accords 
neutrality by allowing all to enter the conversation. 
An Objection To Political Liberalism: Separatin~ Persons and Ends. An objection 
to this strategy is that it divides the person from their attributes, that it denigrates the link 
between what we believe and what we do, and how those are essential to understanding 
who we are. To proceed in the way political liberalism recommends is to assume that we 
can separate people from their beliefs, something that cannot be done. The reply is that 
this fundamentally misunderstands the norm of equal respect and its basis in human 
dignity. 
Political liberalism can be understood as the view that under the rea-
sonably favorable conditions that make constitutional democracy possible, 
political institutions satisfying the principles of a liberal conception of jus-
tice realize political values and ideals that normally outweigh whatever 
other values oppose them .... 
Of course, there can be no guarantee of stability. Political good, no 
matter how important, can never in general outweigh the transcendent val-
ues-certain religious, philosophical, and moral values-that may possi-
bly come into conflict with it. ... 
[Political liberalism] elaborates a political conception working from 
the fundamental intuitive idea of society as a fair system of coopera-
tion .... The thought is not that primary goods are fair to comprehensive 
conceptions of the good associated with such doctrines by striking a fair 
balance among them, but rather that they are fair to free and equal citizens 
as persons affirming such conceptions. 72 
This accords with (and perhaps even instigated) Rawls's changed view of the scope 
or breadth of justice as fairness, and the roles that comprehensive and political 
conceptions play within an individual's view of life: 
We now assume citizens hold two distinct views; or perhaps better, we 
assume their overall view has two parts. One part can be seen to be, or to 
coincide with, a political conception of justice; the other part is a (fully or 
partially) comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception is in 
some manner related. 73 
(I find it somewhat puzzling that this "new" interpretation of persons would either: ( 1) 
have to be formally acknowledge or announced by Rawls at this point in the development 
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of the theory (it would seem to have been implied as early as 1985); or (2) that it would 
not have been explicitly noted before, either by Rawls or other theorists. Be that as it 
may, the distinction now holds.) 
Moral and Personal Ideals: Kantian Ideals? 
What consequences has this conception of the role of neutrality as an aim of liberal-
ism for liberalism's foundation in autonomy? First, we must recall the source of Rawls's 
idea of autonomy. It is, of course, Kantian but not necessarily from Kant; there are points 
of disagreement between Kant and Rawls, places where Rawls must necessarily disagree 
with Kant's view of persons and the world (Kant's metaphysical view).74 (These 
differences are basically that Rawls does not endorse Kant's use of a phenomenal self that 
is known through reason; rather, persons have a conception of reason that informs their 
place as persons in political society.) Significantly, one area of agreement between 
Rawls and Kant- a part of Kant's theory that Rawls adopts- is the categorical 
imperative: roughly, that one should never treat people as a means only, but always as 
ends in themselves. Kant believed (and we can see that Rawls and Larmore agree with 
Kant) that the personal idea of autonomy should form an indispensable part of political 
liberalism. Kant's idea of personal autonomy was supported by two beliefs, only the first 
of which is necessary for the contemporary theory of political liberalism that Rawls and 
Larmore endorse. 
1. The scope of moral obligations is categorical, binding upon us 
whatever our empirically conditioned interests or desires. 
2. The empirically unconditioned scope or morality implies that we 
must have an empirically unconditioned motivational basis for heeding its 
demands.75 
Larmore gives us good reasons to accept only the first (in qualified form) and not 
the second belief supporting the idea of autonomy. But he also notes that Kant ignored, 
for the most part, the idea of a person's embeddedness within a c~lture: that "we cannot 
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come to know or believe what we morally ought to do, apart from a history of training 
and socialization."76 It is because Rawls and Larmore wish to account for social 
embeddedness that they can properly eschew the second belief, yet hold onto the first as 
formative in the conception of persons. 
Complex and Conflictin~ Moral Claims.77 What kind of training does Larmore 
mean? It is the kind of moral training that most everyone grows up with and learns to 
recognize, but do not necessarily learn to clearly distinguish. Larmore notes three distinct 
and separate principles that are often found when we consider moral conflicts. These are 
the conflicting claims of the principles of partiality, consequentialism, and deontology. 
Deontology we have already seen. It requires that we treat people in certain ways 
regardless of circumstances, that we never do things to people even if acting in that way 
will do "more good" or "less evil." Partiality refers to those relations we hold empirically 
with other people, or with regard to (in virtue of) some special relation: family, friends 
and legal relations are examples here. Consequentialism (in its simplest form) requires 
that our actions do the most good or the least evil in any situation; similar to the idea in 
some theories that view people as utility-driven beings or rational self-interest 
maximizers, consequentialism holds that our morals should as a sum total produce the 
greatest "amount" of good, or conversely the least "amount" of evil. 
Now these general principles or ways of viewing moral judgments and decisions are 
often in conflict. But there are some priority rules. Deontological principles are the base 
level: we must never go below this level of ethics, for to do so would be to deny liberty 
and equality to others. So in situations where deontological and partiality-oriented moral 
judgments would conflict, we must side with deontology: there are simply some ways 
that we treat people regardless of circumstances. It is the dilemma that Antigone faced 
and resolved: there are simply some ways that we treat humans regardless of commands 
and state allegiances. 
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Conflicts between consequential and partiality-oriented judgments are a little more 
difficult, though. Here we can note that consequentialism requires more of us than any 
relation that simply happens to hold; it is a more flexible doctrine, but one that still 
demands a great deal. The preference for consequentialism over partiality is not meant to 
disparage those relations. It is rather intended to point out the burdens of partial 
relationships when considering questions of justice. It is a dilemma of the sort that 
Sartre's fictional younger son could not resolve: to join the resistance, or stay with and 
protect his mother. 
But conflicts between deontology and consequentialism are of a different sort: they 
are not fundamentally ambiguous, but their outcomes can be uncertain. Certainly, some 
situations will be clear; but others will not. Even distinctions such as duty or conviction 
on the one hand, and responsibility on the other might not help; neither might distinctions 
between agent-relative and agent-neutral responsibilities. (Larmore's example is that if 
you do not kill one person, an extortioner will kill ten.) 78 In these kinds of cases, we 
must suspend judgment until a decision can be reached by following the constraints of 
these moral principles. 
Like Steven Lukes, Larmore does not claim that following these principles will 
make moral decisions and judgments any more palatable, nor can these principles 
themselves be backed up by a lower-level, more fundamental appeal to an objective 
rationale: ''These fundamental moral commitments do not admit ... of any justification at 
all. Nor are they 'absolute presuppositions,' except in the sense that we cannot 
understand what it would be to be moral agents and not to hold them fast. They set the 
limits of moral intelligibility ."79 What is important here is that political liberalism is able 
to account for these moral principles, and is able to render these principles coherent and 
applicable to our understanding of persons in a moral and political world. But even 
though persons (and the state) in political liberalism are "bound" by the limits of 
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neutrality and rationality, this does not render these moral principles powerless. Political 
liberalism is a way to conceptualize the individual in order to preserve those moral and 
ideas and notions about people that are essential for our political understanding of 
ourselves and our account of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have shown how the liberal and communitarian positions are 
similar in some ways and different in others with regard to a political conception of the 
person. Further though, by examining the tenets of liberalism and discovering the aims 
of liberalism, I have demonstrated that political liberalism has a fuller conception of the 
person than Rawls had originally proposed in Theory, a conception makes sense of our 
political and moral conception of persons. This conception renders the way we view 
people in politics and the way we must view them coherent and sufficient, even if not 
always and at all times consistent. Political liberalism views persons as autonomous 
beings capable of decisions, yet constrained by conditions of the physical, political, and 
ethical world. so 
I have shown how the person as conceived in political liberalism is able to refute 
communitarian claims of incoherency by showing how liberals do understand the person: 
how the constitutive concepts of liberty and equal respect make up the person in political 
liberalism. I have also shown how persons so conceived refute the other claim of 
insufficiency by showing how and why such implicit concepts make sense when we do 
consider persons in politics: we refer to moral disputes, not epistemological ones, and 
that political liberalism accounts for those ways we view moral conflict by incorporating 
those conflicting moral principles into the very idea of neutrality. 
In the conclusion, I will point to some differences between the two primary 
champions of political liberalism that I have discussed here, Rawls and Larmore, and 
show which reading of the theory, given its aims and desires, is more acceptable and 
tenable. I will conclude by again noting why a political conception of persons is 
important in politics. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
To be sure there is justification; but justification must come to an end. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 
We have seen that the theory of political liberalism has been a response by theorists 
concerned with the manner in which our moral theories and precepts are accounted for in 
our political and social structure. Additionally, political liberalism has responded to these 
concerns expressed as criticisms both from theorists within the liberal tradition, and from 
theorists outside that tradition, the communitarians. In these responses, though, we can 
see that political liberalism has itself responded in two different ways: by relying upon 
the idea of neutrality, or by relying upon the idea of liberty. 
How then does political liberalism resolve this fundamental dispute? While I can-
not give a full answer, I can point to a few reasons why I think (in addition to my argu-
ment in Chapter V) political liberalism must ultimately rely upon liberty and not neutral-
ity for a coherent and defensible justification. 
RAWLS OR LARMORE? LIBERTY OR NEUTRALITY? 
Rawls views social institutions as a means of protecting individuals by helping to 
ensure that they are treated fairly in society, that they are treated equally in questions of 
distributive justice. He does this by relying upon an heuristic idea (the OP) from which 
people are set on equal footing (the veil of ignorance), from which they base their deci-
sions about themselves, and from which they choose principles of justice and association. 
In so doing, Rawls relies upon the idea of liberty. It is primarily an idea of negative 
liberty, or "freedom from." But to help ensure that people as persons (as distinct from a 
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political conception of persons) can have and pursue a conception of the good life, they 
must have positive liberty, or "freedom to." Political liberalism must then remain neutral 
in certain ways with regard to people's visions of the good. That is to say, negative lib-
erty plays a part in the political conception of persons. While it assumes that persons are 
capable of positive liberty, it says little about how that liberty can be exercised except that 
it cannot be exercised in such a way as to deny others the same kind of equal liberty: 
"Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and lib-
erties, which scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all."2 
This raises the rather thorny issue of a distinction that communitarians are wont to 
make: that liberalism relies upon a false distinction between public and private, between 
citoyen and homme. That is an issue that I have addressed only peripherally in my 
discussion, at best But for our purposes, we must note that in moving from JAF to 
political liberalism, Rawls has de-emphasized the Kantian nature of persons, choosing in-
stead to emphasize the structure of J AF within democratic society, a view that relies upon 
the idea summed up in the phrase "a modus vivendi view." One way to view this is sug-
gested by Larmore: by reviewing the question of persons prior to their ends. 
Citizens ... "do not view themselves as inevitably tied to the pursuit of 
the particular conception of the good and its final ends which they espouse 
at any given time." This does not mean that our highest personal ideal 
must be to conceive of ourselves as prior to our ends without any constitu-
tive attachment to a conception of the good. It means, instead, that the po-
litical system treats persons as not necessarily tied to any particular con-
ception of the good, that is, apart from status and ascription .... Outside the 
political realm, however, things may be different. There, as Rawls notes, 
people "may have attachments and loves that they believe they would not, 
or could not, stand apart from." This is the difference between citoyen and 
homme that liberalism promotes as a sort of institutionalized myopia, and 
only the modus vivendi conception of justice makes it intelligible} 
How then, if political liberalism is more concerned with the basic structure as op-
posed to the person, can we say that it successfully accounts for the way we treat people? 
I have responded to this objection by noting the manner in which people are viewed in 
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political society: as a society that is committed in a deep sense to the idea of justice, we 
must structure and conceive of our institutions in such a way that those institutions ac-
count for the basic social unit, the person. That is, political liberalism must be based 
upon the assumption that Rawls makes: persons as beings capable of respect and there-
fore deserving of it. (I do not mean to imply that political liberalism relies upon an idea 
of methodological idealism as described by Steven Lukes.)4 Neutrality then does not 
play a part in the justification of liberalism; it is an aim, and an important one at that. But 
it is not a justification of liberalism, nor can a justification of liberalism rely solely upon 
neutrality. 
How then do we understand Larmore's insistence that political liberalism is, to a 
degree, based upon the idea of neutrality, specifically a "neutral justification of political 
neutrality"? I would respond in the same way that Charles Larmore has responded to 
James Fishkin's review of Larmore. A justification of political liberalism "is neutral in 
that the moral norm of equal respect, on which it rests, is compatible with the wide range 
of views about the good life on which reasonable people disagree." But I would not say, 
as does Larmore, that ''the two norms of rational conversation and equal respect lie at the 
same level, neither being derived from the other."5 
I have indicated reasons why we should consider the norm of equal respect as more 
fundamental than rational dialogue: because rational dialogue must assume that persons 
have an concept and a conception of rationality, and that we respect those persons with 
whom we engage in dialogue because we (1) respect them as persons in a basic sense, 
and (2) we consider that their being able to provide good reasons (if not necessarily 
persuasive ones) accords them equal respect as persons. Again, that is to say nothing of 
the ideas they hold: if we can trust Plato, then we can be sure that Socrates tolerated a 
great deal of stupidity and hard-headed opinion in his conversations with others. But that 
did not preclude Socrates from speaking with others, it did not prevent him from 
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continuing the conversation. His purpose was, to a great extent, predicated upon being 
able to continue the conversation if not only to teach, but to associate and learn as well. 
I do not mean to imply here that politics, despite prior claims to the contrary, is 
based upon the idea of a search for truth or knowledge. Certainly some will eschew 
knowledge, if not run from truth; others will (try to) embrace both. But I do mean that 
politics cannot be based upon that search for two reasons, as we can see is the case in 
Rawls's theory. 
Political liberalism is not "true" in that it is some doctrine that we should rationally 
accept, whether or not we agree with it; nor is it "true" in the sense that it is simply one 
that people in Western society would agree upon because it is a socio-historically derived 
theory. To rely upon such slight reasons would be to denigrate the place and importance 
of theory in our social structure. Rather, the rational acceptability of political liberalism 
is based upon the idea that it is not based upon those ideas of truth and knowledge privy 
only to those who have accepted some basic tenet of faith, or who have devoted their 
lives to some search for "the truth." 
To secure this agreement we try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed 
philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious, questions .... We do 
this not because these questions are unimportant or regarded with indiffer-
ence, but because we think them too important and recognize that there is 
no way to resolve them politically .... Philosophy as the search for truth 
about an independent metaphysical and moral order cannot, I believe, 
provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception of justice in 
a democratic society. 6 
BEYOND THE DEBATE OVER PERSONS 
I have presented in this thesis a defense of political liberalism through an ontologi-
cal analysis of the terms of debate by considering the conception of persons that are ar-
ticulated by the theories of political liberalism and communitarianism. I have essentially 
argued against the communitarian position not only by arguing for liberalism, but also by 
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showing how communitarianism, despite a similar basis, misunderstands the foundation 
and claims of liberalism. 
But we must remember that these theories are simply the current way of arguing; it 
is an ongoing discussion that recalls the Hegelian response to Kant's moral philosophy. 
And like that debate, there are presently no clear winners and no clear losers. But that 
way of comparing these different periods does not accurately represent the issue: to say 
"that was then and this is now" is to miss the point of the debate. We should recall that 
even during Kant's time (and especially after) liberals were themselves not agreed as to 
the meaning of the terms of debate, and were even less certain of the way that persons 
should be treated in a democratic constitutional order, let alone the question of how 
individuals are to operate in such a regime. One need only read the records of the U. S. 
constitutional convention and the ensuing ratification debates to note this truism. 
Perhaps, on a larger, more "sociological" view, the communitarians have a claim 
that can be substantiated: liberalism without an epistemology is incoherent or 
undesirable, and leaves us thoroughly confused as to who we are and what we want I 
say "perhaps" because I have demonstrated that political liberalism cannot be understood 
as an epistemological theory: to try to describe liberalism like this is to misunderstand it. 
It is fundamentally a political doctrine, one that addresses the question of how do we get 
along, given that there are some things that we must accept: plurality, moral principles, 
the notion of equal respect and the like. 
To be sure there are some things about persons and human nature that liberalism 
must assume in order to begin theorizing. We must accept these things for various 
reasons: they may be uncontroversial assumptions (we agree that they "exist" in the 
political world); we might think that these things are important in informing our political 
discourse (which does indirectly inform us as to who we are; but again, this is not a basis 
for decision making or liberal justification); or we may simply be committed to the idea 
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of living in a world where these conditions hold, given a particular history of socio-
political chaos and order. But what I have shown are two things: first that liberalism, in 
responding to the communitarian critique, offers an uncontroversial and neutral way of 
assuming these necessary minimal things about persons, and second that this conception 
is to be preferred to the communitarian conception because it does allow those as-
sumptions to be borne out in our theory, and our practice. 
This is not to say that political liberalism is "water tight"; no theory can hope for 
that. Complete consistency in any theory would certainly not be wide enough to account 
for anything controversial, and would be uncontroversial if not boring of itself. Rather, 
political liberalism is a way of dealing with those controversial aspects of social and 
political life that are a result of our historical efforts to deal with just such problems. It 
offers a way of structuring the political system around those things we know about moral 
complexity without rendering the situation too simplistic, yet accounting for those things 
we must accept about social conflict. 
I have shown that the liberal and communitarian positions are not so dissimilar with 
regard to a political conception of the person, once we have examined the respective 
claims involved. Whether the two sides in the debate could "accept" the other theories, 
or make concessions enough to provide a consensus or synthesis is another question alto-
gether; a significant point is that they are certainly not incommensurable, and are both 
well-represented in our reasoned and philosophical debate as well as our intuitive social 
understandings of the way persons and society can be understood. 
Further though, by examining the tenets of liberalism and discovering the aims of 
liberalism, I have demonstrated that political liberalism has a fuller conception of the per-
son than Rawls had originally proposed in Theory, but one that additionally makes sense 
of our political and moral conception of persons. That is, this conception renders coher-
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ent and sufficient, if not always and altogether complete and consistent, the way we view 
people in politics, and the way we wish to view them: as autonomous beings capable of 
decisions, yet constrained by conditions of the physical, political, and ethical world. 7 
However, this conception is not without costs; incompleteness and inconsistency are two 
difficult tests to pass, two heavy burdens for liberalism to bear. But as noted above, I 
think that this challenge is embodied within some of the essential tensions necessary to 
liberalism: within autonomy the tension represented by the distance yet proximity to the 
world, and in liberalism in general in the tension between autonomy and neutrality and 
between autonomy and equality. Additionally, I have shown how the political liberal can 
conceive of the self, and how it makes sense to conceive of the liberal self. 
I have thus shown several things in the course of this thesis. First, the concept of 
the person in contemporary liberal political philosophy has developed in response to crit-
icisms of communitarian theorists who have questioned the basis for that concept. As it 
has developed (a) in response to these criticisms, but also (b) from the concept of justice 
as fairness articulated by Rawls, and (c) as a return to an earlier liberal doctrine grounded 
in less substantial formulations of the concepts of autonomy, neutrality, and equal 
respect, political liberalism has been able to account for the social embeddedness thesis to 
a much greater extent than communitarians acknowledge or appreciate. 
Second, I have questioned some aspects of the communitarian theories and criti-
cisms by analyzing the way communitarianism tends to view the individual. I have fur-
ther suggested that such communitarian views are either empty at base, or are inconsistent 
in that they do not allow strong claims to be made about the nature of persons in political 
society. 
Third, I have shown that the concept of the person in a liberal society is capable of 
accounting for many of the characteristics that liberals generally want to attribute to peo-
ple, but that these concepts have only a limited scope or application. That is, the liberal 
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sense of the self is strong enough to refute claims of incoherence or emptiness, but it is 
not sufficient - nor should aspire to be so - to advance and support terribly strong or full 
conceptions of individuals. Political liberalism accounts for such a "lower-level defense" 
by resting upon the foundations of liberty; yet it retains neutrality as an aim or guiding 
purpose, not a foundation. 
Finally, I have suggested that liberalism is a theory whose limits we must continue 
to explore. A valuable part of that exploration has been undertaken by communitarians. 
Like some liberals, they have undertaken a rigorous analysis of the limits of liberalism: 
how can liberalism make sense of autonomy? of neutrality? of persons? morality? toler-
ation? The questions are valuable not only in themselves, but also- and especially- be-
cause they have been asked by both sides in the debate; the questions have shown a fun-
damental interest in continuing the debate. 
Perhaps in the end Michael Walzer is correct: the communitarian critique "is like 
the pleating of trousers: transient but certain to return."8 If we agree that that is so, as I 
think we must (for good or ill), then liberals should welcome such opportunities-if not 
for the challenge, then for the strength that liberalism can derive from the continued con-
versation. 
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